Looking beyond Self-Interest: The European Union

It is plausible that the European Union would not have been such a successful institution were it not for the early leadership of the European Coal and Steel Community by Alcide De Gasperi from Trentino, Konrad Adenauer from Rhineland and Robert Schuman from Lorraine. In Judt’s view, these men were not worried about the merging of national sovereignty because they “[hailed] from the fringes of their own countries, where identities had long been multiple and boundaries fungible” (Judt 157). Their concepts of nationality and loyalty were much more malleable, all having lived in territories that were at one time parts of either the Austro-Hungarian or German Empires. The Christian Democratic Party had strong roots in many of the original six member states of the ECSC, the effect of which was the establishment of a platform concerned with social cohesion and collective responsibility. Though it would have been very easy to ostracize Germany after the war, these statesmen’s common Germanic background and involvement in Christian associations helped keep their eyes toward the long term economic and political security of Europe. Rather than being swept up in the nationalistic tendencies that characterized the previous period, Schuman especially was able to look past war-time hatreds and identified the fact that it was in France’s (and Europe’s) interest to incorporate the West German state, in order to mobilize its abundance of coal. Here, steel and coal act as centripetal forces strong enough to overpower the centrifugal forces of ethnicity and nationality. Europe was so completely destroyed by the Second World War, in both economic and civilian terms, that these states tempered their self-interests and acceded to union with Germany. This is why the current dominance of the EU by the UK, France, and Germany is ominous for the other member states and the original purpose of the EU. The criticism is that the EU is already hardly a model for democratic institutions, but it becomes less democratic as the interests of these three nations take precedence over the interests of smaller nations like Poland or Austria. The effect will be that fewer European citizens will participate in elections, feeling that the future course of their countries is out of their control.

The UK and the EU- Alex Hanson

Following World War Two, and especially by the mid 1950s, it was becoming clear that Great Britain no longer had the means to uphold its overseas empire. With the collapse of the Commonwealth, Britain needed to find new markets, and with the failure of the European Free Trade Agreement, it turned to the fledgling European Economic Community. Though French President Charles De Gaulle originally blocked Great Britain’s entrance, by 1972 they gained admittance. Judt characterizes Britain’s relationship with the European community, which begins with the EEC and continues through the European Union, as one of positives and negatives, and I would argue more positives than negatives. Great Britain gained much from its participation in the European community: a common market, subsidies and wealth reallocation for poorer regions, uninhibited travel, and seeming protection from another European war. It also helped reestablish and redirect Great Britain, which following the Suez Canal debacle was entering into an identity crisis. However, the United Kingdom’s increasing ties to Europe received much opposition. For much of its history Britain has followed a very different path than Europe. Separated by the English Channel, Britain was spared from much of the violence and upheaval that shaped the European continent during modern times. These differences made many British citizens wary of uniting with Europe. The opposition criticized the disproportionate amount the UK paid (Margaret Thatcher did likewise), and how what started off as a purely economic arrangement expanded into many different areas. Tony Wright expresses what, to many, was the greatest objection to Britain’s membership in the European Union, “by giving primacy to European law over domestic law… the old doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty was effectively blown out of the water” (25). Although Britain did have to cede some of its sovereignty to the EU, it was by no means as if they were powerless to legislate their own country. Some of England’s greatest constitutional reforms, such as the Human Rights Act, came during this time. Perhaps the greatest argument for joining the European Union is what would have happen to Britain if they had not done so. What would have happened to the lost Great Britain of the mid 1950s, searching for new markets and a new direction, if it had not joined with Europe?

Midterm Examination Key

Midterm Examination Key

Instructions: Write your answers to the questions below in the blue book. Be sure to number each question. Please write legibly.

Note: Georgetown University is an honor-code school for undergraduates. Cases of suspected academic dishonesty will be handled according to the university’s honor code.

Part I Short Answer (Your response should be no more than a few sentences or a list. 10 pts. each)

1. Briefly describe Marx’s concept of “ideology.”

Best answer should be clearly written and should contain some combination of:

-materialism or historical materialism
-base/superstructure
-relations of production
-system of ideas, culture, beliefs
-causality (ideology as lacking independent causal significance)
-epiphenomenon
-justification / legitimation of relations of production / class relations
-telos / teleology


E.g., ideology is the system of ideas, beliefs, and culture that justifies particular relations of production. This flows from Marx’s materialist conception of history and social life. Material relations are part of the base; ideology and other social epiphenomena are part of superstructure, having no independent causal effects.


2. What is a Condorcet cycle? Does one always occur?

This is the production of incoherent/irrational/intransitive group preference from otherwise rational individual preferences. It does not always occur; in most cases with very limited players and very limited preferences, cycles are unlikely. As you increase both the number of players and the number of preferences, however, the probability of a cycle increases.

Best answers were very clear in the language they used to refer to the group and individual preferences; they mentioned “rational individuals” or “transitive individual preferences” and “irrational” or “intransitive” group preferences arrived at by “aggregation” of individual preferences. They also, in many cases, showed an example (A>B>C>A).

Also, it is important to note that this question had two parts. Best answers to the second part referred to factors that increase the probability of cycles (i.e. group size and preference number).


3. State Arrow’s theorem. What is its significance?

There is no system of translating coherent/rational individual preferences into group preference that does not also either (1) produce irrational/incoherent group preferences or (2) restrict the expression of individual preferences (either across all of society or amongst certain groups, or both). Thus, there is a tradeoff between social rationality and concentration of power. This is “significance” because it means that there is no “natural” majority will and that we must devise sets of rules for determining what we want to count as a majority/group will.

Again, best answers had to give clear responses to both parts of the question.


Part II Long Short Answer (Your answer should be a paragraph. 20 pts. each)

4. Give TWO alternative definitions of a “state” based on lectures, class readings, and discussion sections.

There were a range of possible good responses here. Some possibilities included:

-Marxist
-Institutionalist
-Functionalist
-Weber’s definition
-Aristotle’s definition
-Professor King’s definition of contemporary states from lecture

Most important was to demonstrate your ability to think through two conceptually distinct ways of seeing the idea of a state. The best answers did not simply incorporate the material presented on slides in lecture; they also referred to readings or other sources outside the lecture. The best answers also did not simply restate two definitions from memory (this would receive approximately a B if both definitions were solid), but offered at least some short explanation of where these two definitions came from, how they were different, and why that difference was significant. This could refer, for example, to the malleability of the concept of state and the different types of entities it could include (depending on definition).

5. Describe how plurality, majority, and closed party-list electoral systems work.

A minimally acceptable answer (that is, something in the C to B range) included:

Plurality: most votes wins
Majority: 50% plus one to win; second round if no one achieves this in first round
Party-list: vote for individual parties rather than candidates (in close list form); seats apportioned according to some proportional formula.

Best answers went into district magnitude, allocation method, form of candidature, etc. An answer could also get top credit if it included almost all of this information on each system and also mentioned some of the effects of each system.


6. What is “civil society”? How does the idea of “social capital” relate to it?

A minimally acceptable answer (that is, something in the C to B range, so about 14-17 depending on precision, etc.) included:

Secondary forms of association in society (interest groups, non-state organizations, durable social networks, etc) that exist midway between and help mediate relations between primary social groups (families/ kinship groups) and the state. Social capital as glue/connections among groups within civil society. Some reference to the several components of social capital mentioned in lecture.

Best answers nailed the definition of civil society (either that given in lecture or a similar variant drawn from a seminal text on the subject), demonstrated a clear understanding of the concept of social capital (describing or defining it in terms of “norms,” “trust,” “reciprocity,” and “networks”), demonstrated a clear distinction between these concepts and then showed how they were related, and referenced some of the relevant authors (Putnam, Tocqueville, etc) that we have discussed in relation to these concepts and findings. The discussion of the relationship between civil society and social capital could argue that social capital helps facilitate strong civil society (by allowing people to engage more fruitfully in collective action) or that civil society generally builds social capital (by bringing more people into contact with each other, building networks, and facilitating trust and reciprocity with individuals outside the immediate family). The very best answers pointed to both of these dynamics and linked them to the authors.


7. What is “the tragedy of the commons”? How does it relate to the idea of a public good?

The minimal correct answer (again, about C-B or 14-17/20) included a description of the “tragedy” as the diminution of common pool resources as a result of the individual rational self-interest maximization of all group members. The answer also had to include some notion of “public good” and how it related to the “tragedy.”

Better answers mentioned the distinction between public and private goods, using terms such as rivalrous/nonrivalrous and excludable/nonexcludable. The very best answers also showed consciousness of the difference between “public goods” (that are nonrivalrous, such as a lighthouse or public transportation service), “common goods” (that are rivalrous, such as the park bench or natural resources), and the differences and similarities between the problems that relate to each (collective action problems, free rider problem, tragedy of the commons). These answers also mentioned some of the ways in which authors (Hardin, Olson) recommend addressing these problems and protecting public and common goods (regulation, privatization, selective incentives).


8. How do we judge whether some theories in political science are better than others?

The minimal answer (about C- or 13/20) for this question included at least a reference to all five of the characteristics we discussed in class: generality, accuracy, parsimony, falsifiability, and causality. Additional credit was given for accurate descriptions of each of these (through about B+ or 18/20). The very best answers did a little more than just list these characteristics and their definitions, also mentioning the tradeoff between accuracy and generality, the significance of falsifiability (as opposed to earlier notions of verification), and possibly providing a couple of illustrations.


Part III Essay (70 pts.)

Choose ONE of the following. Remember: Your essay must make an argument by staking out a position and then supporting that position with evidence.

A. Describe the effects of different electoral systems on the outcome of elections. That is, how do the methods we use affect the answers we get? And why is there such a diversity of electoral systems in use around the world?

B. Using what you know of models and theories in political science, design a political science research project to test any of the various theories of any ONE of the following: Marx, Weber, Huntington, Hardin, Duverger. Describe such a project, its structure, its sources of data, and its chief hypothesis.

C. Describe and analyze a real-world collective action problem that we have not discussed during lectures. What allowed the collective action problem to be overcome, or what prevented collective action from occurring?


For the essays, length is not the sole criterion, but in general they should be about 2-3 pages or so of text at a minimum. Foremost was whether the essay answered the question. Then, I was looking for some clarity of argument—a set of coherent points supported with some evidence. Reference to readings was definitely a plus and often was a major part of what distinguished a genuinely “A” answer from the rest.


On essay A, it was vital to realize that there were two parts of the question and to make sure to address each of these. First, you needed to give some general explanation of how electoral systems affect outcomes (many people very thoughtfully framed this in terms of Condorcet, Arrow, the lack of a majority will apart from the institutions used to measure it, etc), and you needed to describe what the effects are of different systems. It was key that you needed to really talk about the EFFECTS of electoral rules. Answers that simply described each system (which you already did for question 5 above) were not awarded nearly as many points. Some of the factors we were looking for included (though not limited to): compromise/inclusiveness, efficiency/effectiveness, accountability, stability, simplicity/tradition, number of parties usually generated, representativeness (of minorities, women, etc), centripitalism/moderation, affects on multi-ethnic populations, how issues get divided amongst parties, preference salience, etc.

For the second question, you had make a theoretical argument as to what accounts for the wide variety of electoral systems that exist internationally. Ideally, your answer to this question was stated as a clear thesis in your introduction and was then either addressed alongside the effects or was handled in the second part of your essay. You needed to demonstrate some knowledge, based on the readings, of why countries might choose or end up with different systems, either based on those systems’ effects (e.g., in cases of ethnically divided societies) or based on history/values. The very best answers addressed the different paths by which electoral systems are created in different states: some by gradual historical evolution or carryover from earlier institutions, some by conscious values- or needs- based choice (where a system was selected to best protect values held by that society or to best handle particular social or demographic tensions). As long as a strong argument was made and backed up by some supporting evidence, however, there was a fair degree of flexibility in acceptable answers (historical path dependency, conscious choice, values, needs of a particular type of society, etc).

Authors that were relevant to this question included: Condorcet, Arrow, Reilly, Norris, Lijphart, Soudriette and Ellis, Burke, Mirabeau, Duverger, North, Rosenfeld, Alesina, …

The very best answers were well structured as responses to both questions, dealt with most of the major systems that we had studied (i.e., plurality, majority, proportional representation, preferential, and possibly the mixed types STV and AV), marshaled the ideas of a number of different authors, referred to at least a few examples of countries to demonstrate points, and made a clear thoughtful argument concerning the origins of variation in system design (not just a quick response in the final paragraph to this part of the question).


Essay B: For this question I wanted to see clear scientific reasoning. You needed to describe clearly what the theoretical model was you planned to test, and then develop an experiment in order to test it. In addition to showing full understanding of the theory being tested, your answer needed to also demonstrate a clear grasp of scientific method and theory judgment criteria. You needed to be conscious of how to apply concepts such as falsifiability and generality to the evaluation of a real theoretical model. (Implicitly, you must show that the theory you intend to test is falsifiable. Also, one clear mistake here was to conceptualize the test as an attempt to “prove” the model correct. This failed to grasp the idea that theories cannot be verified through experimentation, only falsified.)

Best answers laid out a clear neat experimental design, thoughtfully considered the data sources to be used, and correctly identified what hypothesized outcome would correspond with the theory’s predictions and which hypothesized outcome would violate these expectations and falsify the theory. Best answers also generally included some reference to the general principles by which good theories can be judged (discussed in question 8).


Essay C: This essay required that you develop a clear example that demonstrated your comfortable with key concepts from collective action theory and that you can see how these interrelate and apply to real world problems. Your answer had to include: a clear description of the collective action problem at hand, a description of what happened and if the problem was ever overcome, and an explanation for why this was and what factors either allowed or prevented collective action from occurring.

Best answers to this question showed precisely how the problem they had described could be modeled in terms of collective action theory concepts. They clearly identified who the (potential) collective actors were (individuals, groups, countries, etc), what their interests were, and what public or common good was at stake. This last element was particularly relevant, because it requires reframing the “collective action” problem to think “what is in this for everybody?” There are some things that we inherently know are collective action problems, but we do not usually think of in terms of the non-excludable good that they provide. But reframing the question in terms of what the benefit is that all group members can expect (at least in the long term) can help generate a more fruitful analysis of the individual group member’s rational weighting of interests and how that might have led to the particular outcome being explained.

Best answers to this question demonstrated a familiarity with the theoretical explanations for what factors make collective action problems easier or harder to solve. This might include: group size, anonymity versus reputation, values and norms of behavior, individual rationality, free rider and tragedy of the commons problems, levels of social capital (norms of trust and reciprocity in the given group or society, pre-existing networks of relationships), regulation, privatization, and selective incentives. Best answers also referenced some of the literature we have read or discussed on this or closely related and relevant subjects (Olson, Hardin, Putnam, Tocqueville,…) Clear logical argument justifying a plausible causal explanation for the collective action outcome (i.e. success or failure) was also key.

Turkey Club! (Or, Turkey and the EU)

Michael Teitelbaum and Philip Martin raise some interesting questions in their article (Foreign Affairs, May/June 2003) about Turkey's potential accession into the European Union. Much of the article spends time analyzing the pertinent economic facts -- whether or not allowing Turkey into full EU membership would trigger a wave of Turkish migrant workers that might destabilize or weaken other European economies. This is a huge concern, and one that I presume has only become more wide-spread in the last few months as the global financial crisis has battered European markets.

However, I think the article makes one of its most important points early on -- that there are distinct cultural and political fears underlying much of the opposition towards admitting Turkey into the EU. Last semester, I had the chance to attend a week-long student debate in the EU Parliament that focused on the Treaty of Lisbon (an effort to strengthen the Union in the wake of the failed European Constitution) and more broadly the question of "enlargement" or whether or not non-traditional European countries should be allowed into the European Union.

The quote (in the article) from the former President of France reminds me of a lot of the research I did about French cultural fears of a more powerful European Union. Here in the United States, some variant of the "melting pot" has always run through our cultural consciousness. Even in the face of recurring domestic Culture Wars, it can be hard to grasp the European cultural mindset. The differences are apparent even on the insitutional level: France has had a "minister of culture" since the end of the 1950s, and periodically holds summits where the agenda focuses on the spread and protection of specific cultural values. Cultural nationalism, then, plays a distinct role in much of French politics. Particularly given existing fear and distrust against Muslims in France, it should not be surprising at all that there would be powerful opposition to letting in a heavily-populated middle-Eastern country into the EU.

At the end of the day, though, there is still hope. Turkey has made some remarkable strides on certain human rights issues (notably torture and some womens' rights issues) and might eventually become sufficiently "European" to warrant more consideration. Likewise, the need for a larger EU to tackle global ecological and economic issues might spur some of these hesitant European countries to reconsider. Either way, this is a key area where politics, economics, culture, and institutions are deeply intertwined.

Oh the Brits

Tony Wright’s British Politics provided an excellent introduction into a very much different democracy than the one we enjoy here in the United States. Two clear distinctions, each of which is related to the other, struck me as especially interesting. Wright writes (ha!) that while the political Left and Right differ on numerous political issues, “both agreed that Britain’s top-down, government-centered way of doing politics should be defended and protected” (38). This really struck a chord with me as a very politically interested American. In the United States we suggest almost by default that the conservative Republicans are the party of small government, and the liberal Democrats are the party of big government. Traditionally, Republicans favor tax breaks and loosening of governmental regulation while the Democrats favor higher taxes to support numerous programs as well as a high degree of regulation. Granted it isn’t quite fair to say that all British politicians favor big government in the way that Democrats, but that’s really the point. In Britain, Wright explains, when parliament replaced the Monarch as the political (legislative and executive) power, they didn’t forfeit any of the control. They essentially maintained the monarchic level of governmental reach and power and simply transferred it to Houses of Parliament. Wright says this change “preserved intact and undiminished the supreme authority of the State” (49). This seemingly has two consequences. First, it simply necessitates a large government, relatively larger than the US. Second, as a result of the authority of the State, the government’s legitimacy seems to come less from “the people”, as in does in the US, and more from the traditional legitimacy of the “ King in Parliament”. That’s not to say the British don’t have a huge say in their politics. They do by voting. If they feel the country is going in the wrong direction they can vote to change the majority party. However, it appears to me that in a system where the majority party essentially operates as one executive and legislative entity with virtually no checks and balances, this traditional form of legitimacy must serve some kind of reassuring role to the citizens whose laws are almost entirely controlled by one essentially monopolistic political party. 

British Politics

In Tony Wright's British Politics, he speaks about the notion that English people are relatively unconcerned with their democracy, quoting Hugo Young as writing, "The British do not passionately care about democracy (14)." It seems that the British people have given Parliament a good deal of performance legitimacy- "As long as they get a vote every few years and the children don't starve, they are prepared to put up with almost anything (14)." Wright describes the strong central government of Britain in great detail, a government whose strength, to my mind, is born out of it's peoples laissez-faire attitude towards its Parliament. This in turn contributes towards the long-standing stability of their government- the MP are more than happy to maintain their heavily centralized government and the power it provides the Parliament so long as the people will support it. It even extends to their lack of a truly centralized constitution- there is no motivation to codify their numerous laws and edicts unless the people demand a clear outlining of their rights. It creates a cyclical relationship where both lawmakers and citizens are given what they desire, the citizens being provided a safe, stable society and the lawmakers the power to enact the policies they see fit. Such a system could never work in a country like the United States where rights and regulations were clearly stated from the conception of the nation. One must consider, however, whether the British system is more preferable in today's society. It allows the government a great deal of fluidity that the heavily codified American government cannot hope to simulate. In a time when quick, decisive action is all the more necessary and prevalent, it seems the British government has a governmental leg up on our own.

postwar

Something I found very interesting in the Retribution chapter is that according to Judt, "Germans in the 1940s had little sense of the way the rest of the world saw them." (57) They did not understand the full extend of what their countrymen and leaders did during the war. Instead, they were inclined to view themselves as victims of their own post-war difficulties-- "food shortages, housing shortages, and the like." (57) The rest of Europe, while wanting to move on past the difficult memories of the atrocities, very much blamed the worst crimes against humanity on the Germans and expected accountability and justice to be served. It's mindblowing to imagine the German people of that time as being detached from the actions of their state leaders, as feeling victimized while so many others were being hatefully targeted and murdered. Of course to a certain extent, the Germans would have been conditioned by their government and used to the propaganda and exploitation as simply what happened to other people, not them; they had their own problems. This mentality shows just how subjective and relative history can be depending on the perspective of the teller. Human selfish need can blindsight even the most guilty away from objective analysis to biased interpretation. Of course, everyone in that generation was struggling with post-war difficulties. There were bigger problems than economic strife though. Everlasting dilemmas had arised due to ethnic cleansing, and the Germans were standing around asking why the finger was being pointed at them so harshly. This is hard for me to conceive, but I suppose we humans are that capable of convincing ourselves what we want to believe. There may not always be a definitive, mutually agreed upon right or wrong, even if there are exact accounts of history, because of what side of the line we were standing on at the time of the events.