Response #1

In Rosenfeld’s “What Democracy?” the questions that we’ve come to learn as being distinctly those involved with comparative politics ( How? Why?) are applied to an institution we are familiar with—the United States Senate— revealing facets of our own system of representation that may be less democratic than previously thought.
Rosenfeld makes it a point to take note of the fact that more often than not in the Senate, a minority (in terms of population) runs the show as opposed to the majority.
The reasons behind this seemingly unfair, and as Rosenfeld states, virtually unchangeable, system are perhaps best connected to professor King’s lecture in two specific areas. First, when finding sources of concern in the game theory that was played out in a run-off situation, one question was ‘would player III be a perpetual minority, and therefore, loser’? Even though Players 1 and 2 accepted “B” as their second choice, and A was the absolute last in line for player 3, A was still chosen because in an American-type democracy and system of government, we don’t care about depth of choice. First preference is all that matters. This brings into question the impotence of political minorities, but also ethnic, racial, religious, etc. minorities that might also, and often do, form along political divisions.

As professor King said, this only compounds the issue that might aggravate the minority (player 3) and interferes with social cohesion. In an election like a Senate election, this is clearly displayed because the elections, instead of being held in terms of smaller districts, are statewide. As Rosenfeld points out, even if a minority makes up “more than a third of a state’s population” they can still have an elected Senator that completely stands against their views as a result of such large statewide voting constituencies. Furthermore, as populations grow more and more wealth will be needed to campaign, meaning less wealthy candidates, who most likely carry the voice of a minority, will be disenfranchised.
Secondly, as Arrow states, we ultimately have a choice between restriction of the expression of individual preference or irrational preference. This brings into play another very causal comparative political question brought up in lecture—why choose some restrictions over others? Simply put, it is our values, or in the case of what lies in the American constitution, the values of our forefathers that remain un-amended.

Will Thompson - Response #1 - Protestant Ethic

9/17/08:

I think Weber’s contention (that the values of Protestantism are especially conducive to capitalism) was correct. He is definitely a smart man making a compelling case.

The difference between Protestants and Catholics that stands out most to me is the central authority. While Catholics follow the Pope, Protestants have no such figure. The lack of central authority in Protestantism probably helped them adopt capitalism. Capitalism is an individualistic system in which the state does not direct economic activity. Perhaps Protestants, already used to aggregated individual choices shaping their religion, were especially comfortable with the market’s invisible hand guiding the economy. It was already natural for them to think of a system without central authority as a good way of organizing.

Today, however, Weber’s assertion that the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism are connected has many critics. Many of these critics routinely cite the advanced economies of modern, non-protestant nations, like Japan and South Korea, in an effort to prove Weber wrong. Obviously, no one can doubt that these are capitalist countries that have succeeded economically without a being Protestant, but this doesn’t prove Weber wrong.

All this proves is that a Protestant heritage is not a necessary condition for economic achievement. These countries transformed their economies by learning from the Protestant nations that had already done so. (Think about American guidance in Japan after World War II.) The non-protestant countries adopted the relevant values of Protestantism without the religion itself. It’s also important to note that many non-protestant countries share some of the Protestant values that are conducive to capitalism.

In short, I think Weber was correct in saying that economic success can be helped by having a Protestant population, but that is certainly not the only way to develop economically.

Kathleen Nahill - 1st Blog Entry

9/19 Blog Posting:

A critical question in the field of comparative politics seems to be that of the role of cultural and ethnic differences in society. On the one hand, Huntington argues that the immobility of culture makes it a permanent obstacle to unity. On the other, Collier's research seems to show that ethnically diverse societies are less likely to devolve into internal conflict than homogenous ones. While these theories would appear to contradict one another, they ultimately demonstrate an important about the importance of cultural diversity to the success of a society.

Huntington is indeed correct that one cannot change his culture as easily as he could his political or economic positions. But Huntington is perhaps too hasty in his assumption that cultural diversity is an obstacle to society unity. Rather, in an age where in many parts of the world, lines between cultures are being blurred by increased travel, communication, and even intermarriage, societies are moving farther and farther away from defining themselves in strictly ethnic or cultural terms.

Societies that define themselves along ethnic boundaries have a certain security in that Huntington is correct, culture is immovable. The problem that inevitably arises, however, is that culture does not, particularly in modern society, determine ideology. If societies are established on an ethnic foundation alone, ideological conflicts would almost inevitably lead to unrest. In contrast, if ethnically diverse societies were to form based on a common ideology, as Collier suggests, then that society is much less likely to deteriorate into civil unrest.

Ultimately, while the role of cultural diversity in society can and will continue to be debated, the evidence put forth by Collier and Huntington leads to the conclusion that cultural diversity is to the betterment of society – rather than its detriment.

Response #1

In his work, The Clash of Civilizations, Huntington proposes that the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world will be cultural rather than ideological or economic.  His presentation of this hypothesis is slightly murky in that I would consider ideological and economic situations to be a substantial addition to the links between people that promote a cultural identity; however, he seems to have unofficially defined these broad terms in reference to their role in the Cold War, which is understandable, and draws a number of pertinent observations, although his conclusions may be overreaching.  

Huntington notes a tendency to view interactions in terms of "'us' versus 'them'" (4) in groups who self-identify in terms of ethnicity and religion moreso than in other terms just as "civilization rallying" (8) expedites the resolution of violence.  This is a general claim that seems to be heavily based in correlation rather than causation, but it works as a basis for further observation.  He also notes a pattern of "economic regionalism" prompted by common cultures (3).  This is a valid point: trade can certainly be facilitated by proximity, and shared customs between trade partners can lead to happy dealings without unfortunate misunderstandings.  Conversely, cultural differences can impede trade: linguistic barriers are an obvious hurdle, but simple religious observances such as the Thursday/Friday or Friday/Saturday weekend in many Arab countries can also limit trade opportunities.

Chiefly, Huntington ponders the domination of Western civilization, as in its modern state, the West feels it has the power to make qualitative judgements on other cultures.  Coexistence and cooperation are clearly key to global interations, but they must be lobbied on more of an equally modern footing for the Western civilization to respect the cultural differences and avoid an explosive "clash of cultures."

-Amanda Delp

Response #3: Huntington's "the Clash of Civilizations vs. Marxian political philosophy, as discussed in class

I found the dichotomy between Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations" and King's Monday lecture on Marxian political philosophy very interesting for the way the two were so directly opposed to each other. Huntington's most basic arguments for why civilizations will clash rely on assumptions opposite to Marx’s historical materialism, and the compelling examples Huntington is able to provide (in comparison to Marx, who has no examples or empirical evidence) ultimately show the impracticality and inaccuracy of Marx's analysis of politics.

The concept of historical materialism, as advocated by Marx, maintains that all events throughout the entire course of human history have been driven by "material relations," defined as the struggle over "material power," defined as the "means of production," defined as the way in which people make a living. So everything that ever happened in history happened as a result of people competing over the way to make a living. "Culture" or "ideas" (about equality, self-determination, the will of God, etc) that aren't material objects, Marx believes, have no real power to direct events in the world.

Huntington cites the ephemeral ideas and feelings which Marx scorns as the causes of future concrete wars between civilizations. His first reason for civilizations' not being able to coexist peacefully is that differences are basic, but the differences he cites are not in production capabilities-they are in the "language, culture, tradition, and most important, religion [which Marx derided as "the opiate of the masses"]". There isn’t space to unpack the other ways in which Huntington describes how the power of ideas shapes conflicts, but it’s undeniable that Marx would disagree fairly strongly with him. Given the ways in which Huntington’s and Marx’s views have played out (consider 9/11, and the disaster of the former Soviet Union, among other examples), I would agree with Se-Jun that Marx’s political philosophies are somewhat less than useful and/or accurate.

Response #1

In Communist Menifesto, Marx argues that any individual who is not part of the bourgeoisie will become a member of the proletariat. Marx claims that the bourgeoisie has even “converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, [and] the man of science, into its paid wage-labourers”. This claim, however, is absolutely untrue in the modern society, meaning that Marx's claim may be just an outdated argument without much valid rationality, at least in the 21st century.

According to contemporary sociologists, there are seven classes in American society today(James Henslin). The top class, the capitalist class which composes one percent of the population, certainly sounds like Marx’s bourgeoisie. These are the people that own the capital. Indeed, the top one percent of Americans control 33% of the nation’s wealth. This works well for Marx’s view; it would seem that we have a solid bourgeoisie. Similarly, sociologists have identified two classes which correspond relatively well to the proletariat: the working class and the working poor which are composed of factory workers, laborers, and so forth. These groups compose about 46% of the population. So, we have proletariats and bourgeoisie in America that make up 47%, just under half, of the total population. Contrary, to Marx’s view, the remaining 53% of society do not fit well into either category.

The three classes that compose the rest of society are the upper middle class and the lower middle class, and the underclass. Marx remarks briefly on the underclass (the homeless, etc.) but dismisses it as small and powerless. On the other hand, Marx explicitly predicted the disappearance of the lower middle class, particularly the craftsmen. Yet, there are still a large number of artisans and craftsmen today. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, there are for example, 1.5 million carpenters in America today. These carpenters rely on “all around skills” and their “specialized training” Marx clearly stated “that specialized skill is rendered useless by new means of production,” yet today, many carpenters still rely on those specialized skills. Moreover, the Bureau of Labor Statistics predicts a 10% increase in the number of carpenters over the next decade. Far from being in decline, these specialized craftsmen are experiencing a period of expansion.

Marx might perhaps argue that the specialized craftsmen are merely a holdover, an anachronism whose abolition will still come. This objection may have some merit, but if 150 years has not served to remove the craftsmen, how long will it take? Marx might also argue that the craftsmen of today are in fact nothing more than proletariats in disguise, exploited by the bourgeoisie. I find this assertion implausible as the carpenter has little in common with the laborers that form the essence of the industrial proletariat. Carpenters are not easily replaceable, and many take pride in their work, so they do not appear to meet key qualifications.

Of course, carpenters, after all, are still relatively poor, earning only $17.57 per hour on average. Yet this example is strong enough to show the illogicality of Marx's argument. As I was answered by Jackie, it might be very important to learn Marx's argument for he is one of the pioneers of the political and social science field, but it is questionable if his logic is appliable in modern period.

Response #2

My response is an analysis and impression of the prescience of Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” article (and subsequent book) written in 1993. His article is a macro-level theory in the mold of those discussed in class like Robert Putnam, Gabriel Almond, Sydney Verba, Max Weber, and even Karl Marx. Writing in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union, Huntington attempts to identify the next clash that will dominate history, or the substance of the next clashes that will dominate history. Eager to move past the ideological, military, and economic clashes of the Cold War Era, he focuses on a less micro subject—cultural differences and what culture adds to one’s identity will be a point of contention between people. Naturally, clashes will most likely occur on the “fault-lines,” as it were, where different civilizations meet. Huntington’s argument here proves compelling when looking at the modern international order—conflict between India and Pakistan, Israel and Palestine, Russia and the former Soviet Bloc States, to name a few, all lend credence to this theory. Huntington defines “culture” in the widest scope possible, thereby minimizing the number of cultures he must necessarily involve in his theory. Still, he outlines the differences between West and East and the many sub-cultures that exist in each. Ultimately, it remains rather ambiguous what Huntington considers a “culture” in his theory (though he says there are about 7-8 important ones); at times “culture” appears to function as broadly as an entire region or state in his theory, and at other times something as small as an ethnic or religious minority (sub-culture or even sub sub-culture). This is not necessarily a criticism of his theory per se, as I believe the definition of “culture” to be a highly subjective one; if you were to ask twelve different academics, you would likely get twelve different definitions. Perhaps the most prescient observation Huntington made in the wake of the Cold War, however, is the “West versus the rest” argument. He posited that the West may contain the seed of her own destruction—that is, it built the modern international system through nation-states and intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations and European Union, and the desirability to promote these societies as a whole cloth solution is prevalent. This seed may have existed well before the end of the Cold War, but certainly didn’t manifest itself until after the U.S. had other countries to focus on, rather than exclusively on Russia and her surrogates. The insistence that our norms are “universalizable” (to use a Kantian term) and desirable all over is extremely naïve, yet it persists according to Huntington, because the West invented liberal democracy, and through its institutions, gave the international system so much substance through IGO’s and NGO’s. Moreover, current Western policies indicate the militarization of these values, a move that is indicative of our insistence that these values, norms, and forms of government be spread. The fact that this is antagonistic to other cultures is only further proven in the terrorist attacks of September 11th and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.