Ethnic and Nationalist Violence Variation

In “Ethnic and Nationalist Violence”, Rogers Brubaker and David Laitin highlight that the fundamental problem in the literature concerning ethnic violence does not have to do with competing theories about a well-defined phenomenon; but rather, the overarching ideas on what exactly constitutes ethnic violence.

First of all, while pointing out that ethnic violence is certainly not widesprea, Brubaker and Laitin point out the recent increase in regions of the former Soviet Union and Sub-Saharan Africa. The first explanation regards the decline or “decay of the Weberian state”, an argument which uses Max Weber’s definition of the state as an entity that has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence/force within a territory. The authors argue that the inability of states in the developing world to maintain order results in diminishing transnational, state-strengthening resources. The lack of an “external patron” to help maintain peace in the region makes ethnic cleavages more likely to translate into conflict, and eventually into violence.

However, what the authors fail to point out is the analogous ability of transnational resources to function as means for furthering ethnic violence. For example, in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, I believe that the availability of economic and military resources to the Yakouba ethnic group in Cote d’Ivoire from their kin across the Liberian border largely influenced their choice of armed violence rather than non-violent protest against the government in 2002. Therefore, the availability of transnational resources can play a role in the process of protest—violent or non-violent—that an ethnic group may choose.

Brubaker and Laitin’s second explanation concerns the ideological shifts that have occurred since the fall of Communism. The authors point to ethnic separatist movements between the 1950s and 1980s that framed the struggle between the opposition and the incumbent in the context of the larger struggle between communism and capitalism. Today, as many NGOs and international institutions are starting to recognize individual ethnic group claims, the incentive of violent challengers to structure their struggle in the context of human rights and ethnic claims has strengthened. In fact, this “ethnicization” of violence is perhaps the underlying reason behind Brubaker and Laitin’s claim that interpretations of violent struggles as exemplars of ethnic violence are subject to so much dispute.

When analyzing violence in the framework of ethnic conflict, Brubaker and Laitin point out the importance of looking at violence not as a degree but rather, as a phase of conflict. The authors, therefore, establish the definition of ethnic violence to as “violence perpetrated across ethnic lines, in which at least one party is not a state, and in which the ethnic difference is noted…as having been integral rather than incidental to the violence.” They then provide an analytical review of the literature on ethnic violence, examining three particular approaches to ethnic violence: inductive, theory-driven, and culturalist. Within the inductive approach, I found the discussion on the variation between regions with similar ethnic tensions in which one has erupted into ethnic violence while ethnic conflict in the other region has been largely nonviolent. Many questions arise when examining this variation, as in the case between the Basques and the Catalan. Why is it that ethnic conflict has been characterized by the violence of the terrorist ETA while the conflict in Catalonia has been relatively non-violent? If Laitin and Brubaker define violence as a phase in ethnic conflict, is it only a matter of time before ethnic conflict will erupt into violence in the autonomous region of Catalonia? In analyzing these questions, I found it especially helpful to look at Brubaker and Laitin’s “cultural construction of fear” within their cultural approaches. Indeed, the legacy of Francisco Franco’s repression and attempted elimination of Basque and Catalan language and culture in attempt to establish a unified, centralist Spanish identity still continues today. However, it seems that while the main concern in Catalonia has been the perpetuation of its language and culture, the Basque language, spoken and understood by less than one-fourth of the ethnic group, has been more a source of division than anything else. Therefore, Basque nationalism is still largely based on the fear of centralist repression (from the Spanish state) rather than on its common cultural or linguistic identity.

Looking over Brubaker and Laitin’s three approaches towards ethnic conflict, it appears that the dominant theme is the existing variation and heterogeneity between occurrences of ethnic violence. Their discussion on the need to identify, analyze and explain the differences between instances of ethnic violence is extremely valuable, rather than attempting to construct one enormous and dilute theory of ethnic violence, we are better off analyzing the variations first and foremost. After all, that is what comparative politics is all about.

Balancing Civil Society and Strong States in the Development Process (While Avoiding Disorder)

We’ve been talking a lot about the dichotomy between an active citizen base, or strong civil society, versus strong and efficient states, mostly categorizing one or the other as necessary for modernization and development. Midgal, as it so clearly states in the title of his book, addresses what happens when society is strong and the state is weak, analyzing the relationship between the two and calling for a strengthening of the state to make effective change, and even Meredith compares India’s diverse and active pluralistic society and arguably inefficient, corrupt government (Strong civil society/weak state) to China’s super-efficient and pragmatic authoritarian government, which historically and even presently represses its citizenship (the Cultural Revolution of the 60’s, 1989’sTiananmen Square incident, and today’s censorship of the internet and media: Strong state/weak civil society). Tuesday night I also attended a talk given by Duncan Green, head of research for Oxfam Great Britain (and also former Senior Policy Adviser on Trade and Development at the Department for International Development and formrr policy analyst on trade and globalization for the Catholic Aid Agency of England and Wales) who discussed his latest book on development, From Poverty to Power: How Active Citizens and Effective States can Change the World. He spoke about this “active citizenship” (as an indication of success post-development ) versus “effectives states” (necessary to develop, he argued) dichotomy as well, claiming that historically there is a conflict between the two.
What I’m interested in though, is whether this dichotomization is necessary? To me it seems the old paradigm, ‘nothing in excess,’ holds true, and although it might seem like an obvious (and maybe naive) solution to any sort of disorder that could arise from either extreme, I would personally argue for a moderate form of both state and society, in order for a nation to actually function effectively. Too great of unrestrained freedom given to civil society means consensus would never be reached as well as allows for the capacity for ethnic tensions to flair, as addressed by Bates as well as Brubaker and Laitin. I think we can all understand and agree on the dangers of too repressive of a government as well. Either, I believe, could lead to a form of disorder, possibly violent, and the potential for society to get out of hand, whether this should come from lack of government control, or too much of it (thus causing civil society to rise up violently or ‘explode’ if too thoroughly repressed as Buruma addressed last week).
Finding some sort of balance between the two is definitely something that I would say most developed and already industrialized Western countries, like the US, aim to do in forming a picture of their ideal governments. The issue, however, is whether a government balanced between an active but not too disorderly civil society and effective yet not repressive government can combine in the right measures to complete the modernization process of an undeveloped or third world country. Both Midgal and Duncan seem to think that a strengthened state is important in the development process. Not that I am familiar with all the case studies of all the countries in recent history that have undergone rapid growth, but it seems to me that most of the ones we have looked at (ie China and India in Meredith, Israel in Midgal, Eastern bloc nations, etc) have done so through the means of either a particularly pro-active civil society (an up rise of the people) or else through the forces of a particularly strong state, with little civil engagement. Is one or the other really necessary in modernizing while avoiding disorder, though, or is there a way that a moderation of the two can become combined?

Democratization For Who? Says Who?

In reading Wittes discussion of the democratization process in the Middle East, focusing on the variant forms of Islamist political participant, what I was drawn to focus on the connection between this discussion of what political parties would be conducive to democratization and the question of a weak versus a strong state, not to mention the strength of the internal society. 

When considering these two themes and how they relate to one another, two questions come to mind, though they somewhat intermingle.

Firstly, I wonder about Wittes' refusal to accept the ability of militant and nationalist Islamist groups to create democracy. It seems that there are plenty of examples, including the popular election of Hamas in Gaza, where these groups are democratically elected. But even if they are not popularly elected, my second question is on the issue of who exactly an authority has legitimacy over. If there is a particular group, be it a militant Islamist group or even a group of tafkiris, that are able to provide for themselves the basic capabilities of a state, such as "appropriating or using resources in determined ways" as Migdal states in the beginning of his book, then was authority or legitimacy is given to any other body to try and enforce some larger view of theirs that aims at "democratization."

This, I think gets at a fundamental question of what is a state. If, as Migdal says, it is a body that is able to provide for its "citizens" and regulate society and resources in a determined way, then who has authority to impose government on a group that might already be achieving capabilities?

This is a question that I think is resurfacing repeatedly around the world with questions of secessionist states, or even in Iraq to relate it closer to Wittes' subject matter, is what is an acceptable size of government to operate on an international level? And also, what legitimacy is given to what has effectively amounted to civil societal institutions, such as a militant political party, when a state is too weak to provide those capabilities on its own.

Is Islamic democratization possible?

After reading Amara Wittes, "Three Kinds of Movements," I was left wondering if it is possible for an Islamist state to become democratized. As stated in the article one of the main requirements for democracy is some sort of equality of law for all individuals: male and female, rich and poor, religious and atheist.  However, it seems that Islamic society would be unwilling to embrace this type of equality, as it would lessen religious control of the state and allow for its citizens more freedom to potentially question religious influence over laws. 

Wittes discussed three different types of Islamic groups: tikfiris, militant and nationalist Islamist groups, and those groups that appear to reject violence as a means to achieve their goals.  The first group uses violence to accomplish their goals, justifying the violence by means of religion.  However, since religion is used as a justification it is extremely unlikely that the violence would stop, even if a group like al-Qaeda was able to seize control; there would always be those citizens who are not religious enough or not observant enough of religious law and customs, who need to be 'taken care of' so to speak.  The second group attempts to reinforce democratic processes by means of violence.  However, democratic means cannot exist if the government, or group, employing them uses force or the threat of violence to reinforce the democratic policies.  The third group appears to be more peaceful and conducive to democratization such as Jordan, but the state is still greatly influenced by Islamic law and tradition.

Wittes postulates that democracy cannot really exist in an Islamist state until there is "a more open political market" and more pluralism.  I agree that in order for democracy to exist there needs to be an arena for open discussion between the government and the citizens about the manner in which the government is operating.  In addition, the state needs to allow others to run for office in a fair election, in order to support a diversity of political views.  Although I would argue that true democracy cannot exist without the separation of church and state.  This, however, appears to be impossible as religion is so thoroughly engrained in Islamist society that is would be difficult to separate the religious from the secular, and most likely any attempts to do so would meet violent opposition.

China - Social Issues and Income Inequalities Call for Political Reform

As China is experiencing the rise of the Fourth Generation, is emerging as a global commercial power, and has had an extraordinary average annual growth in GDP as a result of globalization, it is easy to believe that the changes in China after communism have dramatically improved the livelihood of the Chinese people overall. However, this perspective may be deceiving; although poverty levels have undoubtedly decreased after China opened to marketization as a whole, there are a vast number of social problems in the country that the government is failing to address, thus there is still a great need for political reform.
In The Elephant and the Dragon, the life story of a man who was a child when Mao was in power, Tony Ma, illustrates how there is still a great lack of opportunity for people in the countryside to succeed through hard work and ambition. Mr. Ma had worked in a steel mill for two dollars a month and lived with the fear that he would have to work in this mill for the rest of his life. He was one of the only 3 workers, out of 2000 workers in the mill, who was admitted to college, and later received a scholarship to study in the United States. In this sense, Mao’s legacy of a lack of opportunity for people to rise above working in a factory for low wages is still present.
The World Bank suggests that there are still 300 million poor in China. Although marketization and globalization has highly decreased the amount of people living below the poverty line, there has been dramatically increasing inequalities in income, health and education as a result. China’s social problems span to include child labor, very few labor rights, fragile banks, deteriorating environment, shortages in drinkable water, among many others.
These facts demonstrate that we cannot be fooled by China’s rise as a political and economic power in the international scene; it is still very much a developing country and the government needs to provide a safety net for the poor in rural regions. And if the political atmosphere actually has improved to protect the poor, there is still room for improvement, because when there are children making fireworks 15 hours a day for 12 cents an hour instead of attending school, a lot of change needs to be made.