Democratization For Who? Says Who?

In reading Wittes discussion of the democratization process in the Middle East, focusing on the variant forms of Islamist political participant, what I was drawn to focus on the connection between this discussion of what political parties would be conducive to democratization and the question of a weak versus a strong state, not to mention the strength of the internal society. 

When considering these two themes and how they relate to one another, two questions come to mind, though they somewhat intermingle.

Firstly, I wonder about Wittes' refusal to accept the ability of militant and nationalist Islamist groups to create democracy. It seems that there are plenty of examples, including the popular election of Hamas in Gaza, where these groups are democratically elected. But even if they are not popularly elected, my second question is on the issue of who exactly an authority has legitimacy over. If there is a particular group, be it a militant Islamist group or even a group of tafkiris, that are able to provide for themselves the basic capabilities of a state, such as "appropriating or using resources in determined ways" as Migdal states in the beginning of his book, then was authority or legitimacy is given to any other body to try and enforce some larger view of theirs that aims at "democratization."

This, I think gets at a fundamental question of what is a state. If, as Migdal says, it is a body that is able to provide for its "citizens" and regulate society and resources in a determined way, then who has authority to impose government on a group that might already be achieving capabilities?

This is a question that I think is resurfacing repeatedly around the world with questions of secessionist states, or even in Iraq to relate it closer to Wittes' subject matter, is what is an acceptable size of government to operate on an international level? And also, what legitimacy is given to what has effectively amounted to civil societal institutions, such as a militant political party, when a state is too weak to provide those capabilities on its own.

Is Islamic democratization possible?

After reading Amara Wittes, "Three Kinds of Movements," I was left wondering if it is possible for an Islamist state to become democratized. As stated in the article one of the main requirements for democracy is some sort of equality of law for all individuals: male and female, rich and poor, religious and atheist.  However, it seems that Islamic society would be unwilling to embrace this type of equality, as it would lessen religious control of the state and allow for its citizens more freedom to potentially question religious influence over laws. 

Wittes discussed three different types of Islamic groups: tikfiris, militant and nationalist Islamist groups, and those groups that appear to reject violence as a means to achieve their goals.  The first group uses violence to accomplish their goals, justifying the violence by means of religion.  However, since religion is used as a justification it is extremely unlikely that the violence would stop, even if a group like al-Qaeda was able to seize control; there would always be those citizens who are not religious enough or not observant enough of religious law and customs, who need to be 'taken care of' so to speak.  The second group attempts to reinforce democratic processes by means of violence.  However, democratic means cannot exist if the government, or group, employing them uses force or the threat of violence to reinforce the democratic policies.  The third group appears to be more peaceful and conducive to democratization such as Jordan, but the state is still greatly influenced by Islamic law and tradition.

Wittes postulates that democracy cannot really exist in an Islamist state until there is "a more open political market" and more pluralism.  I agree that in order for democracy to exist there needs to be an arena for open discussion between the government and the citizens about the manner in which the government is operating.  In addition, the state needs to allow others to run for office in a fair election, in order to support a diversity of political views.  Although I would argue that true democracy cannot exist without the separation of church and state.  This, however, appears to be impossible as religion is so thoroughly engrained in Islamist society that is would be difficult to separate the religious from the secular, and most likely any attempts to do so would meet violent opposition.

China - Social Issues and Income Inequalities Call for Political Reform

As China is experiencing the rise of the Fourth Generation, is emerging as a global commercial power, and has had an extraordinary average annual growth in GDP as a result of globalization, it is easy to believe that the changes in China after communism have dramatically improved the livelihood of the Chinese people overall. However, this perspective may be deceiving; although poverty levels have undoubtedly decreased after China opened to marketization as a whole, there are a vast number of social problems in the country that the government is failing to address, thus there is still a great need for political reform.
In The Elephant and the Dragon, the life story of a man who was a child when Mao was in power, Tony Ma, illustrates how there is still a great lack of opportunity for people in the countryside to succeed through hard work and ambition. Mr. Ma had worked in a steel mill for two dollars a month and lived with the fear that he would have to work in this mill for the rest of his life. He was one of the only 3 workers, out of 2000 workers in the mill, who was admitted to college, and later received a scholarship to study in the United States. In this sense, Mao’s legacy of a lack of opportunity for people to rise above working in a factory for low wages is still present.
The World Bank suggests that there are still 300 million poor in China. Although marketization and globalization has highly decreased the amount of people living below the poverty line, there has been dramatically increasing inequalities in income, health and education as a result. China’s social problems span to include child labor, very few labor rights, fragile banks, deteriorating environment, shortages in drinkable water, among many others.
These facts demonstrate that we cannot be fooled by China’s rise as a political and economic power in the international scene; it is still very much a developing country and the government needs to provide a safety net for the poor in rural regions. And if the political atmosphere actually has improved to protect the poor, there is still room for improvement, because when there are children making fireworks 15 hours a day for 12 cents an hour instead of attending school, a lot of change needs to be made.

In contemporary China, is democratization really an issue?

Gallagher’s “Reform and Openness” takes a different direction than Lipset, describing the causal relationship between economic growth and a movement towards democratization. Though China remains a Leninist state among a sea of collapsed socialist states, Gallagher suggests that China will eventually follow the path to democratization. This view is clear in the title of the last section of the article (“Delayed Democracy”).

However, I would like the point out that Gallagher’s article does not acknowledge the possibility that the Chinese people may not necessarily care to democratize at all (at least during the current times). Her attention to FDI, while raising several points about why China’s shift to an open market economy was smooth, seems to ignore some human realities of China’s history and mentality during the 20th century. Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution did not just cause a “dire capital shortage”; millions of people starved as a result of these policies. Perhaps China’s smooth transition can also be attributed to competition between firms, but the simple realization of the Chinese people that they have more to eat as a result of the “Reform and Openness” policy could have very well led to their ignoring of now seemingly lesser important governmental actions. This point is made clear in the Tiananmen Square case: though it stands stark in the minds of the older generation of political dissidents, a new generation of young Chinese, now spending, eating, and playing as they please, do not know nor may not care about this event that happened merely 20 years ago. This dismissal can not only be attributed to governmental censorship.

China and FDI: A Break in the Correlation

I distinctly remember one day in one of my high school government classes when my professor told the class that economic growth and democratization are correlated. This notion was further proven to me when I read Seymour Martin Lipset: when a country’s economy grows and progresses to a more worldly economy, democracy “and democratic characteristics” are also developed—especially with communication and education.

 

As is usually the case with many of these “rules” and assumptions, there is an exception; and China is clearly the one in this case. According to Mary E. Gallagher, “China has maintained a rapid pace of economic growth for over twenty years without succumbing to political liberalization—indeed with only the slightest movement toward democratic government.” A key factor is the country’s foreign direct investment liberalization. In this case, therefore, economic growth has not influenced or aided the advancement of democracy (despite the opposite being the foundation of United States foreign policy toward China for the last two and a half decades or so), but has instead been credited with saving the Chinese Communist Party. By opening its borders to large flows of foreign capital, China’s communist leaders have related this economic issue to nationalist ones, thus leaving no space for any demands on political reform by society. Gallagher posits, “Economic development amid increasing openness has contributed to the stability of authoritarian rule in China.”

 

Foreign direct investment has furthermore created greater competition between firms and between workers. This competition has developed pressures to adopt capitalistic practices learned from foreigners. By obtaining more capitalistic practices, those in the state can gain not only capital and technology but also “the prestige that comes with ties to the international economy.” Because they are being separated by this competitiveness, workers are not able to unite into a strong urban class and uniformly protest for reform in the political sphere.

 

So, will China stop being the exception to Lipset’s correlation? Perhaps… but in the long run! Gallagher concludes,

 

While foreign investment may indirectly improve the environment for future democratization, through the promotion of the rule of law, transparency, and the freer flow of information, in the short term its presence has afforded the regime more time and more political space to pursue economic reform without political liberalization.

 

I can say I somewhat agree. After growing up in an environment that has always portrayed China as unfaltering and “übercommunist,” it is a bit difficult to imagine it as a “real” democracy. Gallagher’s argument, nonetheless, seems plausible. I really do hope that in the long run China’s integration into the global economy and interaction with democratic countries will hopefully influence its society and build a more stable foundation for future democratization; after all, it can be as Gallagher asserted: “political change has been delayed, not stopped.”

Will China Ever Move Towards Democracy?

As we have read and learned, mainly from Seymour Martin Lipset, it is generally thought that economic growth directly correlates to a growth of democracy. As a nation’s economy grows, increases in communication, mobilization, and education all occur throughout society. All of these factors point toward an increase in democracy. So why is China, which has experienced some of the most staggering economic growth of the last century, still under the control of an authoritarian regime? Gallagher argues that it is the timing and sequencing of its reforms, combined with the prevalence of foreign direct investment, that have kept the communist party in control of China. By utilizing foreign direct investment as the catalyst and engine for economic growth, competition, and with it capitalism, increased dramatically in China. Competition for jobs decreased the power of the urban working class (often a strong supporter of democracy), gave the government political capital to enact reforms in the future, and also allowed the Communist Party to frame privatization and reform as vital for Chinese interests. All of these factors have stemmed the tide of political liberalization, and many now believe China may remain under authoritarian control for the foreseeable future. However, there are many problems that China’s rapid growth has created which may test the sturdiness of the Communist Party. The rewards of the booming economy have created an enormous gap between the rich and the poor and rural areas and cities. The increase in industries has forced China to rely on coal for much of its energy, making many Chinese cities some of the most polluted on the planet. Corruption is still widespread throughout China, and causes many ordinary workers to see smaller incomes. The Chinese banking system has taken on many bad loans at the orders of the government, and as we have seen this can lead to financial disaster. Lastly, what was once China’s great strength, its seemingly limitless potential work force and giant population, may soon become a problem. Will China be able to take care of its elderly, with the one-child policy limiting younger generations? All of these are serious problems China is faced with. While the Communist Party’s grip today seems as strong as ever, there are many roadblocks towards its continued dominance.

Civil Society: A Help or Hindrance?

China began its process toward rapid growth and expansion under Deng Xiopang, who believed the road to advancement was through slow, deliberate reforms of the economic system rather than through pronounced revolutionary change. In Robyn Meredith’s work, The Elephant and the Dragon, we are given a thorough account of the Communist Party of China’s micromanagement of economic growth, from the formation of special economic zones to huge infrastructure development projects. Several questions are especially salient with respect to the relationship between economic reform and political reform, the space for civil associations and institutions in society, and ultimately China’s ability to maintain its superpower status and its economic growth. Meredith paints an image of the Chinese countryside being lifted out of poverty, and to be sure, Chinese citizens are better off because of the Communist Party’s invitation of foreign investment and implementation of economic projects. Yet as Mary Gallagher’s article points out, much of China’s economic growth stems from Foreign Direct Investment. It seems that a strong indigenous Chinese role in the country’s economic development does not exist. Is this the reason why China persists in its authoritarian system, why citizens have been reticent to demand real political and social reform from their leadership? Buruma’s article speculates that because Chinese civil society is so weak, and because opposition is rigorously suppressed, this idea of a new, modern China could fail, stemming from the fact that citizens have no outlets for protest. China is always being brought up as an example of rapid economic growth and success, but are the achievements of countries like India in some ways more enduring, because the leaders have been held accountable for their actions? India’s growth rate is nearing China’s, but what is interesting is that India has had a long history of opposition movements and freedom of expression. Or is the lack of civil society in inconsequential, as Marc Morjé Howard brought up in his article. Would a more vibrant civil society in China merely “rock the boat,” creating disruptions domestically and economically? Is it possible to sustain this impressive rate of economic growth and societal advancement while at the same time introducing more democratic processes?