Ethnic Conflict: When States Are No Longer Respected to Determine Society's Behavior

As several of the previous have been discussing ethnicity and ethnic conflict, and as I have been reading them, the question that came to mind was that of identity politics. Why do people choose to align themselves with ethnic, tribal, religious, or other non-state in-groups instead of the state apparatus? And this seemed to relate to Migdal's discussion on who a society deems the authority on directing acceptable social behavior, on creating the societal institutions that mold individual behavior.

Migdal describes the modern state as being a phenomenon in that it is a phase in history in which the state is generally accepted without little question as the ultimate authority on societal behavior and directing that. Problems of ethnic, or really any conflict that is intra-state rather than inter-state seems to be connected to a rejection of the given state apparatus as this authority. This is a large source of societal outliers: those who deem religion or some other force more legitimate than the state in directing behavior.

And even if the majority of individuals are not naturally of this ilk, I think what the film about Bosnia illustrated was that the threats of war and the virus of fear can cause us to easily latch on to those in-group identities that oppose that over-arching authority of the state. I think that is similar to one of the previous blog's discussion of the rebound effects of "ethnic coding". When the cause of a conflict is deemed to be due to opposing ethnic in-groups, even if that is not the cause, these identities are very easy to latch on to.

Relating back to the idea of strong states and weak societies however, I think that the ability of states to be strong (to provide the necessary resources as they deem appropriate) is what really influences people to align or not align themselves with a view of ultimate state-based authority. As in the film, where the people were so isolated from the central government and had to turn to their own civil societal resources and strengths, if the government is not able to provide security and safety then the people will no longer view the state as that primary authority of determining societal behavior.

Ultimately, I think this is easily boiled down to a simpler question of how these in-groups gain levels of accepted authority higher than the state and where the individual citizen's acceptance of that authority comes from: from some personal background cause or from imposed views of biased outsiders?

Social Science

As Dr. King mentioned in class, the task of social scientist is not to study the minutia of a single country's inner-workings, but instead the patterns and trends born out the actions of multiple states. By keeping an eye on “the social”, the social scientists is able to interpret general behaviors of humanity. He/she cannot be concerned with individuals, just their contribution as part of the greater whole. This understanding of societies general trends enables the social scientists to better understand the driving forces of societies.
The individual concerned with the singular actor is the psychologist, the student of the individual's behavior. As students of foreign policy, this a striking distinction between two different paths Is a foreign policy expert expected to be both psychologist and social scientist, and if so, which takes precedence? While at first glance the two seem reconcilable, there actually exists a significant problem in their coexistence. Consider the situation of an outbreak of fighting in Baghdad. The social scientist would consider this an event common to most civil wars, while the psychologist would instead think of it as the work of an specific member of the insurgency, an example of this persons particular habits and behavior. How do these two different assessments of a situation change one's reaction to what has happened, their solutions? Social science views ones actions as a piece of the general trend, but psychology demands the primacy of the individual- trends are only a macroscopic snapshot. Though not necessarily mutually exclusive, two differing world views at some level demand a foreign policy advisor to make their own choice of the trend or the individual.

More on ethnicity...

In a sort of response to the previous post, and to the general idea it addresses, I agree with the idea that defining a conflict as “ethnic” violence without proper understanding of the situation on the ground is foolish and all too common.  At the same time, I feel that the misunderstanding from the outsider’s point of view is often more strongly correlated with an incorrect interpretation of the concept of ethnic identity, exclusive of the occurrence of violence.

 

If we’re referring to communities in Africa, Eastern Europe, and Asia, many of the entities that we term “ethnic groups” today are modern constructions that only came into existence during the colonial period and as a result of the “divide and conquer” strategy employed by Europeans.  In Africa especially, prior to this it’s generally assumed that groups of people in regions that now experience “ethnic” violence were no more ethnically divided than Western Europe is today.  Of course there were divisions – of lineage and occupation, and class and language – and even some that resulted in violent conflict, but group compositions were much more fluid and adaptive than how we picture them today.

 

This is not to say that ethnic identities, meaningfully or arbitrarily imposed, don’t carry weight in modern society, because obviously they do – we have last weekend’s events in Nigeria and, to a degree, India to prove that.  Constructions of ethnicity have evolved to encompass religious, cultural, and, most unfortunately, racial differences, and it’s this evolution that, especially from a Western perspective, has resulted in the amplification of ethnic nationalism.  Societies to which ethnic conflict is a foreign concept often conceive of it as a characteristic that is concurrent with and inherent to societies that also experience underdevelopment, corruption, and religious extremism; admittedly, it does appear on a surface level that they are mutually reinforcing. But, as Professor King mentioned, though social order may be fragile, violence is never predetermined.  Ethnic conflict hasn’t always existed, and the common Western idea that it is inevitable and uncontrollable in or between specific states, cultures, and religions is inaccurate.  A shift towards more accurate categorizing of “ethnic” violence is unlikely to occur without a transition in the common understanding of what ethnicity itself was originally, and what it has become today.

Coding "Ethnic Violence"

In “Ethnic and Nationalist Violence”, Brubaker and Laitin argue an imperative point regarding coding practices. Specifically, the authors argue that coding violence as “ethnic” can: (1) cause an overestimation of the incidence of ethnic violence and (2) cause a feedback effect, increasing the actual occurrence of ethnic violence.

The first point seems more obvious. If we code using the word “ethnic”, we assume there is a right way to measure violence. Obviously, this is much more complex and complicated. To code violence as “ethnic” requires statistical knowledge and research at the local level; most of us would agree on this point.

The second argument regarding coding is not as straightforward. If some sort of feedback effect occurs when we code (possibly miscode) something as “ethnic violence”, then how can be keep from instigating this effect? If coding violence as “ethnic” creates feedback and can lead to greater occurrence of violence, then how can we “accurately” code? Is it possible? Although Brubaker and Laitin do not outline any specific solutions, “Ethnic and Nationalist Violence” should spark some sort of creative thought regarding the daunting task of coding.

While miscoding can occur due to lack of knowledge regarding the situation at hand, it can also originate from the misuse of language. During the 1960’s, the semi-fixation with discussing ethnic identity became prominent in academic and journalistic writings. As time progressed, the phrase “ethnic violence” was thrown into academic journal articles, with no real analysis or explanation of the term. I argue that such nonchalant use the phrase “ethnic violence” also accounts for the feedback effect.

In general, language seems to be an unscientific mess. Nevertheless, as social scientists, the way in which we present our ideas and the language that we use greatly impact public perception, opinion, action and reaction. Coding violence as “ethnic” not only requires proper information, but it also requires an explanation of how the phrase “ethnic violence” is being used for the particular situation. In other words, an explanation of the ordinary language term “ethnic violence” should be given before any analysis is made regarding the particular violent conflict. While coding will continue to be messy and complex, this approach could decrease the occurrence of the feedback effect.