Ethnic Conflict: When States Are No Longer Respected to Determine Society's Behavior

As several of the previous have been discussing ethnicity and ethnic conflict, and as I have been reading them, the question that came to mind was that of identity politics. Why do people choose to align themselves with ethnic, tribal, religious, or other non-state in-groups instead of the state apparatus? And this seemed to relate to Migdal's discussion on who a society deems the authority on directing acceptable social behavior, on creating the societal institutions that mold individual behavior.

Migdal describes the modern state as being a phenomenon in that it is a phase in history in which the state is generally accepted without little question as the ultimate authority on societal behavior and directing that. Problems of ethnic, or really any conflict that is intra-state rather than inter-state seems to be connected to a rejection of the given state apparatus as this authority. This is a large source of societal outliers: those who deem religion or some other force more legitimate than the state in directing behavior.

And even if the majority of individuals are not naturally of this ilk, I think what the film about Bosnia illustrated was that the threats of war and the virus of fear can cause us to easily latch on to those in-group identities that oppose that over-arching authority of the state. I think that is similar to one of the previous blog's discussion of the rebound effects of "ethnic coding". When the cause of a conflict is deemed to be due to opposing ethnic in-groups, even if that is not the cause, these identities are very easy to latch on to.

Relating back to the idea of strong states and weak societies however, I think that the ability of states to be strong (to provide the necessary resources as they deem appropriate) is what really influences people to align or not align themselves with a view of ultimate state-based authority. As in the film, where the people were so isolated from the central government and had to turn to their own civil societal resources and strengths, if the government is not able to provide security and safety then the people will no longer view the state as that primary authority of determining societal behavior.

Ultimately, I think this is easily boiled down to a simpler question of how these in-groups gain levels of accepted authority higher than the state and where the individual citizen's acceptance of that authority comes from: from some personal background cause or from imposed views of biased outsiders?

Social Science

As Dr. King mentioned in class, the task of social scientist is not to study the minutia of a single country's inner-workings, but instead the patterns and trends born out the actions of multiple states. By keeping an eye on “the social”, the social scientists is able to interpret general behaviors of humanity. He/she cannot be concerned with individuals, just their contribution as part of the greater whole. This understanding of societies general trends enables the social scientists to better understand the driving forces of societies.
The individual concerned with the singular actor is the psychologist, the student of the individual's behavior. As students of foreign policy, this a striking distinction between two different paths Is a foreign policy expert expected to be both psychologist and social scientist, and if so, which takes precedence? While at first glance the two seem reconcilable, there actually exists a significant problem in their coexistence. Consider the situation of an outbreak of fighting in Baghdad. The social scientist would consider this an event common to most civil wars, while the psychologist would instead think of it as the work of an specific member of the insurgency, an example of this persons particular habits and behavior. How do these two different assessments of a situation change one's reaction to what has happened, their solutions? Social science views ones actions as a piece of the general trend, but psychology demands the primacy of the individual- trends are only a macroscopic snapshot. Though not necessarily mutually exclusive, two differing world views at some level demand a foreign policy advisor to make their own choice of the trend or the individual.

More on ethnicity...

In a sort of response to the previous post, and to the general idea it addresses, I agree with the idea that defining a conflict as “ethnic” violence without proper understanding of the situation on the ground is foolish and all too common.  At the same time, I feel that the misunderstanding from the outsider’s point of view is often more strongly correlated with an incorrect interpretation of the concept of ethnic identity, exclusive of the occurrence of violence.

 

If we’re referring to communities in Africa, Eastern Europe, and Asia, many of the entities that we term “ethnic groups” today are modern constructions that only came into existence during the colonial period and as a result of the “divide and conquer” strategy employed by Europeans.  In Africa especially, prior to this it’s generally assumed that groups of people in regions that now experience “ethnic” violence were no more ethnically divided than Western Europe is today.  Of course there were divisions – of lineage and occupation, and class and language – and even some that resulted in violent conflict, but group compositions were much more fluid and adaptive than how we picture them today.

 

This is not to say that ethnic identities, meaningfully or arbitrarily imposed, don’t carry weight in modern society, because obviously they do – we have last weekend’s events in Nigeria and, to a degree, India to prove that.  Constructions of ethnicity have evolved to encompass religious, cultural, and, most unfortunately, racial differences, and it’s this evolution that, especially from a Western perspective, has resulted in the amplification of ethnic nationalism.  Societies to which ethnic conflict is a foreign concept often conceive of it as a characteristic that is concurrent with and inherent to societies that also experience underdevelopment, corruption, and religious extremism; admittedly, it does appear on a surface level that they are mutually reinforcing. But, as Professor King mentioned, though social order may be fragile, violence is never predetermined.  Ethnic conflict hasn’t always existed, and the common Western idea that it is inevitable and uncontrollable in or between specific states, cultures, and religions is inaccurate.  A shift towards more accurate categorizing of “ethnic” violence is unlikely to occur without a transition in the common understanding of what ethnicity itself was originally, and what it has become today.

Coding "Ethnic Violence"

In “Ethnic and Nationalist Violence”, Brubaker and Laitin argue an imperative point regarding coding practices. Specifically, the authors argue that coding violence as “ethnic” can: (1) cause an overestimation of the incidence of ethnic violence and (2) cause a feedback effect, increasing the actual occurrence of ethnic violence.

The first point seems more obvious. If we code using the word “ethnic”, we assume there is a right way to measure violence. Obviously, this is much more complex and complicated. To code violence as “ethnic” requires statistical knowledge and research at the local level; most of us would agree on this point.

The second argument regarding coding is not as straightforward. If some sort of feedback effect occurs when we code (possibly miscode) something as “ethnic violence”, then how can be keep from instigating this effect? If coding violence as “ethnic” creates feedback and can lead to greater occurrence of violence, then how can we “accurately” code? Is it possible? Although Brubaker and Laitin do not outline any specific solutions, “Ethnic and Nationalist Violence” should spark some sort of creative thought regarding the daunting task of coding.

While miscoding can occur due to lack of knowledge regarding the situation at hand, it can also originate from the misuse of language. During the 1960’s, the semi-fixation with discussing ethnic identity became prominent in academic and journalistic writings. As time progressed, the phrase “ethnic violence” was thrown into academic journal articles, with no real analysis or explanation of the term. I argue that such nonchalant use the phrase “ethnic violence” also accounts for the feedback effect.

In general, language seems to be an unscientific mess. Nevertheless, as social scientists, the way in which we present our ideas and the language that we use greatly impact public perception, opinion, action and reaction. Coding violence as “ethnic” not only requires proper information, but it also requires an explanation of how the phrase “ethnic violence” is being used for the particular situation. In other words, an explanation of the ordinary language term “ethnic violence” should be given before any analysis is made regarding the particular violent conflict. While coding will continue to be messy and complex, this approach could decrease the occurrence of the feedback effect.

Core-Periphery?

We were short of time on Friday and I had to give up my chance to speak, so here, I'd like to write a little more of my thoughts about globalization.

First of all, let's start by having everyone's consensus on two points.

1st - The point of (economic) wealth is to earn more "happiness".
2nd - "Happiness," in this case, can be measured only by how a person himself describes his own level of happiness. In other words, I am the only person who has right to say whether or not I'm happy. Other people's judgment on my happiness is irrelevantly subjective, and likewise, I hold no right to measure other people’s level of happiness.

If we agree with these two conditions, I find it difficult to agree with the whole idea of globalization and core-periphery system. As I said, statistics show that people who are relatively wealthier than other people are happier, not the people who are absolutely wealthy. (it looks like this http://images.google.co.kr/imgres?imgurl=http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/1107/images/02Wellbeing-1.gif&imgrefurl=http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/1107/HTML/docshell.asp%3FURL%3D02Wellbeing.asp&usg=__J0nvlkmCpG6P4MEl9mz-1ENJ5g0=&h=262&w=492&sz=4&hl=ko&start=19&um=1&tbnid=39JkR81x5MyTKM:&tbnh=69&tbnw=130&prev=/images%3Fq%3DLevel%2Bof%2Bhappiness%2Bnations%26um%3D1%26complete%3D1%26hl%3Dko%26lr%3D%26newwindow%3D1%26sa%3DN although not quite identical) For instance, according to data I found a couple years ago, people from Bangladesh describe themselves happier than Americans do for themselves.

There are two types of ‘other’ people. One is the people who are living close by within a nation, and the other is the people who live in neighboring countries. The data I used explicitly illustrate that people tend to be happier as long as they are wealthier (or not poorer by significant amount) than one(or both) of the two types. This means, although globalization might help developing countries in numbers, when we are considering the real effect, it’s actually degrading their level of happiness.

One person said during our discussion group: “Isn’t it still better as long as countries are producing more?” Well, the thing is, who are we to judge what ‘better’ really means. If we go back to the second premise I made earlier, I do not have any right to say they are being better off (let’s say ‘better off’ means ‘having more happiness’). As long as the people of developing countries say they are happy, who are we to decide which is ‘better’ for them? The relative wealth determines who’s happy, not the absolute wealth.

In short, it all comes down to one point: we do not have the right to say what makes them happy, simply because we are not them. If we agree with the two previously stated pre-conditions, it seems impossible to think how core-periphery system benefits developing nations under the World-system Theory.

Ethnic and Nationalist Violence Variation

In “Ethnic and Nationalist Violence”, Rogers Brubaker and David Laitin highlight that the fundamental problem in the literature concerning ethnic violence does not have to do with competing theories about a well-defined phenomenon; but rather, the overarching ideas on what exactly constitutes ethnic violence.

First of all, while pointing out that ethnic violence is certainly not widesprea, Brubaker and Laitin point out the recent increase in regions of the former Soviet Union and Sub-Saharan Africa. The first explanation regards the decline or “decay of the Weberian state”, an argument which uses Max Weber’s definition of the state as an entity that has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence/force within a territory. The authors argue that the inability of states in the developing world to maintain order results in diminishing transnational, state-strengthening resources. The lack of an “external patron” to help maintain peace in the region makes ethnic cleavages more likely to translate into conflict, and eventually into violence.

However, what the authors fail to point out is the analogous ability of transnational resources to function as means for furthering ethnic violence. For example, in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, I believe that the availability of economic and military resources to the Yakouba ethnic group in Cote d’Ivoire from their kin across the Liberian border largely influenced their choice of armed violence rather than non-violent protest against the government in 2002. Therefore, the availability of transnational resources can play a role in the process of protest—violent or non-violent—that an ethnic group may choose.

Brubaker and Laitin’s second explanation concerns the ideological shifts that have occurred since the fall of Communism. The authors point to ethnic separatist movements between the 1950s and 1980s that framed the struggle between the opposition and the incumbent in the context of the larger struggle between communism and capitalism. Today, as many NGOs and international institutions are starting to recognize individual ethnic group claims, the incentive of violent challengers to structure their struggle in the context of human rights and ethnic claims has strengthened. In fact, this “ethnicization” of violence is perhaps the underlying reason behind Brubaker and Laitin’s claim that interpretations of violent struggles as exemplars of ethnic violence are subject to so much dispute.

When analyzing violence in the framework of ethnic conflict, Brubaker and Laitin point out the importance of looking at violence not as a degree but rather, as a phase of conflict. The authors, therefore, establish the definition of ethnic violence to as “violence perpetrated across ethnic lines, in which at least one party is not a state, and in which the ethnic difference is noted…as having been integral rather than incidental to the violence.” They then provide an analytical review of the literature on ethnic violence, examining three particular approaches to ethnic violence: inductive, theory-driven, and culturalist. Within the inductive approach, I found the discussion on the variation between regions with similar ethnic tensions in which one has erupted into ethnic violence while ethnic conflict in the other region has been largely nonviolent. Many questions arise when examining this variation, as in the case between the Basques and the Catalan. Why is it that ethnic conflict has been characterized by the violence of the terrorist ETA while the conflict in Catalonia has been relatively non-violent? If Laitin and Brubaker define violence as a phase in ethnic conflict, is it only a matter of time before ethnic conflict will erupt into violence in the autonomous region of Catalonia? In analyzing these questions, I found it especially helpful to look at Brubaker and Laitin’s “cultural construction of fear” within their cultural approaches. Indeed, the legacy of Francisco Franco’s repression and attempted elimination of Basque and Catalan language and culture in attempt to establish a unified, centralist Spanish identity still continues today. However, it seems that while the main concern in Catalonia has been the perpetuation of its language and culture, the Basque language, spoken and understood by less than one-fourth of the ethnic group, has been more a source of division than anything else. Therefore, Basque nationalism is still largely based on the fear of centralist repression (from the Spanish state) rather than on its common cultural or linguistic identity.

Looking over Brubaker and Laitin’s three approaches towards ethnic conflict, it appears that the dominant theme is the existing variation and heterogeneity between occurrences of ethnic violence. Their discussion on the need to identify, analyze and explain the differences between instances of ethnic violence is extremely valuable, rather than attempting to construct one enormous and dilute theory of ethnic violence, we are better off analyzing the variations first and foremost. After all, that is what comparative politics is all about.

Balancing Civil Society and Strong States in the Development Process (While Avoiding Disorder)

We’ve been talking a lot about the dichotomy between an active citizen base, or strong civil society, versus strong and efficient states, mostly categorizing one or the other as necessary for modernization and development. Midgal, as it so clearly states in the title of his book, addresses what happens when society is strong and the state is weak, analyzing the relationship between the two and calling for a strengthening of the state to make effective change, and even Meredith compares India’s diverse and active pluralistic society and arguably inefficient, corrupt government (Strong civil society/weak state) to China’s super-efficient and pragmatic authoritarian government, which historically and even presently represses its citizenship (the Cultural Revolution of the 60’s, 1989’sTiananmen Square incident, and today’s censorship of the internet and media: Strong state/weak civil society). Tuesday night I also attended a talk given by Duncan Green, head of research for Oxfam Great Britain (and also former Senior Policy Adviser on Trade and Development at the Department for International Development and formrr policy analyst on trade and globalization for the Catholic Aid Agency of England and Wales) who discussed his latest book on development, From Poverty to Power: How Active Citizens and Effective States can Change the World. He spoke about this “active citizenship” (as an indication of success post-development ) versus “effectives states” (necessary to develop, he argued) dichotomy as well, claiming that historically there is a conflict between the two.
What I’m interested in though, is whether this dichotomization is necessary? To me it seems the old paradigm, ‘nothing in excess,’ holds true, and although it might seem like an obvious (and maybe naive) solution to any sort of disorder that could arise from either extreme, I would personally argue for a moderate form of both state and society, in order for a nation to actually function effectively. Too great of unrestrained freedom given to civil society means consensus would never be reached as well as allows for the capacity for ethnic tensions to flair, as addressed by Bates as well as Brubaker and Laitin. I think we can all understand and agree on the dangers of too repressive of a government as well. Either, I believe, could lead to a form of disorder, possibly violent, and the potential for society to get out of hand, whether this should come from lack of government control, or too much of it (thus causing civil society to rise up violently or ‘explode’ if too thoroughly repressed as Buruma addressed last week).
Finding some sort of balance between the two is definitely something that I would say most developed and already industrialized Western countries, like the US, aim to do in forming a picture of their ideal governments. The issue, however, is whether a government balanced between an active but not too disorderly civil society and effective yet not repressive government can combine in the right measures to complete the modernization process of an undeveloped or third world country. Both Midgal and Duncan seem to think that a strengthened state is important in the development process. Not that I am familiar with all the case studies of all the countries in recent history that have undergone rapid growth, but it seems to me that most of the ones we have looked at (ie China and India in Meredith, Israel in Midgal, Eastern bloc nations, etc) have done so through the means of either a particularly pro-active civil society (an up rise of the people) or else through the forces of a particularly strong state, with little civil engagement. Is one or the other really necessary in modernizing while avoiding disorder, though, or is there a way that a moderation of the two can become combined?

Democratization For Who? Says Who?

In reading Wittes discussion of the democratization process in the Middle East, focusing on the variant forms of Islamist political participant, what I was drawn to focus on the connection between this discussion of what political parties would be conducive to democratization and the question of a weak versus a strong state, not to mention the strength of the internal society. 

When considering these two themes and how they relate to one another, two questions come to mind, though they somewhat intermingle.

Firstly, I wonder about Wittes' refusal to accept the ability of militant and nationalist Islamist groups to create democracy. It seems that there are plenty of examples, including the popular election of Hamas in Gaza, where these groups are democratically elected. But even if they are not popularly elected, my second question is on the issue of who exactly an authority has legitimacy over. If there is a particular group, be it a militant Islamist group or even a group of tafkiris, that are able to provide for themselves the basic capabilities of a state, such as "appropriating or using resources in determined ways" as Migdal states in the beginning of his book, then was authority or legitimacy is given to any other body to try and enforce some larger view of theirs that aims at "democratization."

This, I think gets at a fundamental question of what is a state. If, as Migdal says, it is a body that is able to provide for its "citizens" and regulate society and resources in a determined way, then who has authority to impose government on a group that might already be achieving capabilities?

This is a question that I think is resurfacing repeatedly around the world with questions of secessionist states, or even in Iraq to relate it closer to Wittes' subject matter, is what is an acceptable size of government to operate on an international level? And also, what legitimacy is given to what has effectively amounted to civil societal institutions, such as a militant political party, when a state is too weak to provide those capabilities on its own.

Is Islamic democratization possible?

After reading Amara Wittes, "Three Kinds of Movements," I was left wondering if it is possible for an Islamist state to become democratized. As stated in the article one of the main requirements for democracy is some sort of equality of law for all individuals: male and female, rich and poor, religious and atheist.  However, it seems that Islamic society would be unwilling to embrace this type of equality, as it would lessen religious control of the state and allow for its citizens more freedom to potentially question religious influence over laws. 

Wittes discussed three different types of Islamic groups: tikfiris, militant and nationalist Islamist groups, and those groups that appear to reject violence as a means to achieve their goals.  The first group uses violence to accomplish their goals, justifying the violence by means of religion.  However, since religion is used as a justification it is extremely unlikely that the violence would stop, even if a group like al-Qaeda was able to seize control; there would always be those citizens who are not religious enough or not observant enough of religious law and customs, who need to be 'taken care of' so to speak.  The second group attempts to reinforce democratic processes by means of violence.  However, democratic means cannot exist if the government, or group, employing them uses force or the threat of violence to reinforce the democratic policies.  The third group appears to be more peaceful and conducive to democratization such as Jordan, but the state is still greatly influenced by Islamic law and tradition.

Wittes postulates that democracy cannot really exist in an Islamist state until there is "a more open political market" and more pluralism.  I agree that in order for democracy to exist there needs to be an arena for open discussion between the government and the citizens about the manner in which the government is operating.  In addition, the state needs to allow others to run for office in a fair election, in order to support a diversity of political views.  Although I would argue that true democracy cannot exist without the separation of church and state.  This, however, appears to be impossible as religion is so thoroughly engrained in Islamist society that is would be difficult to separate the religious from the secular, and most likely any attempts to do so would meet violent opposition.

China - Social Issues and Income Inequalities Call for Political Reform

As China is experiencing the rise of the Fourth Generation, is emerging as a global commercial power, and has had an extraordinary average annual growth in GDP as a result of globalization, it is easy to believe that the changes in China after communism have dramatically improved the livelihood of the Chinese people overall. However, this perspective may be deceiving; although poverty levels have undoubtedly decreased after China opened to marketization as a whole, there are a vast number of social problems in the country that the government is failing to address, thus there is still a great need for political reform.
In The Elephant and the Dragon, the life story of a man who was a child when Mao was in power, Tony Ma, illustrates how there is still a great lack of opportunity for people in the countryside to succeed through hard work and ambition. Mr. Ma had worked in a steel mill for two dollars a month and lived with the fear that he would have to work in this mill for the rest of his life. He was one of the only 3 workers, out of 2000 workers in the mill, who was admitted to college, and later received a scholarship to study in the United States. In this sense, Mao’s legacy of a lack of opportunity for people to rise above working in a factory for low wages is still present.
The World Bank suggests that there are still 300 million poor in China. Although marketization and globalization has highly decreased the amount of people living below the poverty line, there has been dramatically increasing inequalities in income, health and education as a result. China’s social problems span to include child labor, very few labor rights, fragile banks, deteriorating environment, shortages in drinkable water, among many others.
These facts demonstrate that we cannot be fooled by China’s rise as a political and economic power in the international scene; it is still very much a developing country and the government needs to provide a safety net for the poor in rural regions. And if the political atmosphere actually has improved to protect the poor, there is still room for improvement, because when there are children making fireworks 15 hours a day for 12 cents an hour instead of attending school, a lot of change needs to be made.

In contemporary China, is democratization really an issue?

Gallagher’s “Reform and Openness” takes a different direction than Lipset, describing the causal relationship between economic growth and a movement towards democratization. Though China remains a Leninist state among a sea of collapsed socialist states, Gallagher suggests that China will eventually follow the path to democratization. This view is clear in the title of the last section of the article (“Delayed Democracy”).

However, I would like the point out that Gallagher’s article does not acknowledge the possibility that the Chinese people may not necessarily care to democratize at all (at least during the current times). Her attention to FDI, while raising several points about why China’s shift to an open market economy was smooth, seems to ignore some human realities of China’s history and mentality during the 20th century. Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution did not just cause a “dire capital shortage”; millions of people starved as a result of these policies. Perhaps China’s smooth transition can also be attributed to competition between firms, but the simple realization of the Chinese people that they have more to eat as a result of the “Reform and Openness” policy could have very well led to their ignoring of now seemingly lesser important governmental actions. This point is made clear in the Tiananmen Square case: though it stands stark in the minds of the older generation of political dissidents, a new generation of young Chinese, now spending, eating, and playing as they please, do not know nor may not care about this event that happened merely 20 years ago. This dismissal can not only be attributed to governmental censorship.

China and FDI: A Break in the Correlation

I distinctly remember one day in one of my high school government classes when my professor told the class that economic growth and democratization are correlated. This notion was further proven to me when I read Seymour Martin Lipset: when a country’s economy grows and progresses to a more worldly economy, democracy “and democratic characteristics” are also developed—especially with communication and education.

 

As is usually the case with many of these “rules” and assumptions, there is an exception; and China is clearly the one in this case. According to Mary E. Gallagher, “China has maintained a rapid pace of economic growth for over twenty years without succumbing to political liberalization—indeed with only the slightest movement toward democratic government.” A key factor is the country’s foreign direct investment liberalization. In this case, therefore, economic growth has not influenced or aided the advancement of democracy (despite the opposite being the foundation of United States foreign policy toward China for the last two and a half decades or so), but has instead been credited with saving the Chinese Communist Party. By opening its borders to large flows of foreign capital, China’s communist leaders have related this economic issue to nationalist ones, thus leaving no space for any demands on political reform by society. Gallagher posits, “Economic development amid increasing openness has contributed to the stability of authoritarian rule in China.”

 

Foreign direct investment has furthermore created greater competition between firms and between workers. This competition has developed pressures to adopt capitalistic practices learned from foreigners. By obtaining more capitalistic practices, those in the state can gain not only capital and technology but also “the prestige that comes with ties to the international economy.” Because they are being separated by this competitiveness, workers are not able to unite into a strong urban class and uniformly protest for reform in the political sphere.

 

So, will China stop being the exception to Lipset’s correlation? Perhaps… but in the long run! Gallagher concludes,

 

While foreign investment may indirectly improve the environment for future democratization, through the promotion of the rule of law, transparency, and the freer flow of information, in the short term its presence has afforded the regime more time and more political space to pursue economic reform without political liberalization.

 

I can say I somewhat agree. After growing up in an environment that has always portrayed China as unfaltering and “übercommunist,” it is a bit difficult to imagine it as a “real” democracy. Gallagher’s argument, nonetheless, seems plausible. I really do hope that in the long run China’s integration into the global economy and interaction with democratic countries will hopefully influence its society and build a more stable foundation for future democratization; after all, it can be as Gallagher asserted: “political change has been delayed, not stopped.”

Will China Ever Move Towards Democracy?

As we have read and learned, mainly from Seymour Martin Lipset, it is generally thought that economic growth directly correlates to a growth of democracy. As a nation’s economy grows, increases in communication, mobilization, and education all occur throughout society. All of these factors point toward an increase in democracy. So why is China, which has experienced some of the most staggering economic growth of the last century, still under the control of an authoritarian regime? Gallagher argues that it is the timing and sequencing of its reforms, combined with the prevalence of foreign direct investment, that have kept the communist party in control of China. By utilizing foreign direct investment as the catalyst and engine for economic growth, competition, and with it capitalism, increased dramatically in China. Competition for jobs decreased the power of the urban working class (often a strong supporter of democracy), gave the government political capital to enact reforms in the future, and also allowed the Communist Party to frame privatization and reform as vital for Chinese interests. All of these factors have stemmed the tide of political liberalization, and many now believe China may remain under authoritarian control for the foreseeable future. However, there are many problems that China’s rapid growth has created which may test the sturdiness of the Communist Party. The rewards of the booming economy have created an enormous gap between the rich and the poor and rural areas and cities. The increase in industries has forced China to rely on coal for much of its energy, making many Chinese cities some of the most polluted on the planet. Corruption is still widespread throughout China, and causes many ordinary workers to see smaller incomes. The Chinese banking system has taken on many bad loans at the orders of the government, and as we have seen this can lead to financial disaster. Lastly, what was once China’s great strength, its seemingly limitless potential work force and giant population, may soon become a problem. Will China be able to take care of its elderly, with the one-child policy limiting younger generations? All of these are serious problems China is faced with. While the Communist Party’s grip today seems as strong as ever, there are many roadblocks towards its continued dominance.

Civil Society: A Help or Hindrance?

China began its process toward rapid growth and expansion under Deng Xiopang, who believed the road to advancement was through slow, deliberate reforms of the economic system rather than through pronounced revolutionary change. In Robyn Meredith’s work, The Elephant and the Dragon, we are given a thorough account of the Communist Party of China’s micromanagement of economic growth, from the formation of special economic zones to huge infrastructure development projects. Several questions are especially salient with respect to the relationship between economic reform and political reform, the space for civil associations and institutions in society, and ultimately China’s ability to maintain its superpower status and its economic growth. Meredith paints an image of the Chinese countryside being lifted out of poverty, and to be sure, Chinese citizens are better off because of the Communist Party’s invitation of foreign investment and implementation of economic projects. Yet as Mary Gallagher’s article points out, much of China’s economic growth stems from Foreign Direct Investment. It seems that a strong indigenous Chinese role in the country’s economic development does not exist. Is this the reason why China persists in its authoritarian system, why citizens have been reticent to demand real political and social reform from their leadership? Buruma’s article speculates that because Chinese civil society is so weak, and because opposition is rigorously suppressed, this idea of a new, modern China could fail, stemming from the fact that citizens have no outlets for protest. China is always being brought up as an example of rapid economic growth and success, but are the achievements of countries like India in some ways more enduring, because the leaders have been held accountable for their actions? India’s growth rate is nearing China’s, but what is interesting is that India has had a long history of opposition movements and freedom of expression. Or is the lack of civil society in inconsequential, as Marc Morjé Howard brought up in his article. Would a more vibrant civil society in China merely “rock the boat,” creating disruptions domestically and economically? Is it possible to sustain this impressive rate of economic growth and societal advancement while at the same time introducing more democratic processes?

Thoughts on Merediths Book and Policy Recommendations

In many ways Robyn Meredith’s 2007 book The Elephant and the Dragon portends many of the financial hardships and burdens of the financial market the U.S. is facing today in 2008, in light of the rise of China and India. The book does a great job documenting China and India’s rise to global prominence, appearing more like a statistical review at times rather than an analytical approach to globalization and its implications. Nevertheless, Meredith manages to highlight several problems the U.S. faces with the rise of China and India. The first and most obvious is the use off-shoring and outsourcing practices by American corporations to save money. In my opinion, however, the most disconcerting and important obstacle the U.S. faces in light of the rise of China and India is her perennial budget deficit and shoddy monetary policy. It is remarkable how the U.S. went from the world’s largest creditor country (in the 50s-70s) with monumental foreign projects like the Marshall Plan, to the world’s largest debtor country in a matter of one generation. As of 2005, the U.S. has perpetually had a negative savings rate (-0.4%), yet the Federal Reserve continues to keep interest rates hovering around 1.5-2%. Pulling up interest rates is imperative in combating inflation and encouraging savings—after all, capital comes from savings, not the printing of money out of thin air. Besides, the market would never set interest rates at 1.5-2%, and the only way to effectively have artificially low interest rates is to print money, i.e. inflation (a direct increase in the supply of money). Meredith talks about the erosion of the middle class in America, but I feel that she neglects the monetary aspect of the issue. Inflation acts as a second tax on the citizenry and it is the most regressive tax of all, disproportionately affecting the middle and lower classes. People are quick to notice their cost of living go up, manifest in the Department of Labor’s monthly calculation of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and Producer Price Index (PPI). Though the markets are quick to adjust for inflation, daily wages and thus yearly salaries are the slowest to adjust; therefore, the middle and lower classes find themselves having to spend more of their money on daily items for sustenance and hence less on savings and retirement. This contributes to a severe case of “status anxiety”—a more subtle, yet pervasive type of class warfare whereby members of the middle class will “lash out” at any attempt by others at social mobility, for fear that there place will be usurped (as if it were a zero-sum game). Tocqueville called this “the constant search for place”, or “place hunting.” Perhaps the most unfortunate aspect of the U.S. debt, however, is the fact that we have nothing to show for it. The government has borrowed trillions of dollars and told consumers to do just that—consume. We have no improved infrastructure, restored manufacturing base, improved education, increased research in science and technology, or increased service sector to show for it; we only have new cars, more plasma televisions, and bigger homes to show for it. I am optimistic that the U.S. can turn its economy around, but first it must do several momentous things: 1) reign in federal spending and fix the national deficit, 2) pass a constitutional amendment requiring a balanced budget to ensure that we groom Congressman that value sound budgets and monetary policy (currently we have the most fiscally irresponsible Congress in the world), 3) decrease our global empire and thereby reign in military spending, 4) fix social programs like Social Security and Medicare (part D) to ensure that they do not bankrupt our country, 5) transform our phony economy into one that actually produces things or provides services instead of merely consuming, 6) reform monetary policy so that inflation is curbed and therefore increase incentives to save (right now there is no incentive to save if one knows that there money will not be worth anything when they want to take it out—the time value of money), and 7) transform the notion of the American dream from one that values riches and material possessions to one that values living within one’s means and values the notion of constant evolution, not necessarily measured in material wealth.

A few thoughts on Democracy

At the end of Pierre Hassner's article on Russia's transition, he invokes an interesting quote that summed up one of the major themes of this week's readings on Post-communist states and democracy: "Liberal democracy is the least natural regime on earth".

For the most part, as Americans raised in a highly normative mold as to the best or most legitimate form of Government, we tend to think of political systems as existing roughly on a scale of better to worse -- and often in a sort of teleological flux. It is easy to cultivate such an attitude: a mix of patriotism (with a natural inclination towards liberal democracy), historical precedent (the scores of oppressive tyrannies that pepper history), and a distinctly Western individualist ethic (further re-enforcing liberalism) all contribute to the widely-held notion that we have somehow achieved a rather ideal form of government.

There is plenty of debate over what form of Democracy best accomplishes democratic ends -- and we spent much of the early part of this CPS class discussing the trade-offs inherent to different structural and electoral features that characterize modern democracies. And rather naturally, we look upon those countries that seem stunted under authoritarian or autocratic regimes as dangerous or backward to some extent. The oft-repeated attitude of Winston Churchill ("Democracy is the worst form of government except for all those others that have been tried.") is really the one that sticks with us.

Hassner, however, raises the very interesting question of whether this is an appropriate attitude to take. I do not mean to defend the actions of the various autocratic regimes around the world -- certainly most have not achieved a level of peace and stability that many Liberal Democracies have been able to cultivate. It is possible, though, to imagine that different cultural and historical circumstances might lend themselves to the neccessary establishment of a rather autocratic political system.

The tumultuous political history of France is a rather interesting example (and one which Hassner touches upon with his discussion of Charles De Gaulle). In some sense, France still grapples with the historical legacy of both its Monarchy and the powerful chief-executives that occasionally are at odds with strong Republican principles. Napoleoen, De Gaulle, and others give France a history of a strong central leadership and (particularly in the Fifth Republic) have resulted in proportionally more power being allocated to the President (as opposed to, say, Britain's strong Parliamentary streak). It is tempting to lump the world's liberal democracies together to contrast them with less democratic regimes -- but even among the utterly legitimate we see that some cultures may have a strong tendency towards central (and individual) rule. If we continue this spectrum a little further, Putin's rise in Russia may make perfect sense given the social context (and indeed, seems related to Russia's Tsarist past).

It is wrong to justify Putin's various crimes under this banner -- and we certainly cannot declare his violent oppression of various groups legitimate. We might be wise, however, to try to challenge our gut-level take on these autocratic regimes. Even if we hold liberal ideas, we have to acknowledge the wide range of possibilities that even competing liberal values might lead to in forms of government. And we should tailor out attitudes and foreign affairs philosophy to this reality.

Reaction to Hassner's "Russia's Tranisiton to Democracy"

When thinking about democracy and all of the different types and descriptions that have been provided and criticized, Russia is among one of the more confusing nations when it comes to classification. Pierre Hassner highlights this especially through the actions and perception of the nation's former (and very much arguably current) leader--Valdimir Putin.
Hassner discusses both Putin and former leader Yeltsin, and there seem to be parallels between the leadership of each and previously explored political syndromes. For example, Yeltsin seems to have been a likely medium for an examination of feckless pluralism, where there is a blurred line between the state and the ruling party. Yeltsin in 1993 decided to order troops (state owned?) to fire on a "rebellious" parliament presumably to cater to his own agenda. Seizure of public wealth by the oligarchs was also not uncommon. Still, under Yeltsin there were vital elements of democracy such as freedom of the media and public debate, at least more so than under Putin. Putin, on the other hand, made his ascension to power and loves to create a guise of democracy while eliminating the content of institutions that he likes to tout as democratic. This element would not fit under the syndrome of dominant power politics, yet I believe that the sheer amount of power exercised by Putin that remains even once he leaves the position of prime minister is a testament to how much this single leader "dominates the political system in such a way that there appears to be little prospect of alternation of power in the forseeable future". This is especially evident through a) Putins handle on the malleable figure-head prime minister Medvedev b) Putin's own pro-Putin youth group "Nashi" ("ours" in Russian) and countless other examples.
Overall, I agree with Hassner's characterization of Russia's political system as a result of the political leader. One can hardly blame the Russian people for being in favor of a stabilizing force after the break-up of the Soviet Union, the U.S.'s indifferent diplomatic attitude following the Cold-War, etc. I do think he is accurate when he states that because a majority of people support Putin, it seems to them to be a sufficient democratic regime. I do, however, disagree with him on one point that I view as critical, especially in the wake of the recent Russia-Georgia conflict. A residual desire for respectability in the eyes of the West and the world is evident, but perhaps not in the way Hassner does. I think this desire for respectability has become a desire for other nations to fear Russia as a re-emerging superpower, not revere it as a democracy(which it is arguably not). While Putin has acquiesced his position as Prime Minister without touching the constitution, I think hes remaining strong hold on Russia is evident to the world. This desire for respect as a democracy once might have been relevent, but I think more than anything now Russia just wants to be recognized once again as a threat, hence the backing of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the resulting conflict with Georgia.
Is it fair to blame Russia for desiring such recognition, especially as they became essentially dipolmatically ignored after the U.S. presumed it had won the Cold War, and Nato is expanding, and U.S. troops are in Central Asia? Maybe, maybe not. This likely has a lot to do with the nationalism that is brewing inside the country and the amount of power the people of Russia are currently willing to cede to their beloved stabilzer, Vladimir Putin (Judomaster).



While he outlines Russia's current system, a sort of "virtual democracy" I have to disagree with one point he makes.

Post communism: democratic break through & consolidation of liberal democracy

This reading raises several concerns regarding the types of democracy and the process of democratization not only in the postcommunist world but in general as well.

1. Opposition to the authoritarian regime vs. Favor of democratic regime
In thinking about the transition to democracy, does a state become a democracy (or have a democratic breakthrough) because it tries to escape from the current authoritarian system or because it has the desire to move toward democracy? In other words, is democracy just one of many possible regimes for those who are trying to overthrow the current authoritarian regime? ("Heart of the matter was getting rid of unpopular and deeply dishonest incumbents, not backing some specific new set of policies or reforms"-McFaul) or is there a conscious pull or gravitational force from the democratic regimes (what McFaul describes as prodemocratic pull) from the West, aided by the domestic support?

2. Democratic breakthrough vs. consolidation of liberal democracy
Is democratization a gradual process or does it necessarily require a powerful breakthrough as discussed in McFaul's article? McFaul's article goes on to discuss the seven specific common factors that contributed to the successful democratic breakthroughs in three cases but goes on to state that those breakthroughs are only a start that cannot go on to consolidate democracy on their own. What is more interesting about these breakthroughs, however, is that all three cases assume the existence of electoral democracy (or the mere existence of elections for that matter), since, for an election to be fraud, it has to exist in the first place. Relating back to Zakaria's, Diamond's...etc articles, does this mean that elections are in fact the basis for democratization? (McFaul explicitly dismisses other economic, social factors as playing an essential role). McFaul further provides unessential factors and I was rather surprised to see him dismissing economic factors: "it was a purely political factor-vote fraud- that set things off" (McFaul) as apposed to Howard who acknowledges the role of economic stability/higher standards of living as the foundation for further democratization.

3. Institution -> values/traditions vs. values/traditions -> institution?
Comparing McFaul's piece with the one of Howard's then brings back this question discussed earlier in the course. For McFaul, it is the democratic values developed among the people that eventually change the institutional structure. But Howard argues that it is the communist and later postcommunist institutions and people's experience within them that prevent those people from actively participating in the civil society and organizations: "the prior regime type is by far the most powerful and statistically significant factor" (Howard) This also relates to our discussion of social capital and its vital role in a civil society as well as the decision to condemn the communist system rather than the people's lifestyles and personal histories.

4. Democratization vs. sovereignty/nationalism
In response to Hassner's piece, we should consider this dilemma between democratization (term often associated in "nation-building") and sovereignty (and its relation to nationalism). This discussion is important as it has an implication in discussion regarding humanitarian intervention in non-democratic states as well. Furthermore, considering Russia's desire to restore its power, which is more preferable: strong, autocratic state? or weak, democratic state?

5. Domestic pressure vs. international pressure toward democratization
Domestic factors: nationalism, corruption reported by the media, desire to restore power and legitimacy...etc
International factors: pressure from the democratic West (might even seem like a threat)
Which plays a greater role? this is important for determinig the mechanism for democratization.

The Fall of Communism from the Perspective of Przeworski and Arendt

My reflection this week focuses on Przeworski’s piece, “A Prologue: The Fall of Communism.” In this article he compares the fall of Communism to cancer, and the unique symptoms that led to its demise in individual countries, such as Poland, to pneumonia, which often kills cancer patients before cancer itself. He attempts to describe the decay of Eastern European Communism as a regime that was morally bankrupt and difficult to implement. While reading this I couldn’t help but think of Arendt’s characterization of totalitarian regimes in her work “The Origins of Totalitarianism,” which seems to explore Przeworski’s observation in greater detail.

Arendt states that ideals held by totalitarian parties, such as the Bolsheviks, are utopian, and while they may seem feasible while in the opposition, they are difficult to implement once in power. The machinations of the state’s political process hinders the creation of such a utopia as the party becomes bogged down in everyday politics. However, the party’s desire to keep power necessitates the imposition of a systematic, mass reign of terror, which becomes their sole means for creating order and utopia.

In my opinion, this method of retaining political power is doomed to failure in the case of Marxist-Leninism (and Fascism). The whole idea of a solitary party or vanguard coming to power in the name of the people and claiming to speak for them does not necessarily mean that the people espouse the same ideology. Such an ideology is often only half-heartedly adopted by the masses and only fully espoused with party stalwarts. Over time, the old party enthusiasts lose their zeal and the new generation becomes concerned only with keeping power and very few hold the ideals of the ruling party. Thus, totalitarians are only kept in power by force and control, which cannot last forever.

British Party Politics

I didn’t know a lot about British politics before reading Tony Wright’s book, other than the basic structure of the legislature and executive and names like Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, and Margaret Thatcher.  I didn’t realize that the party system in Parliament was laid out, and more importantly accepted, the way that it is; that in accordance with the first-past-the-post electoral system the party in power, which may have received only a few more votes than the opposition party, can essentially pass any legislation it wants without running into any significant obstacles. The dynamics of this system are really interesting to me, because the regimes I’m most familiar with have a much less friendly relationship with similar styles of governance.   The U.S. legislature is designed to prevent unilateral policy domination as far as possible, while rising democracies in the developing world are criticized, and often penalized in terms of donor aid and support, for developing what has been termed the “dominant one party” system, in which party turnover and equality of policy creation are markedly low. The view from the outside, or at least from where I’m standing, would have to be curious about why the “shadow” party, and the citizens who support it and the other opposition parties, so willingly accept a near-complete lack of political influence and interest articulation whenever they happen to lose an election.  However functionally efficient the system may be, it seems like it requires a certain extreme amount of trust that the party in power won’t completely screw everyone else over.  Maybe this is indicative of how deeply this particular system of government organization is ingrained in British history, consciousness, and culture, because I’m not sure how it would survive in “newer” democratic states.

Postwar and Backlash Toward the European Union

In Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945, Judt unfolds the social, economic and cultural changes of Europe after World War II. Within his analysis, Judt examines the rise of the European Union, evaluating its economic and ideological impact. In short, the European Union involved the integration of nation states into an economic union. Postwar portrays the complex and intricate history behind the EU, as the union sought to provide durable peace to a continent heavily damaged by two World Wars.

The public backlash toward the European Union is particularly interesting (and is a topic Professor King was only able to briefly mention in lecture). Like many, Judt is a proponent of the European Union and discusses the benefits and successes of the EU. Nevertheless, Judt also points out the limitations of the European Union; these limitations are often disconcerting to European citizens. Judt writes: “Like ‘growth’ or ‘peace’ –with both of which it was closely associated in the minds of its proponents– ‘Europe’ was too benign to attract opposition” (733).

The vagueness of the EU, along with “the all-too-precise detail of EU legislative directives”, has given rise to the democratic deficit (as described in lecture). For this reason, Europeans have trouble caring about a union which is unclear in its identity, but at the same time heavily encroaches and influences daily life.

Of course, Judt counters this “public backlash”, pointing out the way in which laws may be collectively devised via the European Union, but then implemented by individual nation states; this is a rather unique aspect of the EU. In other words, the Union serves as a sort of compromise, and as Judt puts it, an “international governance undertaken by national governments”.

Secondly, the EU is limited in that it has no way of determining and enforcing security interests. The EU is not a state; it has no army. For this reason, many wonder how the European Union will intervene when member-states are threatened. Again, Judt refutes this common “backlash”. He points out that the EU has defended its member states against foreign threats, specifically, by protecting economic interests. To exemplify EU defense, Judt cites tax breaks for exporters, high tariffs and restrictions on European products.

Judt continues this argument: “But these limitations –the fact that in spite of its size and wealth the EU was not a state, much less a great power– paradoxically served to enhance its image, at home and abroad” (735). In other words, the EU is unique in that it isn’t as much a slew of institutions but instead a set of “European values” which is, and continues to be, a very powerful entity.

Reflection on Democracy and Politics in Tony Wright's "British Politics"

The British political system has been called democratic. In a way, it is. The majority party, as elected by the people, has a tremendous amount of power. At any given time, it can dictate legislation and point the country in any direction it chooses (within reason). Political power is centralized within the executive office, which is run by the Prime Minister, the leader of the popularly-elected majority party.

However, while the British system may be called democratic in that it occasionally allows its citizens to vote for “two and a half” parties, the parties and not the people run the political system. Their insularity and total control over the government and its political agenda make it difficult for democratic politics or societal plurality to play out. This definitely allows for expedient governance, but is this a good thing?

Bernard Crick in his work In Defense of Politics extols politics as the arena in which important societal issues of the day can be worked out through compromises and power struggles. Yet, how are these issues to be adequately raised if the political system does not accurately represent its society? The narrow party system and the extent to which the parties control the political process, from the candidates to the manifesto, severely restricts individual preference, thus preventing issues from coming to the table.

The British system has a very long and proud tradition. It has proven resilient in the face of adversity and capable of adapting to change. Globalization has altered the contemporary British landscape, both in terms of its demographics and the types of questions its citizens ask of their government. Perhaps it’s time again for the British system to adapt to its surroundings and become more democratic, representative, and accountable.

Looking beyond Self-Interest: The European Union

It is plausible that the European Union would not have been such a successful institution were it not for the early leadership of the European Coal and Steel Community by Alcide De Gasperi from Trentino, Konrad Adenauer from Rhineland and Robert Schuman from Lorraine. In Judt’s view, these men were not worried about the merging of national sovereignty because they “[hailed] from the fringes of their own countries, where identities had long been multiple and boundaries fungible” (Judt 157). Their concepts of nationality and loyalty were much more malleable, all having lived in territories that were at one time parts of either the Austro-Hungarian or German Empires. The Christian Democratic Party had strong roots in many of the original six member states of the ECSC, the effect of which was the establishment of a platform concerned with social cohesion and collective responsibility. Though it would have been very easy to ostracize Germany after the war, these statesmen’s common Germanic background and involvement in Christian associations helped keep their eyes toward the long term economic and political security of Europe. Rather than being swept up in the nationalistic tendencies that characterized the previous period, Schuman especially was able to look past war-time hatreds and identified the fact that it was in France’s (and Europe’s) interest to incorporate the West German state, in order to mobilize its abundance of coal. Here, steel and coal act as centripetal forces strong enough to overpower the centrifugal forces of ethnicity and nationality. Europe was so completely destroyed by the Second World War, in both economic and civilian terms, that these states tempered their self-interests and acceded to union with Germany. This is why the current dominance of the EU by the UK, France, and Germany is ominous for the other member states and the original purpose of the EU. The criticism is that the EU is already hardly a model for democratic institutions, but it becomes less democratic as the interests of these three nations take precedence over the interests of smaller nations like Poland or Austria. The effect will be that fewer European citizens will participate in elections, feeling that the future course of their countries is out of their control.

The UK and the EU- Alex Hanson

Following World War Two, and especially by the mid 1950s, it was becoming clear that Great Britain no longer had the means to uphold its overseas empire. With the collapse of the Commonwealth, Britain needed to find new markets, and with the failure of the European Free Trade Agreement, it turned to the fledgling European Economic Community. Though French President Charles De Gaulle originally blocked Great Britain’s entrance, by 1972 they gained admittance. Judt characterizes Britain’s relationship with the European community, which begins with the EEC and continues through the European Union, as one of positives and negatives, and I would argue more positives than negatives. Great Britain gained much from its participation in the European community: a common market, subsidies and wealth reallocation for poorer regions, uninhibited travel, and seeming protection from another European war. It also helped reestablish and redirect Great Britain, which following the Suez Canal debacle was entering into an identity crisis. However, the United Kingdom’s increasing ties to Europe received much opposition. For much of its history Britain has followed a very different path than Europe. Separated by the English Channel, Britain was spared from much of the violence and upheaval that shaped the European continent during modern times. These differences made many British citizens wary of uniting with Europe. The opposition criticized the disproportionate amount the UK paid (Margaret Thatcher did likewise), and how what started off as a purely economic arrangement expanded into many different areas. Tony Wright expresses what, to many, was the greatest objection to Britain’s membership in the European Union, “by giving primacy to European law over domestic law… the old doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty was effectively blown out of the water” (25). Although Britain did have to cede some of its sovereignty to the EU, it was by no means as if they were powerless to legislate their own country. Some of England’s greatest constitutional reforms, such as the Human Rights Act, came during this time. Perhaps the greatest argument for joining the European Union is what would have happen to Britain if they had not done so. What would have happened to the lost Great Britain of the mid 1950s, searching for new markets and a new direction, if it had not joined with Europe?

Midterm Examination Key

Midterm Examination Key

Instructions: Write your answers to the questions below in the blue book. Be sure to number each question. Please write legibly.

Note: Georgetown University is an honor-code school for undergraduates. Cases of suspected academic dishonesty will be handled according to the university’s honor code.

Part I Short Answer (Your response should be no more than a few sentences or a list. 10 pts. each)

1. Briefly describe Marx’s concept of “ideology.”

Best answer should be clearly written and should contain some combination of:

-materialism or historical materialism
-base/superstructure
-relations of production
-system of ideas, culture, beliefs
-causality (ideology as lacking independent causal significance)
-epiphenomenon
-justification / legitimation of relations of production / class relations
-telos / teleology


E.g., ideology is the system of ideas, beliefs, and culture that justifies particular relations of production. This flows from Marx’s materialist conception of history and social life. Material relations are part of the base; ideology and other social epiphenomena are part of superstructure, having no independent causal effects.


2. What is a Condorcet cycle? Does one always occur?

This is the production of incoherent/irrational/intransitive group preference from otherwise rational individual preferences. It does not always occur; in most cases with very limited players and very limited preferences, cycles are unlikely. As you increase both the number of players and the number of preferences, however, the probability of a cycle increases.

Best answers were very clear in the language they used to refer to the group and individual preferences; they mentioned “rational individuals” or “transitive individual preferences” and “irrational” or “intransitive” group preferences arrived at by “aggregation” of individual preferences. They also, in many cases, showed an example (A>B>C>A).

Also, it is important to note that this question had two parts. Best answers to the second part referred to factors that increase the probability of cycles (i.e. group size and preference number).


3. State Arrow’s theorem. What is its significance?

There is no system of translating coherent/rational individual preferences into group preference that does not also either (1) produce irrational/incoherent group preferences or (2) restrict the expression of individual preferences (either across all of society or amongst certain groups, or both). Thus, there is a tradeoff between social rationality and concentration of power. This is “significance” because it means that there is no “natural” majority will and that we must devise sets of rules for determining what we want to count as a majority/group will.

Again, best answers had to give clear responses to both parts of the question.


Part II Long Short Answer (Your answer should be a paragraph. 20 pts. each)

4. Give TWO alternative definitions of a “state” based on lectures, class readings, and discussion sections.

There were a range of possible good responses here. Some possibilities included:

-Marxist
-Institutionalist
-Functionalist
-Weber’s definition
-Aristotle’s definition
-Professor King’s definition of contemporary states from lecture

Most important was to demonstrate your ability to think through two conceptually distinct ways of seeing the idea of a state. The best answers did not simply incorporate the material presented on slides in lecture; they also referred to readings or other sources outside the lecture. The best answers also did not simply restate two definitions from memory (this would receive approximately a B if both definitions were solid), but offered at least some short explanation of where these two definitions came from, how they were different, and why that difference was significant. This could refer, for example, to the malleability of the concept of state and the different types of entities it could include (depending on definition).

5. Describe how plurality, majority, and closed party-list electoral systems work.

A minimally acceptable answer (that is, something in the C to B range) included:

Plurality: most votes wins
Majority: 50% plus one to win; second round if no one achieves this in first round
Party-list: vote for individual parties rather than candidates (in close list form); seats apportioned according to some proportional formula.

Best answers went into district magnitude, allocation method, form of candidature, etc. An answer could also get top credit if it included almost all of this information on each system and also mentioned some of the effects of each system.


6. What is “civil society”? How does the idea of “social capital” relate to it?

A minimally acceptable answer (that is, something in the C to B range, so about 14-17 depending on precision, etc.) included:

Secondary forms of association in society (interest groups, non-state organizations, durable social networks, etc) that exist midway between and help mediate relations between primary social groups (families/ kinship groups) and the state. Social capital as glue/connections among groups within civil society. Some reference to the several components of social capital mentioned in lecture.

Best answers nailed the definition of civil society (either that given in lecture or a similar variant drawn from a seminal text on the subject), demonstrated a clear understanding of the concept of social capital (describing or defining it in terms of “norms,” “trust,” “reciprocity,” and “networks”), demonstrated a clear distinction between these concepts and then showed how they were related, and referenced some of the relevant authors (Putnam, Tocqueville, etc) that we have discussed in relation to these concepts and findings. The discussion of the relationship between civil society and social capital could argue that social capital helps facilitate strong civil society (by allowing people to engage more fruitfully in collective action) or that civil society generally builds social capital (by bringing more people into contact with each other, building networks, and facilitating trust and reciprocity with individuals outside the immediate family). The very best answers pointed to both of these dynamics and linked them to the authors.


7. What is “the tragedy of the commons”? How does it relate to the idea of a public good?

The minimal correct answer (again, about C-B or 14-17/20) included a description of the “tragedy” as the diminution of common pool resources as a result of the individual rational self-interest maximization of all group members. The answer also had to include some notion of “public good” and how it related to the “tragedy.”

Better answers mentioned the distinction between public and private goods, using terms such as rivalrous/nonrivalrous and excludable/nonexcludable. The very best answers also showed consciousness of the difference between “public goods” (that are nonrivalrous, such as a lighthouse or public transportation service), “common goods” (that are rivalrous, such as the park bench or natural resources), and the differences and similarities between the problems that relate to each (collective action problems, free rider problem, tragedy of the commons). These answers also mentioned some of the ways in which authors (Hardin, Olson) recommend addressing these problems and protecting public and common goods (regulation, privatization, selective incentives).


8. How do we judge whether some theories in political science are better than others?

The minimal answer (about C- or 13/20) for this question included at least a reference to all five of the characteristics we discussed in class: generality, accuracy, parsimony, falsifiability, and causality. Additional credit was given for accurate descriptions of each of these (through about B+ or 18/20). The very best answers did a little more than just list these characteristics and their definitions, also mentioning the tradeoff between accuracy and generality, the significance of falsifiability (as opposed to earlier notions of verification), and possibly providing a couple of illustrations.


Part III Essay (70 pts.)

Choose ONE of the following. Remember: Your essay must make an argument by staking out a position and then supporting that position with evidence.

A. Describe the effects of different electoral systems on the outcome of elections. That is, how do the methods we use affect the answers we get? And why is there such a diversity of electoral systems in use around the world?

B. Using what you know of models and theories in political science, design a political science research project to test any of the various theories of any ONE of the following: Marx, Weber, Huntington, Hardin, Duverger. Describe such a project, its structure, its sources of data, and its chief hypothesis.

C. Describe and analyze a real-world collective action problem that we have not discussed during lectures. What allowed the collective action problem to be overcome, or what prevented collective action from occurring?


For the essays, length is not the sole criterion, but in general they should be about 2-3 pages or so of text at a minimum. Foremost was whether the essay answered the question. Then, I was looking for some clarity of argument—a set of coherent points supported with some evidence. Reference to readings was definitely a plus and often was a major part of what distinguished a genuinely “A” answer from the rest.


On essay A, it was vital to realize that there were two parts of the question and to make sure to address each of these. First, you needed to give some general explanation of how electoral systems affect outcomes (many people very thoughtfully framed this in terms of Condorcet, Arrow, the lack of a majority will apart from the institutions used to measure it, etc), and you needed to describe what the effects are of different systems. It was key that you needed to really talk about the EFFECTS of electoral rules. Answers that simply described each system (which you already did for question 5 above) were not awarded nearly as many points. Some of the factors we were looking for included (though not limited to): compromise/inclusiveness, efficiency/effectiveness, accountability, stability, simplicity/tradition, number of parties usually generated, representativeness (of minorities, women, etc), centripitalism/moderation, affects on multi-ethnic populations, how issues get divided amongst parties, preference salience, etc.

For the second question, you had make a theoretical argument as to what accounts for the wide variety of electoral systems that exist internationally. Ideally, your answer to this question was stated as a clear thesis in your introduction and was then either addressed alongside the effects or was handled in the second part of your essay. You needed to demonstrate some knowledge, based on the readings, of why countries might choose or end up with different systems, either based on those systems’ effects (e.g., in cases of ethnically divided societies) or based on history/values. The very best answers addressed the different paths by which electoral systems are created in different states: some by gradual historical evolution or carryover from earlier institutions, some by conscious values- or needs- based choice (where a system was selected to best protect values held by that society or to best handle particular social or demographic tensions). As long as a strong argument was made and backed up by some supporting evidence, however, there was a fair degree of flexibility in acceptable answers (historical path dependency, conscious choice, values, needs of a particular type of society, etc).

Authors that were relevant to this question included: Condorcet, Arrow, Reilly, Norris, Lijphart, Soudriette and Ellis, Burke, Mirabeau, Duverger, North, Rosenfeld, Alesina, …

The very best answers were well structured as responses to both questions, dealt with most of the major systems that we had studied (i.e., plurality, majority, proportional representation, preferential, and possibly the mixed types STV and AV), marshaled the ideas of a number of different authors, referred to at least a few examples of countries to demonstrate points, and made a clear thoughtful argument concerning the origins of variation in system design (not just a quick response in the final paragraph to this part of the question).


Essay B: For this question I wanted to see clear scientific reasoning. You needed to describe clearly what the theoretical model was you planned to test, and then develop an experiment in order to test it. In addition to showing full understanding of the theory being tested, your answer needed to also demonstrate a clear grasp of scientific method and theory judgment criteria. You needed to be conscious of how to apply concepts such as falsifiability and generality to the evaluation of a real theoretical model. (Implicitly, you must show that the theory you intend to test is falsifiable. Also, one clear mistake here was to conceptualize the test as an attempt to “prove” the model correct. This failed to grasp the idea that theories cannot be verified through experimentation, only falsified.)

Best answers laid out a clear neat experimental design, thoughtfully considered the data sources to be used, and correctly identified what hypothesized outcome would correspond with the theory’s predictions and which hypothesized outcome would violate these expectations and falsify the theory. Best answers also generally included some reference to the general principles by which good theories can be judged (discussed in question 8).


Essay C: This essay required that you develop a clear example that demonstrated your comfortable with key concepts from collective action theory and that you can see how these interrelate and apply to real world problems. Your answer had to include: a clear description of the collective action problem at hand, a description of what happened and if the problem was ever overcome, and an explanation for why this was and what factors either allowed or prevented collective action from occurring.

Best answers to this question showed precisely how the problem they had described could be modeled in terms of collective action theory concepts. They clearly identified who the (potential) collective actors were (individuals, groups, countries, etc), what their interests were, and what public or common good was at stake. This last element was particularly relevant, because it requires reframing the “collective action” problem to think “what is in this for everybody?” There are some things that we inherently know are collective action problems, but we do not usually think of in terms of the non-excludable good that they provide. But reframing the question in terms of what the benefit is that all group members can expect (at least in the long term) can help generate a more fruitful analysis of the individual group member’s rational weighting of interests and how that might have led to the particular outcome being explained.

Best answers to this question demonstrated a familiarity with the theoretical explanations for what factors make collective action problems easier or harder to solve. This might include: group size, anonymity versus reputation, values and norms of behavior, individual rationality, free rider and tragedy of the commons problems, levels of social capital (norms of trust and reciprocity in the given group or society, pre-existing networks of relationships), regulation, privatization, and selective incentives. Best answers also referenced some of the literature we have read or discussed on this or closely related and relevant subjects (Olson, Hardin, Putnam, Tocqueville,…) Clear logical argument justifying a plausible causal explanation for the collective action outcome (i.e. success or failure) was also key.

Turkey Club! (Or, Turkey and the EU)

Michael Teitelbaum and Philip Martin raise some interesting questions in their article (Foreign Affairs, May/June 2003) about Turkey's potential accession into the European Union. Much of the article spends time analyzing the pertinent economic facts -- whether or not allowing Turkey into full EU membership would trigger a wave of Turkish migrant workers that might destabilize or weaken other European economies. This is a huge concern, and one that I presume has only become more wide-spread in the last few months as the global financial crisis has battered European markets.

However, I think the article makes one of its most important points early on -- that there are distinct cultural and political fears underlying much of the opposition towards admitting Turkey into the EU. Last semester, I had the chance to attend a week-long student debate in the EU Parliament that focused on the Treaty of Lisbon (an effort to strengthen the Union in the wake of the failed European Constitution) and more broadly the question of "enlargement" or whether or not non-traditional European countries should be allowed into the European Union.

The quote (in the article) from the former President of France reminds me of a lot of the research I did about French cultural fears of a more powerful European Union. Here in the United States, some variant of the "melting pot" has always run through our cultural consciousness. Even in the face of recurring domestic Culture Wars, it can be hard to grasp the European cultural mindset. The differences are apparent even on the insitutional level: France has had a "minister of culture" since the end of the 1950s, and periodically holds summits where the agenda focuses on the spread and protection of specific cultural values. Cultural nationalism, then, plays a distinct role in much of French politics. Particularly given existing fear and distrust against Muslims in France, it should not be surprising at all that there would be powerful opposition to letting in a heavily-populated middle-Eastern country into the EU.

At the end of the day, though, there is still hope. Turkey has made some remarkable strides on certain human rights issues (notably torture and some womens' rights issues) and might eventually become sufficiently "European" to warrant more consideration. Likewise, the need for a larger EU to tackle global ecological and economic issues might spur some of these hesitant European countries to reconsider. Either way, this is a key area where politics, economics, culture, and institutions are deeply intertwined.

Oh the Brits

Tony Wright’s British Politics provided an excellent introduction into a very much different democracy than the one we enjoy here in the United States. Two clear distinctions, each of which is related to the other, struck me as especially interesting. Wright writes (ha!) that while the political Left and Right differ on numerous political issues, “both agreed that Britain’s top-down, government-centered way of doing politics should be defended and protected” (38). This really struck a chord with me as a very politically interested American. In the United States we suggest almost by default that the conservative Republicans are the party of small government, and the liberal Democrats are the party of big government. Traditionally, Republicans favor tax breaks and loosening of governmental regulation while the Democrats favor higher taxes to support numerous programs as well as a high degree of regulation. Granted it isn’t quite fair to say that all British politicians favor big government in the way that Democrats, but that’s really the point. In Britain, Wright explains, when parliament replaced the Monarch as the political (legislative and executive) power, they didn’t forfeit any of the control. They essentially maintained the monarchic level of governmental reach and power and simply transferred it to Houses of Parliament. Wright says this change “preserved intact and undiminished the supreme authority of the State” (49). This seemingly has two consequences. First, it simply necessitates a large government, relatively larger than the US. Second, as a result of the authority of the State, the government’s legitimacy seems to come less from “the people”, as in does in the US, and more from the traditional legitimacy of the “ King in Parliament”. That’s not to say the British don’t have a huge say in their politics. They do by voting. If they feel the country is going in the wrong direction they can vote to change the majority party. However, it appears to me that in a system where the majority party essentially operates as one executive and legislative entity with virtually no checks and balances, this traditional form of legitimacy must serve some kind of reassuring role to the citizens whose laws are almost entirely controlled by one essentially monopolistic political party. 

British Politics

In Tony Wright's British Politics, he speaks about the notion that English people are relatively unconcerned with their democracy, quoting Hugo Young as writing, "The British do not passionately care about democracy (14)." It seems that the British people have given Parliament a good deal of performance legitimacy- "As long as they get a vote every few years and the children don't starve, they are prepared to put up with almost anything (14)." Wright describes the strong central government of Britain in great detail, a government whose strength, to my mind, is born out of it's peoples laissez-faire attitude towards its Parliament. This in turn contributes towards the long-standing stability of their government- the MP are more than happy to maintain their heavily centralized government and the power it provides the Parliament so long as the people will support it. It even extends to their lack of a truly centralized constitution- there is no motivation to codify their numerous laws and edicts unless the people demand a clear outlining of their rights. It creates a cyclical relationship where both lawmakers and citizens are given what they desire, the citizens being provided a safe, stable society and the lawmakers the power to enact the policies they see fit. Such a system could never work in a country like the United States where rights and regulations were clearly stated from the conception of the nation. One must consider, however, whether the British system is more preferable in today's society. It allows the government a great deal of fluidity that the heavily codified American government cannot hope to simulate. In a time when quick, decisive action is all the more necessary and prevalent, it seems the British government has a governmental leg up on our own.

postwar

Something I found very interesting in the Retribution chapter is that according to Judt, "Germans in the 1940s had little sense of the way the rest of the world saw them." (57) They did not understand the full extend of what their countrymen and leaders did during the war. Instead, they were inclined to view themselves as victims of their own post-war difficulties-- "food shortages, housing shortages, and the like." (57) The rest of Europe, while wanting to move on past the difficult memories of the atrocities, very much blamed the worst crimes against humanity on the Germans and expected accountability and justice to be served. It's mindblowing to imagine the German people of that time as being detached from the actions of their state leaders, as feeling victimized while so many others were being hatefully targeted and murdered. Of course to a certain extent, the Germans would have been conditioned by their government and used to the propaganda and exploitation as simply what happened to other people, not them; they had their own problems. This mentality shows just how subjective and relative history can be depending on the perspective of the teller. Human selfish need can blindsight even the most guilty away from objective analysis to biased interpretation. Of course, everyone in that generation was struggling with post-war difficulties. There were bigger problems than economic strife though. Everlasting dilemmas had arised due to ethnic cleansing, and the Germans were standing around asking why the finger was being pointed at them so harshly. This is hard for me to conceive, but I suppose we humans are that capable of convincing ourselves what we want to believe. There may not always be a definitive, mutually agreed upon right or wrong, even if there are exact accounts of history, because of what side of the line we were standing on at the time of the events.