What Democracy Is... And Is Not

Schmitter and Karl's "What Democracy Is...and Is Not" is a collation of the broadest terms and concepts that can be applied to any modern democracy. This article is reminiscent of the “Clash of Civilizations” by Huntington because Schmitter and Karl provide a definition that is much too vague; consequently, different systems are not democratic or not, but rather different types of democracy. Their definition is too general to help distinguish between democracies— which renders ultimately useless because it is meant to encompass all nations that claim this type of government.

The first section of the article describes characteristics (public realm, ruler) that the authors acknowledge to be applicable not only to nominal democracies but to authoritarian and other types of regimes as well. Though they attempt to further pinpoint a concrete definition through their use of elections and citizenship these too could be used in a number of non-democratic systems. In the past, many regimes have grasped on to the concept of elections and granted near universal suffrage but no one would call Mugabe's current rule in Zimbabwe or Panama under Noriega democracies.

However, the authors claim that the determining principles are neither the leader nor the public realm, but rather the focus on the citizens. They believe a country is only democratic to the extent that it has citizens, a concept that supports Isaiah Berlin’s notion of positive and negative liberty. Whether it be “freedom from” or “freedom to” a system is still catering to the citizens and allowing them an optimal status of citizenship (to be able to vote and participate in government with minimal restrictions).

Furthermore, Schmitter and Karl describe elections as one of the determining factors of democracies; however they are much too vague to actually produce a tangible idea. While dismissing the idea of electoralism, the authors instead argue that civil society can be the most vital part to a developed, modern democracy. They say that honest, accessible, and regular elections are the building blocks of democracy, yet they also claim that elections that exclude certain parties and restrict certain portions of the population can also be democratic. Typically, it is believed that the Sandinistas regime in Nicaragua was a Communist takeover, but they too had elections which were biased in all ways to Communist front. By their standards, this can be called a democratic system.

As discussed in lecture, many Americans in particular have developed a tendency to idealize an image of "true" democracy. Schmitter and Karl assert that no such image exists in reality, but rather that there are various forms of democracy that depend on and differ according to socioeconomic conditions, state structures, and policies. I think this part of the essay has much more basis and rationality because it introduces democracy as a conglomerate of processes, and not just an ideology. They discuss how democracies differ and claim that there are subtypes that are in accord with the set principles, yet it seems all too hasty and absurd. If all components of democracy “should be seen as either indicators of this or that type of democracy,” then Schmitter and Karl ought to discuss these types of democracy in order to be more accurate (243). Grouping different regimes under one term when there is no universality in performance makes no sense. This manner of grouping can only lead to more confusion. Most analysis must be done, because as this article stands, a myriad of different systems can claim a democratic model of governance.

Contrary to what many American’s believe to be true – democracies are automatically “the best” at everything they do - especially on the economic front, the contemporary exponential economic growth of the still-authoritarian China comes into question. While Schmitte rand Karl ultimately argue that democracies have a better change for stability than authoritarian regimes, and while there is a debate over China’s path towards democracy, it is necessary for Americans to realize, especially in such dire times, that merely being a democratic state does not guarantee future prosperity.

"Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism"

What struck me most about Levitsky and Way's characterization of competitive authoritarianism was how it seems to be democracy tainted by institutionalized corruption. The arenas of democratic contestation present in real democracies exist under competitive authoritarian regimes, and ostensibly/technically they operate as they should, but all four arenas--electoral, legislative, judicial, and media--are undermined by the incumbent regime's scheming and ruthless manipulation in their desperate attempts to stay in power. It made me wonder, then, about how preferable this regime type would be in comparison to the two extremes of which it is roughly the average. Competitive authoritarianism seems rooted in and indeed defined by the dishonest power-hungriness of the people/party currently in power, and I don't think it can be argued that this is only a necessary evil on the way to democracy. One of Levitsky and Way's main points was that for too long we have viewed these competitive authoritarian regimes that emerged after the Cold War amidst widespread loss of patience for and acceptance of authoritarian regimes throughout the world--now it has been 18 years since 1990 and the majority of states in the world are still non-democratic, and since close to zero progress has been made by these competitive authoritarian regimes down the path to democracy, it's time to consider competitive authoritarianism as a regime type in its own right and not a set of training wheels on the bicycle of democracy. While competitive authoritarianism is surely an improvement from full-blown authoritarianism, given the legality and occasional success of opposition movements, it is by no means an ideal state of affairs, and it should not be accepted as a satisfactory regime type by Western leaders and states who seek to promote and spread democracy throughout the world.

Response #1: "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy" by Fareed Zakaria

In my response, I would like to focus specifically on the topic of democracy and constitutional liberalism because I see it as a starting point for many possible discussions regarding regime types, types of democracies, role of the government, individual rights...etc.

* Procedure for selecting the government vs. goals/qualities of the government?
Zakaria defines democracy as the “rule of the people” and according to Samuel P. Huntington, it manifests itself in the form of open, free, fair elections – regardless of the qualities of the government established as the result of those elections.
This is an interesting point since democracy is concerned with having a choice, not necessarily its content or the result. It relates back to the role of the electoral system: giving people opportunities to express preferences regardless of the actual content of that preference. Then the qualities we often associate with democracy, such as “comprehensive catalog of social, political, economic, and religious rights” are not necessarily what characterize a state as democratic.
In the realm of our “democracy” discussion, the two elements presented above are really the question of democracy vs. constitutional liberty. These are the two components of a “liberal democracy”: democracy (political liberties) and constitutional liberalism (civil liberties). Is there a causation link here? Zakaria believes that “constitutional liberalism has led to democracy, but democracy does not seem to bring constitutional liberalism.” In other words, if the government acts on behalf of its people’s individual rights and freedom, such an effort will lead to democratic elections…etc. But the reverse might be difficult since "democratic" elections often come down to choosing the lesser evil. Half of the “democratizing states” fall into this category of “illiberal democracy” and are heading toward illiberalism instead of maturing into liberal democracies. This is interesting since we, especially from the West, tend to view elections as the first step toward democratization and liberalization but yet the argument made above implies otherwise.
Then there is this quote from Zakaria’s piece to consider: “Constitutional liberalism is about the limitation of power, democracy about its accumulation and use." Is there a dichotomy here? Does this contradict his other points? Is there a way to resolve this tension?

Then I would like to raise another question briefly mentioned in Zakaria’s piece:
* Illiberal democracy or liberal autocracy?
Election may be the symbolical first step but constitutional liberalism is viewed as a stronger foundation/preparation for further democratization. Furthermore, it is more difficult to push constitutional liberalism on a society than to impose elections.
Is one more admirable than the other? Which one has higher possibility/potential to move toward liberal democracy? And more broadly, is it always beneficial to move in that direction despite the chaos and instability that seem to accompany liberalization and democratization-not to mention many failed attempts around the world?
Zakaria’s quote toward the end seems to answer this question partially: “[illiberal democracies] will discredit liberal democracy itself… democracy without constitutional liberalism is not simply inadequate, but dangerous, bringing with it the erosion of liberty, the abuse of power, ethnic divisions, and even war.” But...are we simply assuming here that liberal democracy is the most ideal form? Zakaria's piece raises numerous interesting questions.