Response #1

In his work, The Clash of Civilizations, Huntington proposes that the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world will be cultural rather than ideological or economic.  His presentation of this hypothesis is slightly murky in that I would consider ideological and economic situations to be a substantial addition to the links between people that promote a cultural identity; however, he seems to have unofficially defined these broad terms in reference to their role in the Cold War, which is understandable, and draws a number of pertinent observations, although his conclusions may be overreaching.  

Huntington notes a tendency to view interactions in terms of "'us' versus 'them'" (4) in groups who self-identify in terms of ethnicity and religion moreso than in other terms just as "civilization rallying" (8) expedites the resolution of violence.  This is a general claim that seems to be heavily based in correlation rather than causation, but it works as a basis for further observation.  He also notes a pattern of "economic regionalism" prompted by common cultures (3).  This is a valid point: trade can certainly be facilitated by proximity, and shared customs between trade partners can lead to happy dealings without unfortunate misunderstandings.  Conversely, cultural differences can impede trade: linguistic barriers are an obvious hurdle, but simple religious observances such as the Thursday/Friday or Friday/Saturday weekend in many Arab countries can also limit trade opportunities.

Chiefly, Huntington ponders the domination of Western civilization, as in its modern state, the West feels it has the power to make qualitative judgements on other cultures.  Coexistence and cooperation are clearly key to global interations, but they must be lobbied on more of an equally modern footing for the Western civilization to respect the cultural differences and avoid an explosive "clash of cultures."

-Amanda Delp

Response #3: Huntington's "the Clash of Civilizations vs. Marxian political philosophy, as discussed in class

I found the dichotomy between Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations" and King's Monday lecture on Marxian political philosophy very interesting for the way the two were so directly opposed to each other. Huntington's most basic arguments for why civilizations will clash rely on assumptions opposite to Marx’s historical materialism, and the compelling examples Huntington is able to provide (in comparison to Marx, who has no examples or empirical evidence) ultimately show the impracticality and inaccuracy of Marx's analysis of politics.

The concept of historical materialism, as advocated by Marx, maintains that all events throughout the entire course of human history have been driven by "material relations," defined as the struggle over "material power," defined as the "means of production," defined as the way in which people make a living. So everything that ever happened in history happened as a result of people competing over the way to make a living. "Culture" or "ideas" (about equality, self-determination, the will of God, etc) that aren't material objects, Marx believes, have no real power to direct events in the world.

Huntington cites the ephemeral ideas and feelings which Marx scorns as the causes of future concrete wars between civilizations. His first reason for civilizations' not being able to coexist peacefully is that differences are basic, but the differences he cites are not in production capabilities-they are in the "language, culture, tradition, and most important, religion [which Marx derided as "the opiate of the masses"]". There isn’t space to unpack the other ways in which Huntington describes how the power of ideas shapes conflicts, but it’s undeniable that Marx would disagree fairly strongly with him. Given the ways in which Huntington’s and Marx’s views have played out (consider 9/11, and the disaster of the former Soviet Union, among other examples), I would agree with Se-Jun that Marx’s political philosophies are somewhat less than useful and/or accurate.

Response #1

In Communist Menifesto, Marx argues that any individual who is not part of the bourgeoisie will become a member of the proletariat. Marx claims that the bourgeoisie has even “converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, [and] the man of science, into its paid wage-labourers”. This claim, however, is absolutely untrue in the modern society, meaning that Marx's claim may be just an outdated argument without much valid rationality, at least in the 21st century.

According to contemporary sociologists, there are seven classes in American society today(James Henslin). The top class, the capitalist class which composes one percent of the population, certainly sounds like Marx’s bourgeoisie. These are the people that own the capital. Indeed, the top one percent of Americans control 33% of the nation’s wealth. This works well for Marx’s view; it would seem that we have a solid bourgeoisie. Similarly, sociologists have identified two classes which correspond relatively well to the proletariat: the working class and the working poor which are composed of factory workers, laborers, and so forth. These groups compose about 46% of the population. So, we have proletariats and bourgeoisie in America that make up 47%, just under half, of the total population. Contrary, to Marx’s view, the remaining 53% of society do not fit well into either category.

The three classes that compose the rest of society are the upper middle class and the lower middle class, and the underclass. Marx remarks briefly on the underclass (the homeless, etc.) but dismisses it as small and powerless. On the other hand, Marx explicitly predicted the disappearance of the lower middle class, particularly the craftsmen. Yet, there are still a large number of artisans and craftsmen today. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, there are for example, 1.5 million carpenters in America today. These carpenters rely on “all around skills” and their “specialized training” Marx clearly stated “that specialized skill is rendered useless by new means of production,” yet today, many carpenters still rely on those specialized skills. Moreover, the Bureau of Labor Statistics predicts a 10% increase in the number of carpenters over the next decade. Far from being in decline, these specialized craftsmen are experiencing a period of expansion.

Marx might perhaps argue that the specialized craftsmen are merely a holdover, an anachronism whose abolition will still come. This objection may have some merit, but if 150 years has not served to remove the craftsmen, how long will it take? Marx might also argue that the craftsmen of today are in fact nothing more than proletariats in disguise, exploited by the bourgeoisie. I find this assertion implausible as the carpenter has little in common with the laborers that form the essence of the industrial proletariat. Carpenters are not easily replaceable, and many take pride in their work, so they do not appear to meet key qualifications.

Of course, carpenters, after all, are still relatively poor, earning only $17.57 per hour on average. Yet this example is strong enough to show the illogicality of Marx's argument. As I was answered by Jackie, it might be very important to learn Marx's argument for he is one of the pioneers of the political and social science field, but it is questionable if his logic is appliable in modern period.

Response #2

My response is an analysis and impression of the prescience of Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” article (and subsequent book) written in 1993. His article is a macro-level theory in the mold of those discussed in class like Robert Putnam, Gabriel Almond, Sydney Verba, Max Weber, and even Karl Marx. Writing in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union, Huntington attempts to identify the next clash that will dominate history, or the substance of the next clashes that will dominate history. Eager to move past the ideological, military, and economic clashes of the Cold War Era, he focuses on a less micro subject—cultural differences and what culture adds to one’s identity will be a point of contention between people. Naturally, clashes will most likely occur on the “fault-lines,” as it were, where different civilizations meet. Huntington’s argument here proves compelling when looking at the modern international order—conflict between India and Pakistan, Israel and Palestine, Russia and the former Soviet Bloc States, to name a few, all lend credence to this theory. Huntington defines “culture” in the widest scope possible, thereby minimizing the number of cultures he must necessarily involve in his theory. Still, he outlines the differences between West and East and the many sub-cultures that exist in each. Ultimately, it remains rather ambiguous what Huntington considers a “culture” in his theory (though he says there are about 7-8 important ones); at times “culture” appears to function as broadly as an entire region or state in his theory, and at other times something as small as an ethnic or religious minority (sub-culture or even sub sub-culture). This is not necessarily a criticism of his theory per se, as I believe the definition of “culture” to be a highly subjective one; if you were to ask twelve different academics, you would likely get twelve different definitions. Perhaps the most prescient observation Huntington made in the wake of the Cold War, however, is the “West versus the rest” argument. He posited that the West may contain the seed of her own destruction—that is, it built the modern international system through nation-states and intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations and European Union, and the desirability to promote these societies as a whole cloth solution is prevalent. This seed may have existed well before the end of the Cold War, but certainly didn’t manifest itself until after the U.S. had other countries to focus on, rather than exclusively on Russia and her surrogates. The insistence that our norms are “universalizable” (to use a Kantian term) and desirable all over is extremely naïve, yet it persists according to Huntington, because the West invented liberal democracy, and through its institutions, gave the international system so much substance through IGO’s and NGO’s. Moreover, current Western policies indicate the militarization of these values, a move that is indicative of our insistence that these values, norms, and forms of government be spread. The fact that this is antagonistic to other cultures is only further proven in the terrorist attacks of September 11th and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Response #1

Previous posts suggest that Weber's assertion that a state "claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force" is somehow ambiguous and open to interpretation. One claims that force is but one tool among many while another claims that force is helpful but not necessary for a state. For the purpose of sparking respectful debate, allow me to disagree with both notions.

(1) All authority at the state level stems from force.
It is obvious in the cases of a bank robber tackled by police that force is an important tool of the state. You may, however, be under the misconception that other tools exist as well. What about economic tools like taxation or regulatory tools like licensing? These as well ultimately draw their strength and legitimacy from the state’s monopoly on legitimate force. If you refuse to pay taxes, the IRS will seize your earnings directly, repossess your belongings, throw you out of your home and possibly straight into jail. While most people do not experience this, they pay their taxes knowing that this potential consequence exists. Similarly, operating a vehicle or practicing surgery without a proper license carries with it the potential to be forcibly stopped from continuing such behavior as well as more serious sanctions. There are countless state powers ultimately predicated on the potential use of force and I would be curious to hear if anyone can think of a significant state function that draws fundamental legitimacy from some source unconnected to force.

(2) The strongest force in a state is inherently legitimate.
In 1949, Communist forces pushed the ruling Kuomintang out of mainland China and onto the island of Formosa (Taiwan). For over two decades, the United States chose not to recognize the Communists as the “legitimate” authority in China. This did not change the fact that the Communist Party controlled the military, police, schools, and administration of all of mainland China. Since the inhabitants recognized their authority, they by all means satisfied Weber’s definition of legitimacy. Imagine a case in which the state is not the predominant wielder of force – in that case, the state is no longer the legitimate authority and the more powerful force will inevitably replace the state and claim its legitimacy. In time, the largest force always becomes the legitimate force.

Response #1

Response to: Politics as a Vocation by Max Weber

Near the beginning of his essay, Weber asserts that the defining characteristic of the state is its position as the “sole source of the right to use violence” (32), but he also acknowledges that many other tools are available to the state. After reading this admission of alternative means, I became interested in what other techniques states use to achieve their goals. Clearly other methods exist, or else life would be consumed by constant threats and abuse by the state. The most obvious device outside violence for me is the ability of the state to deprive citizens of freedoms and options, such as when states prohibit certain goods or jail people. The reverse of this is also true: another option for rulers is to provide incentives to follow or obey state policy, including production bonuses or merit recognition. The state may also use psychological strategies to enforce its will, by publicly honoring citizens, by inciting a culture of paranoia, or even by relaxing social norms. Spiritual tools also exist for certain countries, ranging from instituting a theocracy to acknowledging or disregarding the holidays of various religions. For every aspect of human life, there is a way the state can attempt to insert its influence and control, but all these other techniques rest on the foundation of the use of force that Weber initially lays out. Whenever the state does not fully control the use of force, its political stability comes into question, and its other methods of persuasion begin to lose their potency. This is a key reason why former entities like the Roman Empire or the French monarchy eventually fell apart: they had no ultimate way of enforcing their will, due to external takeover or internal collapse of their power base. The use of violence is the essential resource for states.

Response #1 - Ryan Berg

Perhaps the most perplexing thing we have attempted up to this juncture is defining the modern state. Although Aristotle assisted us in developing an overall framework for this definition, Weber attempts to define the state more specifically, namely through its most important function—the monopoly over the legitimization of the use of physical force. Weber defines the scope of this legitimization to a given territory, also an integral part in the definition of a state. It is this violence that maintains public order and contributes to the legitimacy (in the minds of citizens) of the state. Only the use of public force is legitimate, and in the case of private force (i.e. the use of modern private security forces) must be cleared first by the state. Even the ability to defend oneself—thereby using violence—is legitimized by the state, manifested in codified self-defense laws. Implicit in this state monopoly is the idea that private violence should be prevented or punished whenever possible. Because (1) politics must necessarily take place within the parameters of the state and (2) the state is defined in terms of violence and (3) the use of violence is generally relative, the definition of politics is thus a fight over the distribution of the use of legitimate force. Politics is thus a means to an end—the use of legitimate force is used to render control while other plans are carried out. The use of violence makes the state a “dominating” entity over citizen’s lives. Modern political states have created consistency or lasting legitimacy by vesting power in the office or title, rather than the person holding the office. This is seen in Weber’s discussion of administrative means, and whether administrative staffs have ownership or are “separated” from those means. “Separation” effectively curtails political power, while at the same time enhancing the responsibility of politicians. The most ironic accomplishment, however, is that despite the “separated” nature of the administrative means, states have still managed to consolidate these means (even though they don’t explicitly own them) to gain hegemony over the use of legitimate force. Overall, I find Weber’s definition of a state quite compelling (in the sense of accuracy), but he ultimately leaves one question unanswered—whether he meant to take a normative claim saying the state “ought to monopolize violence,” or whether he meant that the citizens “accept this monopolization” is unclear. My guess is that he meant to describe the modern state in the most realistic terms possible without regard for other factors.