Ethnic Conflict: When States Are No Longer Respected to Determine Society's Behavior

As several of the previous have been discussing ethnicity and ethnic conflict, and as I have been reading them, the question that came to mind was that of identity politics. Why do people choose to align themselves with ethnic, tribal, religious, or other non-state in-groups instead of the state apparatus? And this seemed to relate to Migdal's discussion on who a society deems the authority on directing acceptable social behavior, on creating the societal institutions that mold individual behavior.

Migdal describes the modern state as being a phenomenon in that it is a phase in history in which the state is generally accepted without little question as the ultimate authority on societal behavior and directing that. Problems of ethnic, or really any conflict that is intra-state rather than inter-state seems to be connected to a rejection of the given state apparatus as this authority. This is a large source of societal outliers: those who deem religion or some other force more legitimate than the state in directing behavior.

And even if the majority of individuals are not naturally of this ilk, I think what the film about Bosnia illustrated was that the threats of war and the virus of fear can cause us to easily latch on to those in-group identities that oppose that over-arching authority of the state. I think that is similar to one of the previous blog's discussion of the rebound effects of "ethnic coding". When the cause of a conflict is deemed to be due to opposing ethnic in-groups, even if that is not the cause, these identities are very easy to latch on to.

Relating back to the idea of strong states and weak societies however, I think that the ability of states to be strong (to provide the necessary resources as they deem appropriate) is what really influences people to align or not align themselves with a view of ultimate state-based authority. As in the film, where the people were so isolated from the central government and had to turn to their own civil societal resources and strengths, if the government is not able to provide security and safety then the people will no longer view the state as that primary authority of determining societal behavior.

Ultimately, I think this is easily boiled down to a simpler question of how these in-groups gain levels of accepted authority higher than the state and where the individual citizen's acceptance of that authority comes from: from some personal background cause or from imposed views of biased outsiders?

Social Science

As Dr. King mentioned in class, the task of social scientist is not to study the minutia of a single country's inner-workings, but instead the patterns and trends born out the actions of multiple states. By keeping an eye on “the social”, the social scientists is able to interpret general behaviors of humanity. He/she cannot be concerned with individuals, just their contribution as part of the greater whole. This understanding of societies general trends enables the social scientists to better understand the driving forces of societies.
The individual concerned with the singular actor is the psychologist, the student of the individual's behavior. As students of foreign policy, this a striking distinction between two different paths Is a foreign policy expert expected to be both psychologist and social scientist, and if so, which takes precedence? While at first glance the two seem reconcilable, there actually exists a significant problem in their coexistence. Consider the situation of an outbreak of fighting in Baghdad. The social scientist would consider this an event common to most civil wars, while the psychologist would instead think of it as the work of an specific member of the insurgency, an example of this persons particular habits and behavior. How do these two different assessments of a situation change one's reaction to what has happened, their solutions? Social science views ones actions as a piece of the general trend, but psychology demands the primacy of the individual- trends are only a macroscopic snapshot. Though not necessarily mutually exclusive, two differing world views at some level demand a foreign policy advisor to make their own choice of the trend or the individual.

More on ethnicity...

In a sort of response to the previous post, and to the general idea it addresses, I agree with the idea that defining a conflict as “ethnic” violence without proper understanding of the situation on the ground is foolish and all too common.  At the same time, I feel that the misunderstanding from the outsider’s point of view is often more strongly correlated with an incorrect interpretation of the concept of ethnic identity, exclusive of the occurrence of violence.

 

If we’re referring to communities in Africa, Eastern Europe, and Asia, many of the entities that we term “ethnic groups” today are modern constructions that only came into existence during the colonial period and as a result of the “divide and conquer” strategy employed by Europeans.  In Africa especially, prior to this it’s generally assumed that groups of people in regions that now experience “ethnic” violence were no more ethnically divided than Western Europe is today.  Of course there were divisions – of lineage and occupation, and class and language – and even some that resulted in violent conflict, but group compositions were much more fluid and adaptive than how we picture them today.

 

This is not to say that ethnic identities, meaningfully or arbitrarily imposed, don’t carry weight in modern society, because obviously they do – we have last weekend’s events in Nigeria and, to a degree, India to prove that.  Constructions of ethnicity have evolved to encompass religious, cultural, and, most unfortunately, racial differences, and it’s this evolution that, especially from a Western perspective, has resulted in the amplification of ethnic nationalism.  Societies to which ethnic conflict is a foreign concept often conceive of it as a characteristic that is concurrent with and inherent to societies that also experience underdevelopment, corruption, and religious extremism; admittedly, it does appear on a surface level that they are mutually reinforcing. But, as Professor King mentioned, though social order may be fragile, violence is never predetermined.  Ethnic conflict hasn’t always existed, and the common Western idea that it is inevitable and uncontrollable in or between specific states, cultures, and religions is inaccurate.  A shift towards more accurate categorizing of “ethnic” violence is unlikely to occur without a transition in the common understanding of what ethnicity itself was originally, and what it has become today.

Coding "Ethnic Violence"

In “Ethnic and Nationalist Violence”, Brubaker and Laitin argue an imperative point regarding coding practices. Specifically, the authors argue that coding violence as “ethnic” can: (1) cause an overestimation of the incidence of ethnic violence and (2) cause a feedback effect, increasing the actual occurrence of ethnic violence.

The first point seems more obvious. If we code using the word “ethnic”, we assume there is a right way to measure violence. Obviously, this is much more complex and complicated. To code violence as “ethnic” requires statistical knowledge and research at the local level; most of us would agree on this point.

The second argument regarding coding is not as straightforward. If some sort of feedback effect occurs when we code (possibly miscode) something as “ethnic violence”, then how can be keep from instigating this effect? If coding violence as “ethnic” creates feedback and can lead to greater occurrence of violence, then how can we “accurately” code? Is it possible? Although Brubaker and Laitin do not outline any specific solutions, “Ethnic and Nationalist Violence” should spark some sort of creative thought regarding the daunting task of coding.

While miscoding can occur due to lack of knowledge regarding the situation at hand, it can also originate from the misuse of language. During the 1960’s, the semi-fixation with discussing ethnic identity became prominent in academic and journalistic writings. As time progressed, the phrase “ethnic violence” was thrown into academic journal articles, with no real analysis or explanation of the term. I argue that such nonchalant use the phrase “ethnic violence” also accounts for the feedback effect.

In general, language seems to be an unscientific mess. Nevertheless, as social scientists, the way in which we present our ideas and the language that we use greatly impact public perception, opinion, action and reaction. Coding violence as “ethnic” not only requires proper information, but it also requires an explanation of how the phrase “ethnic violence” is being used for the particular situation. In other words, an explanation of the ordinary language term “ethnic violence” should be given before any analysis is made regarding the particular violent conflict. While coding will continue to be messy and complex, this approach could decrease the occurrence of the feedback effect.

Core-Periphery?

We were short of time on Friday and I had to give up my chance to speak, so here, I'd like to write a little more of my thoughts about globalization.

First of all, let's start by having everyone's consensus on two points.

1st - The point of (economic) wealth is to earn more "happiness".
2nd - "Happiness," in this case, can be measured only by how a person himself describes his own level of happiness. In other words, I am the only person who has right to say whether or not I'm happy. Other people's judgment on my happiness is irrelevantly subjective, and likewise, I hold no right to measure other people’s level of happiness.

If we agree with these two conditions, I find it difficult to agree with the whole idea of globalization and core-periphery system. As I said, statistics show that people who are relatively wealthier than other people are happier, not the people who are absolutely wealthy. (it looks like this http://images.google.co.kr/imgres?imgurl=http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/1107/images/02Wellbeing-1.gif&imgrefurl=http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/1107/HTML/docshell.asp%3FURL%3D02Wellbeing.asp&usg=__J0nvlkmCpG6P4MEl9mz-1ENJ5g0=&h=262&w=492&sz=4&hl=ko&start=19&um=1&tbnid=39JkR81x5MyTKM:&tbnh=69&tbnw=130&prev=/images%3Fq%3DLevel%2Bof%2Bhappiness%2Bnations%26um%3D1%26complete%3D1%26hl%3Dko%26lr%3D%26newwindow%3D1%26sa%3DN although not quite identical) For instance, according to data I found a couple years ago, people from Bangladesh describe themselves happier than Americans do for themselves.

There are two types of ‘other’ people. One is the people who are living close by within a nation, and the other is the people who live in neighboring countries. The data I used explicitly illustrate that people tend to be happier as long as they are wealthier (or not poorer by significant amount) than one(or both) of the two types. This means, although globalization might help developing countries in numbers, when we are considering the real effect, it’s actually degrading their level of happiness.

One person said during our discussion group: “Isn’t it still better as long as countries are producing more?” Well, the thing is, who are we to judge what ‘better’ really means. If we go back to the second premise I made earlier, I do not have any right to say they are being better off (let’s say ‘better off’ means ‘having more happiness’). As long as the people of developing countries say they are happy, who are we to decide which is ‘better’ for them? The relative wealth determines who’s happy, not the absolute wealth.

In short, it all comes down to one point: we do not have the right to say what makes them happy, simply because we are not them. If we agree with the two previously stated pre-conditions, it seems impossible to think how core-periphery system benefits developing nations under the World-system Theory.

Ethnic and Nationalist Violence Variation

In “Ethnic and Nationalist Violence”, Rogers Brubaker and David Laitin highlight that the fundamental problem in the literature concerning ethnic violence does not have to do with competing theories about a well-defined phenomenon; but rather, the overarching ideas on what exactly constitutes ethnic violence.

First of all, while pointing out that ethnic violence is certainly not widesprea, Brubaker and Laitin point out the recent increase in regions of the former Soviet Union and Sub-Saharan Africa. The first explanation regards the decline or “decay of the Weberian state”, an argument which uses Max Weber’s definition of the state as an entity that has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence/force within a territory. The authors argue that the inability of states in the developing world to maintain order results in diminishing transnational, state-strengthening resources. The lack of an “external patron” to help maintain peace in the region makes ethnic cleavages more likely to translate into conflict, and eventually into violence.

However, what the authors fail to point out is the analogous ability of transnational resources to function as means for furthering ethnic violence. For example, in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, I believe that the availability of economic and military resources to the Yakouba ethnic group in Cote d’Ivoire from their kin across the Liberian border largely influenced their choice of armed violence rather than non-violent protest against the government in 2002. Therefore, the availability of transnational resources can play a role in the process of protest—violent or non-violent—that an ethnic group may choose.

Brubaker and Laitin’s second explanation concerns the ideological shifts that have occurred since the fall of Communism. The authors point to ethnic separatist movements between the 1950s and 1980s that framed the struggle between the opposition and the incumbent in the context of the larger struggle between communism and capitalism. Today, as many NGOs and international institutions are starting to recognize individual ethnic group claims, the incentive of violent challengers to structure their struggle in the context of human rights and ethnic claims has strengthened. In fact, this “ethnicization” of violence is perhaps the underlying reason behind Brubaker and Laitin’s claim that interpretations of violent struggles as exemplars of ethnic violence are subject to so much dispute.

When analyzing violence in the framework of ethnic conflict, Brubaker and Laitin point out the importance of looking at violence not as a degree but rather, as a phase of conflict. The authors, therefore, establish the definition of ethnic violence to as “violence perpetrated across ethnic lines, in which at least one party is not a state, and in which the ethnic difference is noted…as having been integral rather than incidental to the violence.” They then provide an analytical review of the literature on ethnic violence, examining three particular approaches to ethnic violence: inductive, theory-driven, and culturalist. Within the inductive approach, I found the discussion on the variation between regions with similar ethnic tensions in which one has erupted into ethnic violence while ethnic conflict in the other region has been largely nonviolent. Many questions arise when examining this variation, as in the case between the Basques and the Catalan. Why is it that ethnic conflict has been characterized by the violence of the terrorist ETA while the conflict in Catalonia has been relatively non-violent? If Laitin and Brubaker define violence as a phase in ethnic conflict, is it only a matter of time before ethnic conflict will erupt into violence in the autonomous region of Catalonia? In analyzing these questions, I found it especially helpful to look at Brubaker and Laitin’s “cultural construction of fear” within their cultural approaches. Indeed, the legacy of Francisco Franco’s repression and attempted elimination of Basque and Catalan language and culture in attempt to establish a unified, centralist Spanish identity still continues today. However, it seems that while the main concern in Catalonia has been the perpetuation of its language and culture, the Basque language, spoken and understood by less than one-fourth of the ethnic group, has been more a source of division than anything else. Therefore, Basque nationalism is still largely based on the fear of centralist repression (from the Spanish state) rather than on its common cultural or linguistic identity.

Looking over Brubaker and Laitin’s three approaches towards ethnic conflict, it appears that the dominant theme is the existing variation and heterogeneity between occurrences of ethnic violence. Their discussion on the need to identify, analyze and explain the differences between instances of ethnic violence is extremely valuable, rather than attempting to construct one enormous and dilute theory of ethnic violence, we are better off analyzing the variations first and foremost. After all, that is what comparative politics is all about.

Balancing Civil Society and Strong States in the Development Process (While Avoiding Disorder)

We’ve been talking a lot about the dichotomy between an active citizen base, or strong civil society, versus strong and efficient states, mostly categorizing one or the other as necessary for modernization and development. Midgal, as it so clearly states in the title of his book, addresses what happens when society is strong and the state is weak, analyzing the relationship between the two and calling for a strengthening of the state to make effective change, and even Meredith compares India’s diverse and active pluralistic society and arguably inefficient, corrupt government (Strong civil society/weak state) to China’s super-efficient and pragmatic authoritarian government, which historically and even presently represses its citizenship (the Cultural Revolution of the 60’s, 1989’sTiananmen Square incident, and today’s censorship of the internet and media: Strong state/weak civil society). Tuesday night I also attended a talk given by Duncan Green, head of research for Oxfam Great Britain (and also former Senior Policy Adviser on Trade and Development at the Department for International Development and formrr policy analyst on trade and globalization for the Catholic Aid Agency of England and Wales) who discussed his latest book on development, From Poverty to Power: How Active Citizens and Effective States can Change the World. He spoke about this “active citizenship” (as an indication of success post-development ) versus “effectives states” (necessary to develop, he argued) dichotomy as well, claiming that historically there is a conflict between the two.
What I’m interested in though, is whether this dichotomization is necessary? To me it seems the old paradigm, ‘nothing in excess,’ holds true, and although it might seem like an obvious (and maybe naive) solution to any sort of disorder that could arise from either extreme, I would personally argue for a moderate form of both state and society, in order for a nation to actually function effectively. Too great of unrestrained freedom given to civil society means consensus would never be reached as well as allows for the capacity for ethnic tensions to flair, as addressed by Bates as well as Brubaker and Laitin. I think we can all understand and agree on the dangers of too repressive of a government as well. Either, I believe, could lead to a form of disorder, possibly violent, and the potential for society to get out of hand, whether this should come from lack of government control, or too much of it (thus causing civil society to rise up violently or ‘explode’ if too thoroughly repressed as Buruma addressed last week).
Finding some sort of balance between the two is definitely something that I would say most developed and already industrialized Western countries, like the US, aim to do in forming a picture of their ideal governments. The issue, however, is whether a government balanced between an active but not too disorderly civil society and effective yet not repressive government can combine in the right measures to complete the modernization process of an undeveloped or third world country. Both Midgal and Duncan seem to think that a strengthened state is important in the development process. Not that I am familiar with all the case studies of all the countries in recent history that have undergone rapid growth, but it seems to me that most of the ones we have looked at (ie China and India in Meredith, Israel in Midgal, Eastern bloc nations, etc) have done so through the means of either a particularly pro-active civil society (an up rise of the people) or else through the forces of a particularly strong state, with little civil engagement. Is one or the other really necessary in modernizing while avoiding disorder, though, or is there a way that a moderation of the two can become combined?