The authors' go through many possible answers to this question. However, they spend, in my opinion, far too much time on the economic reasons, producing many charts and statistics. Yet in the end have seem to be unable to say anything really definitive about the effect of economy on redistribution of wealth. I think that the authors' could have better analyzed the data and set forth a more concrete conclusion. In the conclusion, the authors state as one of the reasons that Americans have less redistribution than Europeans, as "Americans believe that they live in an open and fair society and that if someone is poor it is his or her own fault." (p.165) I think that this is the main reason why the US does not have as extensive of a welfare state as Europe. Our culture teaches us that we need to work for everything that nothing will be handed to you, and if you do not get what you want then you did not work hard enough. America is always referred to as the 'land of opportunity' so naturally it is assumed that everyone has the chance to make something of their life. But is that a good thing? Should the American government be more involved? Creating programs that better support the poor and downtrodden? I think that in some instances like health care the US government could do more by way of creating more institutions like Medicare that take care of the needs of the people. The current system just does not reach enough people and the poorest of the poor are unable to keep up with growing medical costs. On the other hand, the American welfare system lends to more philanthropy among citizens. According the article the 11% of American give to charity in one way or another, as opposed to an average of 4% of Europeans. In this sense Europeans are less likely to give to charity because they rely heavily on the government and do not feel as great an inclination as someone living in the US. Which is better? Well, I am biased, but in most regards I am more inclined to like the US's system. However, I am not the poorest of the poor or a racial minority, so for me the system has almost always worked to my advantage. In addition, I think that the more philanthropic a nation is, the better off.
Thursday, September 25, 2008
Response #2
Although it was written 40 years ago, Garrett Hardin’s ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ still delivers great ideas of the tragedy of the commons (so great that it's even on Econ textbooks which makes people think that he's actually an economist).
I will, however, have to raise a question, which might be fatal to his argument. When asserting that conscience will fail to control people's breeding, he makes an important assumtion : "Those who have more children will produce a larger fraction of the next generation than those with more susceptible consciences. The differences will be accentuated, generation by generation."
Well, I am not necessarilly agreeing with this. Statistically speaking, the size of family is surely decreasing; what makes the whole population increase is the number of families rather than the size of families. Surely one might say it is due to the development of society system, which makes it more desirable to have small size familes. Yet, even in a developing countries, and, as a matter of fact, even in nations far from to be even called to be developing countries, same phenomenon is being observed.
So, if this statistics prove that Hardin's assumption is empirically incorrect, that can possibly mean that there is some space that conscience can play a huge role.
By no means, I am saying it does. I, too, believe the control of breeding of mankind will become more and more difficult, partially because of the reason that Hardin mentions. However, his assumption does not quite seem correct. Whether or not his parents bred many children, in fact, has little to do with the size of his own family. If a family keeps being large, it is likely due to the culture, rather than family customs, however we name it. And even such cultures have already started recognizing that having as many children as possible might not be the best idea.
I will, however, have to raise a question, which might be fatal to his argument. When asserting that conscience will fail to control people's breeding, he makes an important assumtion : "Those who have more children will produce a larger fraction of the next generation than those with more susceptible consciences. The differences will be accentuated, generation by generation."
Well, I am not necessarilly agreeing with this. Statistically speaking, the size of family is surely decreasing; what makes the whole population increase is the number of families rather than the size of families. Surely one might say it is due to the development of society system, which makes it more desirable to have small size familes. Yet, even in a developing countries, and, as a matter of fact, even in nations far from to be even called to be developing countries, same phenomenon is being observed.
So, if this statistics prove that Hardin's assumption is empirically incorrect, that can possibly mean that there is some space that conscience can play a huge role.
By no means, I am saying it does. I, too, believe the control of breeding of mankind will become more and more difficult, partially because of the reason that Hardin mentions. However, his assumption does not quite seem correct. Whether or not his parents bred many children, in fact, has little to do with the size of his own family. If a family keeps being large, it is likely due to the culture, rather than family customs, however we name it. And even such cultures have already started recognizing that having as many children as possible might not be the best idea.
Blog Response 9/24/2008
Response to: Why Doesn’t the U.S. Have a European-Style Welfare State?
This essay has many intriguing implications and conclusions, but there are a few glaring problems in it that hinder these developments. Chiefly, the authors’ various explanations for why the United States is not a welfare state are merely stated but not fleshed out or supported. Currently, the article appears to mainly point out the fact that the United States is not a welfare state while not exploring the why of the situation. The conclusions seem reasonable enough and are easily testable, but either the editors have clipped out a critical chunk of the text or the authors simply did not include support for their conclusions. Another element that I feel could have been more fully explored is the relative success of government-backed redistribution versus charity-based assistance, as discovering the strengths and weaknesses of either method would be a valuable finding. Clearly the two differing programs have an inverse relationship (increasing government relief for the poor while raising taxes reduces charitable donations), but this correlation is not taken further. Finally, there are various differences between European countries and the United States that affect analysis of the welfare state. For instance, in countries with relatively stable populations, such as Sweden, welfare states should be easier to achieve, whereas in countries like America with large influxes of immigrants who may not pay as many taxes, welfare states are significantly harder to fund.
Still, the authors certainly demonstrate that a large contrast exists between the welfare states in Europe and the lack of a comparable structure in America. The finding that the American poor tend to be less well-off than their European peers is a particularly startling finding, which implies that the welfare state does maintain an advantage over the American model, albeit at the cost of a small hit to the income per capita average. The authors’ general investigation of how far-reaching the welfare state goes into the minds and institutions of a society is one of their other key contributions. With the threat of collapse of many large institutions like social security growing larger in the U.S., the findings of studies like this become more important and critical to policy makers and analysts.
This essay has many intriguing implications and conclusions, but there are a few glaring problems in it that hinder these developments. Chiefly, the authors’ various explanations for why the United States is not a welfare state are merely stated but not fleshed out or supported. Currently, the article appears to mainly point out the fact that the United States is not a welfare state while not exploring the why of the situation. The conclusions seem reasonable enough and are easily testable, but either the editors have clipped out a critical chunk of the text or the authors simply did not include support for their conclusions. Another element that I feel could have been more fully explored is the relative success of government-backed redistribution versus charity-based assistance, as discovering the strengths and weaknesses of either method would be a valuable finding. Clearly the two differing programs have an inverse relationship (increasing government relief for the poor while raising taxes reduces charitable donations), but this correlation is not taken further. Finally, there are various differences between European countries and the United States that affect analysis of the welfare state. For instance, in countries with relatively stable populations, such as Sweden, welfare states should be easier to achieve, whereas in countries like America with large influxes of immigrants who may not pay as many taxes, welfare states are significantly harder to fund.
Still, the authors certainly demonstrate that a large contrast exists between the welfare states in Europe and the lack of a comparable structure in America. The finding that the American poor tend to be less well-off than their European peers is a particularly startling finding, which implies that the welfare state does maintain an advantage over the American model, albeit at the cost of a small hit to the income per capita average. The authors’ general investigation of how far-reaching the welfare state goes into the minds and institutions of a society is one of their other key contributions. With the threat of collapse of many large institutions like social security growing larger in the U.S., the findings of studies like this become more important and critical to policy makers and analysts.
Wednesday, September 24, 2008
Response # 1
Garrett Hardin’s 1968 article ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ generates a dilemma that I have a problem with. The article is essentially an argument for population control through breeding limit laws, such as China’s one child limit law, justified through the explanation of the phenomenon of its title- the ‘tragedy of the commons.’ Although potentially disturbing when considering an individual’s rights, it is not the proposal of such a law that I have a problem with. His rationale, choosing to protect the rights of the world’s populations as a whole rather than the individual’s (what he calls making the world as a whole ‘more free’), and enacting laws to do so, follows well. He applies this logic when addressing solutions to other problems relating to what King has referred to as ‘public goods,’ (such as the ocean or clean air) or what are here seen as the ‘commons.’ When it comes to population control, Hardin seeks the best interest for the world as a whole, seeking to limit population to a number ‘optimal’ for living based on the finitude of the world’s resources, which makes sense.
My problem with Hardin’s argument though, is his implicit use of what Professor King outlined as the ‘rationality assumption,’ that all individuals would behave in such a manner to basically maximize their own personal good and will not act otherwise unless influenced to do so by some form of coercion. In particular, Hardin addresses the issue of pollution, and people’s lack of willingness to avoid polluting without incentive. Hardin necessitates coercion through laws, sanctions, and taxes to influence people’s behaviors. He warns against appeals to people’s sense of guilt or conscience, alluding to the consequence of anxiety and other potential mental illnesses, and differentiates between propaganda and a more comprehensive education which teaches people the meaning of the laws and necessity for them.
All of this coercion, though, requires some sort of government, institution, or external force’s intervention, and limits the people’s sense of vision. How then, I want to know, does Hardin account for those members of societies that I suppose we might call idealists. The society that Hardin conjures in which the rationality assumption is assumed and applied to each individual in society does not take in to account those in society who are willing to look at the ‘big picture,’ take responsibility for public resources, and act on this. In particular, where do the likes of environmentalists and conservationists fit in?
Is coercion really required in all circumstances to protect the common good? If not, then the situation at hand might not be quite as ‘tragic’ in regards to the finitude of our resources and people’s ‘limitless’ ambition to use them, as Hardin makes it out to be. I’d like to believe that at least some people have a little bit more common sense than to go about behaving in a manner that assumes a false sense of ‘limitless’ resource at all time, but then, according to Hardin’s argument, I suppose that would make me irrational. And that would probably mean that all environmentalists and conservationists are also irrational as well.
My problem with Hardin’s argument though, is his implicit use of what Professor King outlined as the ‘rationality assumption,’ that all individuals would behave in such a manner to basically maximize their own personal good and will not act otherwise unless influenced to do so by some form of coercion. In particular, Hardin addresses the issue of pollution, and people’s lack of willingness to avoid polluting without incentive. Hardin necessitates coercion through laws, sanctions, and taxes to influence people’s behaviors. He warns against appeals to people’s sense of guilt or conscience, alluding to the consequence of anxiety and other potential mental illnesses, and differentiates between propaganda and a more comprehensive education which teaches people the meaning of the laws and necessity for them.
All of this coercion, though, requires some sort of government, institution, or external force’s intervention, and limits the people’s sense of vision. How then, I want to know, does Hardin account for those members of societies that I suppose we might call idealists. The society that Hardin conjures in which the rationality assumption is assumed and applied to each individual in society does not take in to account those in society who are willing to look at the ‘big picture,’ take responsibility for public resources, and act on this. In particular, where do the likes of environmentalists and conservationists fit in?
Is coercion really required in all circumstances to protect the common good? If not, then the situation at hand might not be quite as ‘tragic’ in regards to the finitude of our resources and people’s ‘limitless’ ambition to use them, as Hardin makes it out to be. I’d like to believe that at least some people have a little bit more common sense than to go about behaving in a manner that assumes a false sense of ‘limitless’ resource at all time, but then, according to Hardin’s argument, I suppose that would make me irrational. And that would probably mean that all environmentalists and conservationists are also irrational as well.
Response #1
In Rosenfeld’s “What Democracy?” the questions that we’ve come to learn as being distinctly those involved with comparative politics ( How? Why?) are applied to an institution we are familiar with—the United States Senate— revealing facets of our own system of representation that may be less democratic than previously thought.
Rosenfeld makes it a point to take note of the fact that more often than not in the Senate, a minority (in terms of population) runs the show as opposed to the majority.
The reasons behind this seemingly unfair, and as Rosenfeld states, virtually unchangeable, system are perhaps best connected to professor King’s lecture in two specific areas. First, when finding sources of concern in the game theory that was played out in a run-off situation, one question was ‘would player III be a perpetual minority, and therefore, loser’? Even though Players 1 and 2 accepted “B” as their second choice, and A was the absolute last in line for player 3, A was still chosen because in an American-type democracy and system of government, we don’t care about depth of choice. First preference is all that matters. This brings into question the impotence of political minorities, but also ethnic, racial, religious, etc. minorities that might also, and often do, form along political divisions.
As professor King said, this only compounds the issue that might aggravate the minority (player 3) and interferes with social cohesion. In an election like a Senate election, this is clearly displayed because the elections, instead of being held in terms of smaller districts, are statewide. As Rosenfeld points out, even if a minority makes up “more than a third of a state’s population” they can still have an elected Senator that completely stands against their views as a result of such large statewide voting constituencies. Furthermore, as populations grow more and more wealth will be needed to campaign, meaning less wealthy candidates, who most likely carry the voice of a minority, will be disenfranchised.
Secondly, as Arrow states, we ultimately have a choice between restriction of the expression of individual preference or irrational preference. This brings into play another very causal comparative political question brought up in lecture—why choose some restrictions over others? Simply put, it is our values, or in the case of what lies in the American constitution, the values of our forefathers that remain un-amended.
Rosenfeld makes it a point to take note of the fact that more often than not in the Senate, a minority (in terms of population) runs the show as opposed to the majority.
The reasons behind this seemingly unfair, and as Rosenfeld states, virtually unchangeable, system are perhaps best connected to professor King’s lecture in two specific areas. First, when finding sources of concern in the game theory that was played out in a run-off situation, one question was ‘would player III be a perpetual minority, and therefore, loser’? Even though Players 1 and 2 accepted “B” as their second choice, and A was the absolute last in line for player 3, A was still chosen because in an American-type democracy and system of government, we don’t care about depth of choice. First preference is all that matters. This brings into question the impotence of political minorities, but also ethnic, racial, religious, etc. minorities that might also, and often do, form along political divisions.
As professor King said, this only compounds the issue that might aggravate the minority (player 3) and interferes with social cohesion. In an election like a Senate election, this is clearly displayed because the elections, instead of being held in terms of smaller districts, are statewide. As Rosenfeld points out, even if a minority makes up “more than a third of a state’s population” they can still have an elected Senator that completely stands against their views as a result of such large statewide voting constituencies. Furthermore, as populations grow more and more wealth will be needed to campaign, meaning less wealthy candidates, who most likely carry the voice of a minority, will be disenfranchised.
Secondly, as Arrow states, we ultimately have a choice between restriction of the expression of individual preference or irrational preference. This brings into play another very causal comparative political question brought up in lecture—why choose some restrictions over others? Simply put, it is our values, or in the case of what lies in the American constitution, the values of our forefathers that remain un-amended.
Tuesday, September 23, 2008
Will Thompson - Response #1 - Protestant Ethic
9/17/08:
I think Weber’s contention (that the values of Protestantism are especially conducive to capitalism) was correct. He is definitely a smart man making a compelling case.
The difference between Protestants and Catholics that stands out most to me is the central authority. While Catholics follow the Pope, Protestants have no such figure. The lack of central authority in Protestantism probably helped them adopt capitalism. Capitalism is an individualistic system in which the state does not direct economic activity. Perhaps Protestants, already used to aggregated individual choices shaping their religion, were especially comfortable with the market’s invisible hand guiding the economy. It was already natural for them to think of a system without central authority as a good way of organizing.
Today, however, Weber’s assertion that the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism are connected has many critics. Many of these critics routinely cite the advanced economies of modern, non-protestant nations, like Japan and South Korea, in an effort to prove Weber wrong. Obviously, no one can doubt that these are capitalist countries that have succeeded economically without a being Protestant, but this doesn’t prove Weber wrong.
All this proves is that a Protestant heritage is not a necessary condition for economic achievement. These countries transformed their economies by learning from the Protestant nations that had already done so. (Think about American guidance in Japan after World War II.) The non-protestant countries adopted the relevant values of Protestantism without the religion itself. It’s also important to note that many non-protestant countries share some of the Protestant values that are conducive to capitalism.
In short, I think Weber was correct in saying that economic success can be helped by having a Protestant population, but that is certainly not the only way to develop economically.
I think Weber’s contention (that the values of Protestantism are especially conducive to capitalism) was correct. He is definitely a smart man making a compelling case.
The difference between Protestants and Catholics that stands out most to me is the central authority. While Catholics follow the Pope, Protestants have no such figure. The lack of central authority in Protestantism probably helped them adopt capitalism. Capitalism is an individualistic system in which the state does not direct economic activity. Perhaps Protestants, already used to aggregated individual choices shaping their religion, were especially comfortable with the market’s invisible hand guiding the economy. It was already natural for them to think of a system without central authority as a good way of organizing.
Today, however, Weber’s assertion that the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism are connected has many critics. Many of these critics routinely cite the advanced economies of modern, non-protestant nations, like Japan and South Korea, in an effort to prove Weber wrong. Obviously, no one can doubt that these are capitalist countries that have succeeded economically without a being Protestant, but this doesn’t prove Weber wrong.
All this proves is that a Protestant heritage is not a necessary condition for economic achievement. These countries transformed their economies by learning from the Protestant nations that had already done so. (Think about American guidance in Japan after World War II.) The non-protestant countries adopted the relevant values of Protestantism without the religion itself. It’s also important to note that many non-protestant countries share some of the Protestant values that are conducive to capitalism.
In short, I think Weber was correct in saying that economic success can be helped by having a Protestant population, but that is certainly not the only way to develop economically.
Kathleen Nahill - 1st Blog Entry
9/19 Blog Posting:
A critical question in the field of comparative politics seems to be that of the role of cultural and ethnic differences in society. On the one hand,
Societies that define themselves along ethnic boundaries have a certain security in that
Ultimately, while the role of cultural diversity in society can and will continue to be debated, the evidence put forth by Collier and Huntington leads to the conclusion that cultural diversity is to the betterment of society – rather than its detriment.
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