Response #1

In Rosenfeld’s “What Democracy?” the questions that we’ve come to learn as being distinctly those involved with comparative politics ( How? Why?) are applied to an institution we are familiar with—the United States Senate— revealing facets of our own system of representation that may be less democratic than previously thought.
Rosenfeld makes it a point to take note of the fact that more often than not in the Senate, a minority (in terms of population) runs the show as opposed to the majority.
The reasons behind this seemingly unfair, and as Rosenfeld states, virtually unchangeable, system are perhaps best connected to professor King’s lecture in two specific areas. First, when finding sources of concern in the game theory that was played out in a run-off situation, one question was ‘would player III be a perpetual minority, and therefore, loser’? Even though Players 1 and 2 accepted “B” as their second choice, and A was the absolute last in line for player 3, A was still chosen because in an American-type democracy and system of government, we don’t care about depth of choice. First preference is all that matters. This brings into question the impotence of political minorities, but also ethnic, racial, religious, etc. minorities that might also, and often do, form along political divisions.

As professor King said, this only compounds the issue that might aggravate the minority (player 3) and interferes with social cohesion. In an election like a Senate election, this is clearly displayed because the elections, instead of being held in terms of smaller districts, are statewide. As Rosenfeld points out, even if a minority makes up “more than a third of a state’s population” they can still have an elected Senator that completely stands against their views as a result of such large statewide voting constituencies. Furthermore, as populations grow more and more wealth will be needed to campaign, meaning less wealthy candidates, who most likely carry the voice of a minority, will be disenfranchised.
Secondly, as Arrow states, we ultimately have a choice between restriction of the expression of individual preference or irrational preference. This brings into play another very causal comparative political question brought up in lecture—why choose some restrictions over others? Simply put, it is our values, or in the case of what lies in the American constitution, the values of our forefathers that remain un-amended.