Democracy and Constitutional Liberalism

In “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy”, Fareed Zakaria makes a clear distinction between democracy and constitutional liberalism, a political system characterized by the rule of law and the protection of basic individual liberties, and claims that in the modern world, constitutional liberalism has led to democracy but democracy has not necessarily given rise to constitutional liberalism and the protection of liberal values.
I think Zakaria makes a valid point that it should not be assumed that constitutional liberalism exists in every democratic country, and that constitutional liberalism cannot exist in any non-democratic state. However, I think that democracy sets the conditions needed for constitutional liberalism, and that the factors involved in the creation of democracy are also factors that lead to constitutional liberalism; one of the main factors for democracy is education.
In “Economic Development and Democracy”, Lipset suggests that countries with higher levels of education tend to have democratic governments, and that if it cannot be said that education is a sufficient condition for democracy, it can be said to be almost a necessary one. This begs the question, why is this the case? Why are lower classes in countries with higher education more receptive to democratic values? I think that not only does education encourage independent thinking, but also those who are educated are more aware of their individual rights. With education as a factor for democracy, I think that education in a democracy motivates citizens to push for political decisions that protect their personal liberties, and to use their freedom to vote to do so. Perhaps Zakaria is right in claiming that democracy does not necessarily lead to constitutional liberty, but I think that high education as a factor of democracy, combined with the freedom of speech and assembly involved in democracy, secures constitutional liberty in the modern world.

What Democracy Is... And Is Not

Schmitter and Karl's "What Democracy Is...and Is Not" is a collation of the broadest terms and concepts that can be applied to any modern democracy. This article is reminiscent of the “Clash of Civilizations” by Huntington because Schmitter and Karl provide a definition that is much too vague; consequently, different systems are not democratic or not, but rather different types of democracy. Their definition is too general to help distinguish between democracies— which renders ultimately useless because it is meant to encompass all nations that claim this type of government.

The first section of the article describes characteristics (public realm, ruler) that the authors acknowledge to be applicable not only to nominal democracies but to authoritarian and other types of regimes as well. Though they attempt to further pinpoint a concrete definition through their use of elections and citizenship these too could be used in a number of non-democratic systems. In the past, many regimes have grasped on to the concept of elections and granted near universal suffrage but no one would call Mugabe's current rule in Zimbabwe or Panama under Noriega democracies.

However, the authors claim that the determining principles are neither the leader nor the public realm, but rather the focus on the citizens. They believe a country is only democratic to the extent that it has citizens, a concept that supports Isaiah Berlin’s notion of positive and negative liberty. Whether it be “freedom from” or “freedom to” a system is still catering to the citizens and allowing them an optimal status of citizenship (to be able to vote and participate in government with minimal restrictions).

Furthermore, Schmitter and Karl describe elections as one of the determining factors of democracies; however they are much too vague to actually produce a tangible idea. While dismissing the idea of electoralism, the authors instead argue that civil society can be the most vital part to a developed, modern democracy. They say that honest, accessible, and regular elections are the building blocks of democracy, yet they also claim that elections that exclude certain parties and restrict certain portions of the population can also be democratic. Typically, it is believed that the Sandinistas regime in Nicaragua was a Communist takeover, but they too had elections which were biased in all ways to Communist front. By their standards, this can be called a democratic system.

As discussed in lecture, many Americans in particular have developed a tendency to idealize an image of "true" democracy. Schmitter and Karl assert that no such image exists in reality, but rather that there are various forms of democracy that depend on and differ according to socioeconomic conditions, state structures, and policies. I think this part of the essay has much more basis and rationality because it introduces democracy as a conglomerate of processes, and not just an ideology. They discuss how democracies differ and claim that there are subtypes that are in accord with the set principles, yet it seems all too hasty and absurd. If all components of democracy “should be seen as either indicators of this or that type of democracy,” then Schmitter and Karl ought to discuss these types of democracy in order to be more accurate (243). Grouping different regimes under one term when there is no universality in performance makes no sense. This manner of grouping can only lead to more confusion. Most analysis must be done, because as this article stands, a myriad of different systems can claim a democratic model of governance.

Contrary to what many American’s believe to be true – democracies are automatically “the best” at everything they do - especially on the economic front, the contemporary exponential economic growth of the still-authoritarian China comes into question. While Schmitte rand Karl ultimately argue that democracies have a better change for stability than authoritarian regimes, and while there is a debate over China’s path towards democracy, it is necessary for Americans to realize, especially in such dire times, that merely being a democratic state does not guarantee future prosperity.

"Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism"

What struck me most about Levitsky and Way's characterization of competitive authoritarianism was how it seems to be democracy tainted by institutionalized corruption. The arenas of democratic contestation present in real democracies exist under competitive authoritarian regimes, and ostensibly/technically they operate as they should, but all four arenas--electoral, legislative, judicial, and media--are undermined by the incumbent regime's scheming and ruthless manipulation in their desperate attempts to stay in power. It made me wonder, then, about how preferable this regime type would be in comparison to the two extremes of which it is roughly the average. Competitive authoritarianism seems rooted in and indeed defined by the dishonest power-hungriness of the people/party currently in power, and I don't think it can be argued that this is only a necessary evil on the way to democracy. One of Levitsky and Way's main points was that for too long we have viewed these competitive authoritarian regimes that emerged after the Cold War amidst widespread loss of patience for and acceptance of authoritarian regimes throughout the world--now it has been 18 years since 1990 and the majority of states in the world are still non-democratic, and since close to zero progress has been made by these competitive authoritarian regimes down the path to democracy, it's time to consider competitive authoritarianism as a regime type in its own right and not a set of training wheels on the bicycle of democracy. While competitive authoritarianism is surely an improvement from full-blown authoritarianism, given the legality and occasional success of opposition movements, it is by no means an ideal state of affairs, and it should not be accepted as a satisfactory regime type by Western leaders and states who seek to promote and spread democracy throughout the world.

Response #1: "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy" by Fareed Zakaria

In my response, I would like to focus specifically on the topic of democracy and constitutional liberalism because I see it as a starting point for many possible discussions regarding regime types, types of democracies, role of the government, individual rights...etc.

* Procedure for selecting the government vs. goals/qualities of the government?
Zakaria defines democracy as the “rule of the people” and according to Samuel P. Huntington, it manifests itself in the form of open, free, fair elections – regardless of the qualities of the government established as the result of those elections.
This is an interesting point since democracy is concerned with having a choice, not necessarily its content or the result. It relates back to the role of the electoral system: giving people opportunities to express preferences regardless of the actual content of that preference. Then the qualities we often associate with democracy, such as “comprehensive catalog of social, political, economic, and religious rights” are not necessarily what characterize a state as democratic.
In the realm of our “democracy” discussion, the two elements presented above are really the question of democracy vs. constitutional liberty. These are the two components of a “liberal democracy”: democracy (political liberties) and constitutional liberalism (civil liberties). Is there a causation link here? Zakaria believes that “constitutional liberalism has led to democracy, but democracy does not seem to bring constitutional liberalism.” In other words, if the government acts on behalf of its people’s individual rights and freedom, such an effort will lead to democratic elections…etc. But the reverse might be difficult since "democratic" elections often come down to choosing the lesser evil. Half of the “democratizing states” fall into this category of “illiberal democracy” and are heading toward illiberalism instead of maturing into liberal democracies. This is interesting since we, especially from the West, tend to view elections as the first step toward democratization and liberalization but yet the argument made above implies otherwise.
Then there is this quote from Zakaria’s piece to consider: “Constitutional liberalism is about the limitation of power, democracy about its accumulation and use." Is there a dichotomy here? Does this contradict his other points? Is there a way to resolve this tension?

Then I would like to raise another question briefly mentioned in Zakaria’s piece:
* Illiberal democracy or liberal autocracy?
Election may be the symbolical first step but constitutional liberalism is viewed as a stronger foundation/preparation for further democratization. Furthermore, it is more difficult to push constitutional liberalism on a society than to impose elections.
Is one more admirable than the other? Which one has higher possibility/potential to move toward liberal democracy? And more broadly, is it always beneficial to move in that direction despite the chaos and instability that seem to accompany liberalization and democratization-not to mention many failed attempts around the world?
Zakaria’s quote toward the end seems to answer this question partially: “[illiberal democracies] will discredit liberal democracy itself… democracy without constitutional liberalism is not simply inadequate, but dangerous, bringing with it the erosion of liberty, the abuse of power, ethnic divisions, and even war.” But...are we simply assuming here that liberal democracy is the most ideal form? Zakaria's piece raises numerous interesting questions.

Response #1

Arend Lijphart argues that developing countries would fare better under parliamentary and PR systems than in presidential and plurality systems. I do not always agree with this claim, but in the case of the Dominican Republic I must say that I do. Even though the candidature in Dominican elections is individual, most people end up voting for political parties (always keeping the individual candidate in mind, of course). Such an electoral system has always presided in the Dominican Republic and to this day has not failed. What is odd, though, is that, unlike the United States, the Dominican Republic has three major political parties: PRSC, PLD, and PRD. Each has an equal chance of winning every election and though people speculate, there never really is an “under-represented” one amongst them. Sure, there are other small fringe parties, but they do not really count for much.

I believe, however, that a PR system has not done and cannot do much for the Dominican economy. British scholar S.E. Finer concludes that “economic development requires not so much a strong hand as a steady one.” He and other British scholars further argue that what is needed is “‘greater stability and continuity’ and ‘greater moderation in policy’ which could only be provided by a shift to PR … governments.” Unfortunately for the Dominican Republic, such is not the case. I do not think the problem is within the electoral system, but within the electorate itself. One of Andrew Ellis and Richard W. Soudriette’s five key factors in determining how a system can be effectively administered in a country is voter education because “voters may not fully understand that they are electing legislators to represent them and their community.” And that is exactly what is missing in much of the Dominican Republic. Many [especially uneducated and lower-class] citizens keep nominating the dishonest crooks who promise them a bag of rice at their door in exchange for their vote, instead of promising true representation of their important needs and not just their immediate wants. The economy thus goes to the garbage. Not only is the nation’s potential extremely underdeveloped, but the mentality does not advance. If the citizenship were to be better educated, then perhaps the PR system would work to the fullest in aiding the country to advance. With the correct knowledge imparted to its citizens (which does not necessarily have to be too extensive), the Dominican Republic could be one of the most successful countries in Latin America—politically, economically, and socially. But there is a still long way to go to achieve that (and at the risk of sounding totally pessimistic: if it even is achievable!).

Response #2

Representative Government: It's not just vote counting

In the final minutes of class today, Professor King remarked on the differing views of Edmund Burke and Honoré Gabriel Riqueti, comte de Mirabeau regarding the nature of representational government. Is it enough, as Burke presented, to elect officials to act as proxies for the views of the nation while using their best judgment and expertise to make decisions in the best interest of their constituency? Or as Mirabeau believed, do elected officials need to mirror their constituency, resembling the body of which they are representative?

This week's study of electoral systems examines how representatives are elected. As Pippa Norris notes, majoritarian systems produce "elected dictatorship[s]." Giving the representatives elected by a majority or pluralistic vote leeway to do whatever they want until the next election cycle when roughly half of the population will choose who next will govern makes it easy for politicians to cater and serve only those constituents who put them in office. Other electoral systems such asSTV and Preferential allow significant minority factions to gain representation in a manner roughly proportionate to their incidence in the population.

It is interesting to see how preferences are reflected in these alternative electoral systems which practice vote transferal or give people the option to record a second choice; rather than the most fervently popular, a candidate with whom most people are happy is elected under these terms. Different countries or regions may go out of their way to give special interests groups representations. In Lebanon, the presidency is reserved for a Maronite Christian, while the Prime Minister is required to be a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker of Parliament aShi'a Muslim. Donald Horowitz (ref in Reilly157) feels that this "defuse[s] the importance of ethnicity" and religion and makes voters think about broader issues.

I think this leads to artificiality in representative government. It may be prudent to see that representatives are actually representative of the views of the constituency as per Mirabeau, but people don't necessarily want to exclude certain qualified candidates from public office simply to meet a quota (ie, male/woman ratio). There should be enough flexibility to reflect true preferences.

Blog #1 - Grayson

After just a cursory glance at this week’s readings regarding electoral systems, it should become strikingly clear that the United States is profoundly less “democratic” than it could be. In this case I don’t mean democratic in the classic political science, sense where political power is in the hands of the people, who exercise that power through election. Rather, I mean democracy as it is used colloquially: a political system where every citizen has a voice and a say in what occurs. The United States is a heavily majoritarian democracy. All national level electoral systems (with the possibly exception of that funky Electoral College) are “first-past-the-post” systems, where the winner is simply the candidate who receives the most votes. At the risk of making an excessively general statement, I would guess the vast majority of American students grow up believing that this electoral system in the most desirable and equitable in the world. Upon ingesting this week’s readings, it’s pretty clear that the latter is false and the former is seriously debatable.

 

            My point, however, has nothing to do with bashing our domestic electoral system. While some form of proportional electoral system, be it Party List, Single Transferable Vote or some other variation on that theme would, as Lijphart put it, “limit, divide, separate, and share power in a variety of ways” (227), our pluralistic/majoritarian system works remarkable well because it doesn’t operate in isolation. The American system, essentially “winner-take-all”, would be dangerously volatile in an extremely divided society that offers little protection for the minority, as that minority’s main method of protection (participating in government) would difficult. Countries in this situation, as Reilly explains, have experimented with proportional systems in order to encourage centrist policies. In contrast, while the US does have a rather politically divided population, there exists a long tradition of legal and executive protection of political minorities. For that reason, and many more, the majoritarian democracy we live in isn’t quite as scary as the authors we read can make it sound.