A few thoughts on Democracy

At the end of Pierre Hassner's article on Russia's transition, he invokes an interesting quote that summed up one of the major themes of this week's readings on Post-communist states and democracy: "Liberal democracy is the least natural regime on earth".

For the most part, as Americans raised in a highly normative mold as to the best or most legitimate form of Government, we tend to think of political systems as existing roughly on a scale of better to worse -- and often in a sort of teleological flux. It is easy to cultivate such an attitude: a mix of patriotism (with a natural inclination towards liberal democracy), historical precedent (the scores of oppressive tyrannies that pepper history), and a distinctly Western individualist ethic (further re-enforcing liberalism) all contribute to the widely-held notion that we have somehow achieved a rather ideal form of government.

There is plenty of debate over what form of Democracy best accomplishes democratic ends -- and we spent much of the early part of this CPS class discussing the trade-offs inherent to different structural and electoral features that characterize modern democracies. And rather naturally, we look upon those countries that seem stunted under authoritarian or autocratic regimes as dangerous or backward to some extent. The oft-repeated attitude of Winston Churchill ("Democracy is the worst form of government except for all those others that have been tried.") is really the one that sticks with us.

Hassner, however, raises the very interesting question of whether this is an appropriate attitude to take. I do not mean to defend the actions of the various autocratic regimes around the world -- certainly most have not achieved a level of peace and stability that many Liberal Democracies have been able to cultivate. It is possible, though, to imagine that different cultural and historical circumstances might lend themselves to the neccessary establishment of a rather autocratic political system.

The tumultuous political history of France is a rather interesting example (and one which Hassner touches upon with his discussion of Charles De Gaulle). In some sense, France still grapples with the historical legacy of both its Monarchy and the powerful chief-executives that occasionally are at odds with strong Republican principles. Napoleoen, De Gaulle, and others give France a history of a strong central leadership and (particularly in the Fifth Republic) have resulted in proportionally more power being allocated to the President (as opposed to, say, Britain's strong Parliamentary streak). It is tempting to lump the world's liberal democracies together to contrast them with less democratic regimes -- but even among the utterly legitimate we see that some cultures may have a strong tendency towards central (and individual) rule. If we continue this spectrum a little further, Putin's rise in Russia may make perfect sense given the social context (and indeed, seems related to Russia's Tsarist past).

It is wrong to justify Putin's various crimes under this banner -- and we certainly cannot declare his violent oppression of various groups legitimate. We might be wise, however, to try to challenge our gut-level take on these autocratic regimes. Even if we hold liberal ideas, we have to acknowledge the wide range of possibilities that even competing liberal values might lead to in forms of government. And we should tailor out attitudes and foreign affairs philosophy to this reality.

Reaction to Hassner's "Russia's Tranisiton to Democracy"

When thinking about democracy and all of the different types and descriptions that have been provided and criticized, Russia is among one of the more confusing nations when it comes to classification. Pierre Hassner highlights this especially through the actions and perception of the nation's former (and very much arguably current) leader--Valdimir Putin.
Hassner discusses both Putin and former leader Yeltsin, and there seem to be parallels between the leadership of each and previously explored political syndromes. For example, Yeltsin seems to have been a likely medium for an examination of feckless pluralism, where there is a blurred line between the state and the ruling party. Yeltsin in 1993 decided to order troops (state owned?) to fire on a "rebellious" parliament presumably to cater to his own agenda. Seizure of public wealth by the oligarchs was also not uncommon. Still, under Yeltsin there were vital elements of democracy such as freedom of the media and public debate, at least more so than under Putin. Putin, on the other hand, made his ascension to power and loves to create a guise of democracy while eliminating the content of institutions that he likes to tout as democratic. This element would not fit under the syndrome of dominant power politics, yet I believe that the sheer amount of power exercised by Putin that remains even once he leaves the position of prime minister is a testament to how much this single leader "dominates the political system in such a way that there appears to be little prospect of alternation of power in the forseeable future". This is especially evident through a) Putins handle on the malleable figure-head prime minister Medvedev b) Putin's own pro-Putin youth group "Nashi" ("ours" in Russian) and countless other examples.
Overall, I agree with Hassner's characterization of Russia's political system as a result of the political leader. One can hardly blame the Russian people for being in favor of a stabilizing force after the break-up of the Soviet Union, the U.S.'s indifferent diplomatic attitude following the Cold-War, etc. I do think he is accurate when he states that because a majority of people support Putin, it seems to them to be a sufficient democratic regime. I do, however, disagree with him on one point that I view as critical, especially in the wake of the recent Russia-Georgia conflict. A residual desire for respectability in the eyes of the West and the world is evident, but perhaps not in the way Hassner does. I think this desire for respectability has become a desire for other nations to fear Russia as a re-emerging superpower, not revere it as a democracy(which it is arguably not). While Putin has acquiesced his position as Prime Minister without touching the constitution, I think hes remaining strong hold on Russia is evident to the world. This desire for respect as a democracy once might have been relevent, but I think more than anything now Russia just wants to be recognized once again as a threat, hence the backing of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the resulting conflict with Georgia.
Is it fair to blame Russia for desiring such recognition, especially as they became essentially dipolmatically ignored after the U.S. presumed it had won the Cold War, and Nato is expanding, and U.S. troops are in Central Asia? Maybe, maybe not. This likely has a lot to do with the nationalism that is brewing inside the country and the amount of power the people of Russia are currently willing to cede to their beloved stabilzer, Vladimir Putin (Judomaster).



While he outlines Russia's current system, a sort of "virtual democracy" I have to disagree with one point he makes.

Post communism: democratic break through & consolidation of liberal democracy

This reading raises several concerns regarding the types of democracy and the process of democratization not only in the postcommunist world but in general as well.

1. Opposition to the authoritarian regime vs. Favor of democratic regime
In thinking about the transition to democracy, does a state become a democracy (or have a democratic breakthrough) because it tries to escape from the current authoritarian system or because it has the desire to move toward democracy? In other words, is democracy just one of many possible regimes for those who are trying to overthrow the current authoritarian regime? ("Heart of the matter was getting rid of unpopular and deeply dishonest incumbents, not backing some specific new set of policies or reforms"-McFaul) or is there a conscious pull or gravitational force from the democratic regimes (what McFaul describes as prodemocratic pull) from the West, aided by the domestic support?

2. Democratic breakthrough vs. consolidation of liberal democracy
Is democratization a gradual process or does it necessarily require a powerful breakthrough as discussed in McFaul's article? McFaul's article goes on to discuss the seven specific common factors that contributed to the successful democratic breakthroughs in three cases but goes on to state that those breakthroughs are only a start that cannot go on to consolidate democracy on their own. What is more interesting about these breakthroughs, however, is that all three cases assume the existence of electoral democracy (or the mere existence of elections for that matter), since, for an election to be fraud, it has to exist in the first place. Relating back to Zakaria's, Diamond's...etc articles, does this mean that elections are in fact the basis for democratization? (McFaul explicitly dismisses other economic, social factors as playing an essential role). McFaul further provides unessential factors and I was rather surprised to see him dismissing economic factors: "it was a purely political factor-vote fraud- that set things off" (McFaul) as apposed to Howard who acknowledges the role of economic stability/higher standards of living as the foundation for further democratization.

3. Institution -> values/traditions vs. values/traditions -> institution?
Comparing McFaul's piece with the one of Howard's then brings back this question discussed earlier in the course. For McFaul, it is the democratic values developed among the people that eventually change the institutional structure. But Howard argues that it is the communist and later postcommunist institutions and people's experience within them that prevent those people from actively participating in the civil society and organizations: "the prior regime type is by far the most powerful and statistically significant factor" (Howard) This also relates to our discussion of social capital and its vital role in a civil society as well as the decision to condemn the communist system rather than the people's lifestyles and personal histories.

4. Democratization vs. sovereignty/nationalism
In response to Hassner's piece, we should consider this dilemma between democratization (term often associated in "nation-building") and sovereignty (and its relation to nationalism). This discussion is important as it has an implication in discussion regarding humanitarian intervention in non-democratic states as well. Furthermore, considering Russia's desire to restore its power, which is more preferable: strong, autocratic state? or weak, democratic state?

5. Domestic pressure vs. international pressure toward democratization
Domestic factors: nationalism, corruption reported by the media, desire to restore power and legitimacy...etc
International factors: pressure from the democratic West (might even seem like a threat)
Which plays a greater role? this is important for determinig the mechanism for democratization.

The Fall of Communism from the Perspective of Przeworski and Arendt

My reflection this week focuses on Przeworski’s piece, “A Prologue: The Fall of Communism.” In this article he compares the fall of Communism to cancer, and the unique symptoms that led to its demise in individual countries, such as Poland, to pneumonia, which often kills cancer patients before cancer itself. He attempts to describe the decay of Eastern European Communism as a regime that was morally bankrupt and difficult to implement. While reading this I couldn’t help but think of Arendt’s characterization of totalitarian regimes in her work “The Origins of Totalitarianism,” which seems to explore Przeworski’s observation in greater detail.

Arendt states that ideals held by totalitarian parties, such as the Bolsheviks, are utopian, and while they may seem feasible while in the opposition, they are difficult to implement once in power. The machinations of the state’s political process hinders the creation of such a utopia as the party becomes bogged down in everyday politics. However, the party’s desire to keep power necessitates the imposition of a systematic, mass reign of terror, which becomes their sole means for creating order and utopia.

In my opinion, this method of retaining political power is doomed to failure in the case of Marxist-Leninism (and Fascism). The whole idea of a solitary party or vanguard coming to power in the name of the people and claiming to speak for them does not necessarily mean that the people espouse the same ideology. Such an ideology is often only half-heartedly adopted by the masses and only fully espoused with party stalwarts. Over time, the old party enthusiasts lose their zeal and the new generation becomes concerned only with keeping power and very few hold the ideals of the ruling party. Thus, totalitarians are only kept in power by force and control, which cannot last forever.

British Party Politics

I didn’t know a lot about British politics before reading Tony Wright’s book, other than the basic structure of the legislature and executive and names like Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, and Margaret Thatcher.  I didn’t realize that the party system in Parliament was laid out, and more importantly accepted, the way that it is; that in accordance with the first-past-the-post electoral system the party in power, which may have received only a few more votes than the opposition party, can essentially pass any legislation it wants without running into any significant obstacles. The dynamics of this system are really interesting to me, because the regimes I’m most familiar with have a much less friendly relationship with similar styles of governance.   The U.S. legislature is designed to prevent unilateral policy domination as far as possible, while rising democracies in the developing world are criticized, and often penalized in terms of donor aid and support, for developing what has been termed the “dominant one party” system, in which party turnover and equality of policy creation are markedly low. The view from the outside, or at least from where I’m standing, would have to be curious about why the “shadow” party, and the citizens who support it and the other opposition parties, so willingly accept a near-complete lack of political influence and interest articulation whenever they happen to lose an election.  However functionally efficient the system may be, it seems like it requires a certain extreme amount of trust that the party in power won’t completely screw everyone else over.  Maybe this is indicative of how deeply this particular system of government organization is ingrained in British history, consciousness, and culture, because I’m not sure how it would survive in “newer” democratic states.

Postwar and Backlash Toward the European Union

In Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945, Judt unfolds the social, economic and cultural changes of Europe after World War II. Within his analysis, Judt examines the rise of the European Union, evaluating its economic and ideological impact. In short, the European Union involved the integration of nation states into an economic union. Postwar portrays the complex and intricate history behind the EU, as the union sought to provide durable peace to a continent heavily damaged by two World Wars.

The public backlash toward the European Union is particularly interesting (and is a topic Professor King was only able to briefly mention in lecture). Like many, Judt is a proponent of the European Union and discusses the benefits and successes of the EU. Nevertheless, Judt also points out the limitations of the European Union; these limitations are often disconcerting to European citizens. Judt writes: “Like ‘growth’ or ‘peace’ –with both of which it was closely associated in the minds of its proponents– ‘Europe’ was too benign to attract opposition” (733).

The vagueness of the EU, along with “the all-too-precise detail of EU legislative directives”, has given rise to the democratic deficit (as described in lecture). For this reason, Europeans have trouble caring about a union which is unclear in its identity, but at the same time heavily encroaches and influences daily life.

Of course, Judt counters this “public backlash”, pointing out the way in which laws may be collectively devised via the European Union, but then implemented by individual nation states; this is a rather unique aspect of the EU. In other words, the Union serves as a sort of compromise, and as Judt puts it, an “international governance undertaken by national governments”.

Secondly, the EU is limited in that it has no way of determining and enforcing security interests. The EU is not a state; it has no army. For this reason, many wonder how the European Union will intervene when member-states are threatened. Again, Judt refutes this common “backlash”. He points out that the EU has defended its member states against foreign threats, specifically, by protecting economic interests. To exemplify EU defense, Judt cites tax breaks for exporters, high tariffs and restrictions on European products.

Judt continues this argument: “But these limitations –the fact that in spite of its size and wealth the EU was not a state, much less a great power– paradoxically served to enhance its image, at home and abroad” (735). In other words, the EU is unique in that it isn’t as much a slew of institutions but instead a set of “European values” which is, and continues to be, a very powerful entity.

Reflection on Democracy and Politics in Tony Wright's "British Politics"

The British political system has been called democratic. In a way, it is. The majority party, as elected by the people, has a tremendous amount of power. At any given time, it can dictate legislation and point the country in any direction it chooses (within reason). Political power is centralized within the executive office, which is run by the Prime Minister, the leader of the popularly-elected majority party.

However, while the British system may be called democratic in that it occasionally allows its citizens to vote for “two and a half” parties, the parties and not the people run the political system. Their insularity and total control over the government and its political agenda make it difficult for democratic politics or societal plurality to play out. This definitely allows for expedient governance, but is this a good thing?

Bernard Crick in his work In Defense of Politics extols politics as the arena in which important societal issues of the day can be worked out through compromises and power struggles. Yet, how are these issues to be adequately raised if the political system does not accurately represent its society? The narrow party system and the extent to which the parties control the political process, from the candidates to the manifesto, severely restricts individual preference, thus preventing issues from coming to the table.

The British system has a very long and proud tradition. It has proven resilient in the face of adversity and capable of adapting to change. Globalization has altered the contemporary British landscape, both in terms of its demographics and the types of questions its citizens ask of their government. Perhaps it’s time again for the British system to adapt to its surroundings and become more democratic, representative, and accountable.